Probabilistic Arguments in Mathematics by Berry, DM
	   1	  
 
  
 
Probabilistic 
Arguments 
in Mathematics 
 
 
A Ph.D. Thesis by 
 
Don Berry 
 
 
 
 
University College London 
 
 
I, Don Berry, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. 
Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm 
that this has been indicated in the thesis. 
  
	   2	  
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis addresses a question that emerges naturally from some observations 
about contemporary mathematical practice. Firstly, mathematicians always 
demand proof for the acceptance of new results. Secondly, the ability of 
mathematicians to tell if a discourse gives expression to a proof is less than 
perfect, and the computers they use are subject to a variety of hardware and 
software failures. So false results are sometimes accepted, despite insistence on 
proof. Thirdly, over the past few decades, researchers have also developed a 
variety of methods that are probabilistic in nature. Even if carried out perfectly, 
these procedures only yield a conclusion that is very likely to be true.  
 
In some cases, these chances of error are precisely specifiable and can be made as 
small as desired. The likelihood of an error arising from the inherently uncertain 
nature of these probabilistic algorithms can therefore be made vanishingly small in 
comparison to the chances of an error arising when implementing an equivalent 
deductive algorithm. Moreover, the structure of probabilistic algorithms tends to 
minimise these Implementation Errors too. So overall, probabilistic methods are 
sometimes more reliable than deductive ones. This invites the question: ‘Are 
mathematicians rational in continuing to reject these probabilistic methods as a 
means of establishing mathematical claims?’  
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1. Proof and Practice in Mathematics 
 
 
This chapter is about a rule that characterises contemporary mathematical practice: 
that mathematicians require proof for the acceptance of mathematical claims. The 
opening four sections clarify what this entails. In the fifth section I will discuss 
four desirable features of mathematical practice that this insistence upon proof 
helps to secure. These are that mathematics has a literature that is both permanent 
and highly reliable; that there is consensus amongst mathematicians about which 
results have been definitively established; and that these researchers can in 
principle find intellectually autonomous reasons for their mathematical beliefs. 
Lastly, in the final section we see how mathematical practice has changed due to 
new developments and technologies in recent years.  
 
 
1.i. Proofs and Proof Presentations 
 
We begin with a rough characterisation of proof, which will suffice to fix a subject 
matter for discussion. A proof is a finite set of propositions with a particular kind 
of cumulative inferential structure. It must be possible to arrange the propositions 
into a sequence such that every proposition is either an axiom or else follows from 
one or more propositions appearing earlier in the sequence via some accepted 
mathematical rule of inference (apart from temporary assumptions that are 
discharged later in the sequence, as in reductio arguments). To use the language of 
graph theory, we can thus arrange the propositions into a finite, rooted, directed 
tree, where each proposition is represented by a vertex and edges represent 
implications. This is illustrated by the following diagram of the Cohen Structure 
Theorem: 
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It is clear that if we regard a proof as simply a finite sequence of propositions then 
some entire sections of argument can be reordered whilst keeping the cumulative 
inference nature of the argument intact. Yet intuitively we would in many cases 
still want to regard this as the same proof, despite us now having a different 
sequence of propositions. Again, this is also true if proofs are identified with 
directed graphs. However, this individuation need not concern us, and so we will 
move on to clarifying the other terms in the definition. 
 
The question ‘What is a proposition?’ is of course a difficult one to answer in 
itself. We can give at least a partial characterisation: a proposition is the content 
expressed by a declarative sentence, such as ‘There are infinitely many primes’. 
Propositions are bearers of truth or falsity and are abstract, non-linguistic entities 
that are the shared objects of propositional attitudes such as belief.1 
 
By ‘accepted mathematical inference’ we shall for now mean the collection of 
rules that mathematicians acknowledge as acceptable inferences and standardly 
make use of in the proofs they construct. The question of how this sociological 
description might be replaced with a more satisfying mathematical formulation 
will be discussed in Section 5.vi. We shall then see that these rules of inference are 
truth-preserving, so that it will be impossible for the conclusion to be false if the 
premisses are true. Knowing the existence of a proof, we are thereby provided 
with a special kind of a priori warrant for believing its conclusion. Once a proof 
has been found for a result it is known as a ‘theorem’ thereafter: a significant label 
that confers upon it the status of having been conclusively established. 
 
In this thesis, proofs thus characterised will be carefully distinguished from what I 
shall herein call ‘proof presentations’ (though mathematicians may use the term 
‘proof’ for this concept too). These are the written discourses actually published 
by mathematicians in journal articles, textbooks and lecture notes. Proof 
presentations give expression to proofs, and together with lectures are the chief 
means by which they are communicated. A number of metaphors come to mind 
for how this is achieved: perceptual, semiotic, cartographic. 
 
A good proof presentation enables any competent reader to know that a proof 
exists and thus can provide them with strong reasons for believing that its 
conclusion is a deductive consequence of the axioms or premisses employed. In 
order to achieve this, proof presentations must make the inferential relations of the 
propositions they express transparent. It is not enough that they do in fact stand in 
these relations if this is not clear to a reader. However, the sentences of a proof 
presentation need not be in one-to-one correspondence with the propositions of the 
proof it presents. Indeed, proof presentations generally contain gaps, and often 
make use of subsidiary results that are merely quoted. Where this is the case, we 
must look at both this proof presentation and at presentations of proofs of the cited 
results to know a full proof of the claim in its entirety.  
 
Proof presentations may comprise a mixture of natural language, mathematical 
notation and diagrams. The sentences employed can be declarative in character 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this context, we also extend the term ‘proposition’ to include what is expressed by a sentence 
containing one or more free variables, such as ‘let 𝐺 be a group’. 
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   !𝑛 − 1𝑘 !+ !𝑛 − 1𝑘 − 1! = (𝑛 − 1)!𝑘! (𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1)!+ (𝑛 − 1)!(𝑘 − 1)! (𝑛 − 𝑘)! 
 = (𝑛 − 𝑘)(𝑛 − 1)!𝑘! (𝑛 − 𝑘)! + 𝑘(𝑛 − 1)!𝑘! (𝑛 − 𝑘)! 
 = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)!𝑘(𝑛 − 𝑘)! = 𝑛!𝑘(𝑛 − 𝑘)! = !𝑛𝑘! 
 
(‘triangles ABC and DEF are similar’), but they may also be in the imperative 
mood (‘construct a tangent to the circle 𝛾 meeting the line segment 𝑋𝑌 at right-
angles’). Definitions may be idiosyncratic or delineate entirely new concepts (‘we 
say a group is Klein-free if it contains no subgroup isomorphic to ℤ!×ℤ!’). Proofs 
of theorems are often achieved by first securing auxiliary results or lemmas which 
are then drawn together to complete the argument. As mentioned, many of these 
lemmas are not proved explicitly but quoted from other sources, or are well-known 
enough that they can simply be stated (‘we now invoke the Bolzano-Weierstrass 
Theorem, showing the existence of a convergent subsequence 𝑥!(!)’). Corollaries 
or straightforward consequences of the main theorem are often deduced after it has 
been proved. Conjectures may be put forward with various degrees of assurance, 
and informal comments such as suggestions for further applications of derived 
techniques are often made – though both are sharply distinguished from the central 
mathematical content of the argument. 
 
In general, then, the claim that mathematicians require proof means that in order 
for a new result to become accepted (in a sense to be clarified below) a proof 
presentation must be supplied along with it. In the next section, we get more 
acquainted with both concepts by looking at some concrete examples of arguments 
that mathematicians would agree do constitute presentations of proofs.  
 
 
1.ii. Examples of Proof Presentations 
 
In what follows, the word ‘argument’ is used to mean either a proof itself or a 
written discourse that expresses or purports to express a proof. Individual proof 
presentations are demarcated using boxes. 
 
Theorem 1.2.  
    !! = !!!! + !!!!!!         for all 𝑛 ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 
 
The binomial coefficients !!   – read ‘n-choose-k’ – can be defined as the number 
of ways of choosing a 𝑘-sized subset from an 𝑛-set for 𝑛 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛. We 
may also define them using the formula !! = !!!! !!! !, which is easily shown to be 
extensionally equivalent.  Using the latter definition, we can easily prove Theorem 
1.2 as follows, using algebra. 
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Although this argument makes use of a number of properties of fractions that are 
not explicitly mentioned, it is clear that the result in question is unequivocally 
established, and that it adequately gives expression to a proof. The presentation of 
a different proof of the same result might run as follows, this time using the set-
theoretic definition: 
 
 
 
 
The conclusion has again been conclusively established, but this time the character 
of the proof is much different, and the reliance on natural language in the 
presentation is far more substantial than for the previous proof. We have also 
made use of a very different definition for !! , although one that is known to be 
extensionally equivalent. Thus the same relation between mathematical objects is 
established, even though reference to them is achieved in a different way.  
 
In the latter proof the reader is not merely following mechanical manipulations of 
symbols but are invited to use their imaginations to picture a collection of objects 
that are then manipulated in space and time. These kinds of combinatorial 
arguments are not foolproof; individual steps may be quite demanding to follow, 
and one needs to have developed certain skills in order to construct or check them. 
In this case, the combinatorial argument was also more explanatory: it enabled us 
to see why the two given expressions turn out to be equal. 
 
Sometimes a combinatorial argument may ask us to go even further in conducting 
a thought-experiment about a practical situation. We illustrate this by looking at a 
second theorem about binomial coefficients. 
 
 
Theorem 1.3.   
 𝑘 !! = 𝑛 !!!!!!    for all 𝑛 ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 
 
 
Consider all the 𝑘-subsets of a given 𝑛 set. Let 𝑥 denote one specific member of 
the 𝑛-set. We organise the 𝑘-subsets into two kinds according to whether or not 
they contain 𝑥. The number of 𝑘-subsets that do not contain 𝑥 is equal to !!!!! !, 
as we must select all 𝑘  elements from the remaining 𝑛 − 1  elements not 
identical with 𝑥. The number of 𝑘-subsets that do contain 𝑥 is equal to !!!!!!!!, 
because this time we need only choose another (𝑘 − 1) elements to adjoin to 
{x} to make a subset of size 𝑘. Hence, the total number of 𝑘-subsets of an 𝑛-set 
is !!!!! ! + !!!!!!!!, which proves the identity. 
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It will surely be conceded that once again we have found a proof, although it is 
hard to say exactly how we arrive at this decision. Is the language of the 
presentation precise enough? Have we paid enough attention to boundary cases, 
where mistakes often occur because steps are not valid for very small values? For 
instance, if 𝑘 = 0 the argument does not make sense, because 𝑥  cannot be a 
member of the 𝑘-subset. More generally, we must always ensure that any values 
the symbols can take do correspond to a possible instance of the combinatorial 
interpretation provided.  
 
It is also clear that the details of the particular model I have chosen to base this 
argument on are irrelevant to the logical structure of the argument itself. The 
choice of this practical scenario was merely for psychological convenience, and 
the faculty members individuals that the argument refers to could easily be 
replaced with mathematical objects if necessary. Nevertheless, I intend all of the 
arguments given so far to count as proof presentations as they stand. Let us now 
turn to a third example. 
 
Problem 1.4.    
 
Consider a knockout tournament with 2!  players, where 𝑛 ≥ 1. How many 
matches will be needed to determine the winner?  
 
 
One obvious approach is to proceed as follows: 
 
 
 
However, consider the following elegant argument: 
 
 
Consider a university faculty with 𝑛 members, 𝑛 ≥ 1. We count the number of 
ways of choosing a committee of 𝑘 members with one of these members 
appointed as a chairperson (1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛). We can either choose the whole 
committee first and then select one of its members to be the chair – which can 
be done in 𝑘!!!! ways – or we can first select the chairperson, and then choose 
the other (𝑘 − 1)  members of the committee from the remaining (𝑛 − 1) 
members of the faculty – which can be done in 𝑛!!!!!!!! ways. These two 
expressions must therefore be equal, which is precisely the result to be proved. 
 
There are 2!!! matches in the first round, and half as many in each subsequent 
round down to the final. Hence, the total number of matches is given by 
 2!!! + 2!!! +⋯+ 2 + 1 = !!!!!!! = 2! − 1.  
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This way of reaching the conclusion might seem to the uninitiated to be less 
satisfactory than the first because it is purely conceptual, and the argument 
involves no algebra. Yet it is arguably superior in every way. It doesn’t rely on a 
subsidiary result about the sum of a geometric series, nor an implicit invocation of 
the principle of mathematical induction. And clearly it can be generalised to other 
cases far more easily. This shows that a good proof presentation may be very 
different from how mathematics sometimes appears in the popular imagination, 
i.e. numerical or symbolic calculation, or the rigid application of formal rules. 
 
Theorem 1.5.  (Fermat’s Little Theorem2) 
 
Let 𝑝 be prime and 𝑎 ∈ ℤ!. Then 𝑎! ≡ 𝑎  mod  𝑝 
 
 
Consider the following argument, taken verbatim from Arthur Engel’s excellent 
problem-solving manual.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some details have been skipped over here. For instance, it is not entirely trivial 
that a cyclic permutation of a polychromatic string of length 𝑝 always yields a 
different string, and is only true when 𝑝 is prime. The argument also makes less 
sense for the case 𝑎 = 1, as then there will be no polychromatic strings.  
 
These small omissions are easily fixed; however, there is a deeper reason why the 
argument as it stands will still be unsatisfactory, and hence not a proof 
presentation at all. Although the guiding intuition is correct, there is a fundamental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Not to be confused with Fermat’s Last Theorem, the proof of which this footnote is sadly too 
narrow to contain. 
3 Arthur Engel, Problem-Solving Strategies (New York: Springer, 1998), 120.  
 
We have pearls with 𝑎 colors. From these we make necklaces with exactly 𝑝 
pearls. First, we make a string of pearls. There are 𝑎! different strings. If we 
throw away the 𝑎 one-colored strings 𝑎! − 𝑎 strings will remain. We connect 
the ends of each string to get necklaces. We find that two strings that differ only 
by a cyclic permutation of its pearls result in indistinguishable necklaces. But 
there are 𝑝  cyclic permutations of 𝑝 pearls on a string. Hence the number of 
distinct necklaces is (𝑎! − 𝑎)/𝑝. Because of its interpretation this is an integer. 
So 
 𝑝|𝑎! − 𝑎 
 
 
Each player other than the winner must lose exactly once, and exactly one such 
loss occurs every match. So the number of matches is 2! − 1. 
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issue with the combinatorial interpretation that structures it. It is true that two 
strings differing only by a cyclic permutation lead to identical necklaces. But 
necklaces are also three-dimensional objects that can be picked up and ‘turned 
over’. So strings that are reflections (i.e. strings produced by reversing the order of 
the pearls) of each other lead to identical necklaces too. Hence the group action on 
the strings of pearls is dihedral rather than cyclic as asserted.4 The actual number 
of distinct necklaces in this case is given by Burnside’s Counting Theorem.5 
Again, it clearly requires some skill to avoid such mistakes: Engel himself is a 
renowned writer of problem-solving manuals.  
 
The argument is again easily fixed by replacing the pearls with less symmetrical 
objects; alternatively, we can give something like the following argument, which 
is in essence similar but far more formal and elaborate. It is also more self-
contained: it does not make use of the term ‘cyclic permutation’ and an unproven 
claim about it, although it does make use of some substantive results such as the 
division algorithm. This time we argue for a slightly more general version of the 
theorem than might be yielded by an argument similar to that given above, as now 𝑎  need not be positive but can take any integer value. 
 
 
 
Let 𝑝 be prime. The theorem is trivial if 𝑎 = 0 or 1. Let 𝑎 be an integer ≥ 2. 
Consider the set of finite sequences of length 𝑝 whose elements come from the 
set {1,2,… ,𝑎}. When constructing a sequence, we must make an 𝑎-wise choice 
for each element, so there are 𝑎!  such sequences in total.  
 
There are 𝑎  sequences consisting of the same repeated number, i.e. (1,1,1,… ,1), (2,2,2,… ,2),… , (𝑎,𝑎,𝑎,… ,𝑎). Consider 𝑆, the set of such 𝑝-tuples 
that use more than one element from {1,2, . . ,𝑎}. Then 𝑆 has 𝑎!  –   𝑎 elements.  
 
We now proceed to set up an equivalence relation on the members of 𝑆 that will 
partition 𝑆  into equivalence classes, each of size 𝑝 . There are therefore (𝑎! − 𝑎)/𝑝 classes, which proves the theorem for 𝑎 ≥ 2, as this number must be 
an integer. 
Define a function 𝑓 from 𝑆 onto itself as follows: 
 
 𝑓 ∶ S → S 
 
 𝑓  ((𝑎!,𝑎!,𝑎!,… ,𝑎!))   =    (𝑎!,𝑎!,𝑎!,… ,𝑎!!!).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See also: Carl Pomerance and Richard Crandal, Prime Numbers: A Computational Perspective 
(New York: Springer, 2001), 150. The authors give the same argument, mentioning ‘visual 
highlights’. The argument apparently originates with Solomon Golomb, who does not commit this 
error and discusses the possibility of flipping the necklaces over. See Solomon Golomb, “A 
Combinatorial Proof of Fermat’s Little Theorem”, The American Mathematical Monthly 63 (1956).  
5 Golomb now gives the different answer of !!!!!! , apparently ignoring the possibility that a string 
might be its own inverse. Golomb, “A Combinatorial Proof of Fermat’s Little Theorem”. 
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The function takes a sequence and shifts each element along a place. We note 
that 𝑓  is a bijection, as it is easy to find the preimage of any member of 𝑆 
explicitly, and also straightforward to show that 𝑓 is injective. Hence, there is an 
inverse function 𝑓!!.   
 
We define 𝑓! and 𝑓!! as the composition of the function 𝑛 times and its inverse 𝑛 times, respectively. We also define 𝑓! as the identity function on 𝑆. If 𝑠 is any 
member of 𝑆, then 𝑓! 𝑠 = 𝑠, so 𝑓!"!! 𝑠 = 𝑓! 𝑠  for any integers 𝑏 and 𝑑.  
 
We claim that for each sequence 𝑠 in 𝑆, the sequences 𝑓! 𝑠 ,  𝑓! 𝑠 ,… , 𝑓!!! 𝑠  
are distinct. Suppose not. Then we have distinct integers 𝑖, 𝑗  satisfying 0 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 𝑝 − 1 such that 𝑓! 𝑠 = 𝑓!(𝑠). Without loss of generality, suppose 𝑖 < 𝑗. Then 𝑓!!! 𝑠 = 𝑓!!! 𝑠 = 𝑓! 𝑠 = 𝑠.  
 
Now let 𝑑 be the smallest positive integer such that 𝑓! 𝑠 = 𝑠. Clearly 𝑑 < 𝑝, 
as (𝑗  –   𝑖)  has this property. Using the division algorithm, we can write 𝑝 = 𝑘𝑑 + 𝑏 for some positive integer 𝑘 and some integer 𝑏 with 0 ≤ 𝑏 < 𝑑.  
 
Next we show that 𝑏 ≠ 0. Suppose not; then 𝑝 = 𝑘𝑑, and either 𝑘  or 𝑑 would 
have to be equal to 1, as 𝑝 is prime. But this cannot be the case: d cannot be 1, as 
then 𝑠 would be of the form (𝑥, 𝑥, 𝑥,… , 𝑥), and 𝑘 cannot be 1, as 𝑑 < 𝑝. So 𝑏 ≠ 0 and hence 0 < 𝑏 < 𝑑.  
 
However, now we have that 𝑓! 𝑠 = 𝑓!!!" 𝑠 = 𝑓!(𝑓!!" 𝑠 ) = 𝑠, 
contradicting the definition of 𝑑 as minimal. So 𝑓! 𝑠 , 𝑓! 𝑠 ,… , 𝑓!!!(𝑠) are 
indeed distinct, as claimed. 
 
Now let [𝑠] denote the set {𝑓! 𝑠 ,  𝑓! 𝑠 ,… , 𝑓!!! 𝑠 }  and define a relation 𝑅 on 𝑆 by 𝑟𝑅𝑠 being true just when 𝑟 is a member of [𝑠]. We prove that 𝑅 is an 
equivalence relation and thus partitions 𝑆 into equivalence classes of size 𝑝, as 
we have seen that there are 𝑝 members of [s] for any 𝑠 in 𝑆.  
 
Firstly, we always have 𝑠𝑅𝑠, as 𝑓!(𝑠) = 𝑠 by definition, so 𝑅 is reflexive. 
 
Secondly, 𝑟𝑅𝑠 implies that 𝑠𝑅𝑟. Assume 𝑟 and 𝑠 are distinct; then if 𝑟 = 𝑓!(𝑠) 
for some 1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑝 − 1  then 𝑠   =   𝑓!!!(𝑟)  with 1   ≤   𝑝 − 𝑛   ≤   𝑝 − 1 . The 
case where 𝑟 = 𝑠 has already been proved above. So 𝑅 is also symmetric. 
 
Lastly, we prove that 𝑅  is transitive. Suppose 𝑟𝑅𝑠  and 𝑠𝑅𝑡 . Then there are 
integers 𝑚  and 𝑛  such that 0 ≤ 𝑚,𝑛 ≤ 𝑝 − 1  and 𝑟 = 𝑓  !(𝑠)  and 𝑠 = 𝑓!(𝑡) . 
Let (𝑛 +𝑚)   =   𝑘𝑝 + 𝑑 where 𝑘 is either 0 or 1 and 𝑑 is a non-negative integer 
less than 𝑝. Then 𝑟 = 𝑓!(𝑡), so that 𝑟𝑅𝑡.  
 
So 𝑅  is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and is indeed an equivalence 
relation; therefore 𝑎! ≡ 𝑎  mod  𝑝 whenever 𝑎 ≥ 0 and 𝑝 is prime. 
 
Now fix 𝑎 < 0 and set 𝑏   =   −𝑎 > 0. Let p be a prime other than 2. Then p is 
odd, and so 𝑎! ≡ −𝑏 ! ≡ −𝑏! ≡ −𝑏 ≡ 𝑎  mod  𝑝 . Lastly, we have that 
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      𝑥! − 𝑥 = 0   ⟹ 𝑥! = 𝑥 ⟹ 𝑥! = 1 ⟹ 𝑥 = ±1 
 
𝑎! − 𝑎 = 𝑎 𝑎 − 1 , which is necessarily a multiple of 2, as either 𝑎 or (𝑎 − 1) 
must be even. So 𝑎! ≡ 𝑎  mod  𝑝 for all primes 𝑝 and integers 𝑎.  
 
 
 
This argument is undoubtedly satisfactory from an epistemic perspective, although 
perhaps too much detail has been given and a more economical presentation 
relying on previously established results (such as the Orbit-Stabiliser Theorem or 
Lagrange’s Theorem) would have been preferable. Lastly, consider one final 
argument, which falls short of counting as a proof presentation. 
 
 
Problem 1.6.  
 
Solve the equation 𝑥! − 𝑥 = 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obviously, this fails to be an adequate presentation of the claim that the stated 
solutions are exhaustive because the derivation of the third line assumes that 𝑥 ≠0. But 𝑥 = 0 is in fact a solution to the equation, and so the given answer is 
incomplete. Note however that the argument would not be acceptable even if by 
dint of good luck this kind of carelessness had not prevented us from arriving at 
the correct conclusion.  Even if the propositions making up the proof were all true, 
they would not be clearly arranged into a suitable inferential structure. 
 
The examples considered in this section illustrate how proofs can be presented in 
different formats that make use of diverse kinds of reasoning: algebraic, 
combinatorial, conceptual. We can also distinguish between proof presentations 
which leave gaps that a reader can reasonably be expected to fill in by themselves, 
and arguments which fail to be proof presentations because they contain or rely 
upon a claim which is in fact false. This was true of Engle’s argument, even 
though it can easily be fixed. In some cases, however, repairing the argument may 
not be possible: it may be that there is no proof available that the proof 
presentation-like discourse comes close to expressing. We may compare this to 
hallucinations that seem subjectively like veridical perceptual experiences but 
have no genuine objects. The last example also illustrates how a proof presentation 
must also cover all cases relevant to the conditions given in the theorem. This 
includes borderline and unusual cases, which often require individual attention. 
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1.iii. Acceptance and Publication Requirements 
 
In the previous section, we saw some examples of discourses that mathematicians 
would agree count as proof presentations. Where such agreement is present 
mathematicians are rationally obliged to come to believe the corresponding 
conclusion, because the inferential structure of a proofs is always truth preserving. 
In this section, I will argue that, in a sense of ‘accept’ to be explained presently, 
mathematicians will only come to accept mathematical results if a proof 
presentation regarded as adequate has first been given. In the thesis, I make use of 
two distinct understandings of the term ‘acceptance’.6 
 
 
Private Acceptance 
 
This term indicates personal belief on behalf of individual mathematicians, 
whether or not this belief is announced publicly. 
 
Public Acceptance 
 
This term indicates that a result is an established theorem that is now eligible 
for unqualified assertion in peer-reviewed journals and other serious 
mathematical publications such as textbooks, monographs, and edited 
collections. 
 
 
In making the claim that mathematicians require proofs for the acceptance of 
results, I only intend this to be taken in the sense of Public Acceptance. 
Understood in terms of Private Acceptance, it would in fact be false. In the next 
chapter (Section 2.v) I will give a discussion of the famous Goldbach Conjecture: 
the claim that every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two 
(not necessarily distinct) primes. As we shall see, many mathematicians believe 
this conjecture on the basis of the vast amount of inductive evidence in its favour, 
even though a proof has not yet been found. Hence, mathematicians do sometimes 
Privately Accept results in the absence of proof. 
 
Let us now consider the concept of Public Acceptance in more detail. If a claim is 
Publicly Accepted then it becomes regarded as suitable for unqualified assertion in 
peer-reviewed journals of mathematics and other serious academic publications – 
for example, as an auxiliary result for proving another theorem.7 The fact that a 
claim is asserted in a specifically unqualified way means that – if the result is a 
significant one – it is likely to be circulated and reasserted again in print with the 
same lack of qualification. It will perhaps also find its way into textbooks and 
eventually be taught to large numbers of students. As confidence in the result 
increases, it is inducted into the body of established mathematics, and regarded as 
secure and certain knowledge. The conclusions of subsequent papers whose 
arguments rely the asserted result are also seen as true simpliciter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As with other such phrases that will be introduced later, I will capitalise the labels I give these and 
their cognates throughout the thesis, to indicate that a special, semi-technical sense is intended. 
7 We focus on the journal article herein, as this is now the primary vehicle for new mathematical 
research. 
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The claim being made, then, is that in order to unqualifiedly assert a mathematical 
proposition in an article published in a mathematical journal such as Annals of 
Mathematics, Journal of the American Mathematical Society, and Acta 
Mathematica, an adequate proof presentation must have been given somewhere in 
the literature (in the same paper if it is a new result). Claims for which this is not 
true must be clearly demarcated as a conjecture or informal comment or 
prediction, and thus not part of the central mathematical progression of the article. 
 
This claim about mathematical practice is partly institutional; concerning the 
standards maintained by the current major academic journals through which new 
mathematical research is disseminated. Yet it has also long been reflective of the 
feelings of mathematicians themselves. Euler writes, ‘we should take great care 
not to accept as true such properties of the numbers which we have discovered by 
observation and which are supported by induction alone’,8 and Frege after him that 
‘in mathematics a mere moral conviction, supported by a mass of successful 
applications, is not good enough.’9 More recently, Michael De Villiers writes that 
‘Nobody, today, can really be considered mathematically educated or literate, if he 
or she is not aware of the insufficiency of quasi-empirical evidence to guarantee 
truth in mathematics, no matter how convincing that evidence may seem.’10 
Indeed, journals referees and research mathematicians may on occasion be the 
same groups of people. 
 
Before moving on, a minor development in how mathematical research is 
communicated should be mentioned. Consider the academic journal Experimental 
Mathematics, founded in 1992 by David Epstein, Silvio Levy and Klaus Peters. 
This journal caused controversy when it was founded because it allows researchers 
to publish results for which proofs have not yet been found, on the basis of non-
deductive arguments alone. However, in the current publication guidelines given 
on the journal’s website, the founders explain that they do value proof. In fact, the 
early publication of as yet unproved results is partly intended to facilitate the 
process of finding proofs, because other researchers, who may be better 
positioned, can join in the search.11 Moreover, the unproved results published by 
the journal are not intended to be regarded as theorems. So the founding of this 
journal and similar developments since then present no problems with the claims 
made earlier about the necessity of proof for the Public Acceptance of new 
mathematical results.  
 
 
1.iv. Acceptability Conditions for Journal Articles 
 
I have claimed that mathematicians require proof for the Public Acceptance of 
mathematical claims, though we have not yet given clear criteria for when a given 
body of discourse is to count as a proof presentation. Indeed, we have already seen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Quoted in George Pólya, Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Volume I (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1954), 3. 
9 Gottlob Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. John Austin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980 ) 1. 
10 Michael De Villiers, “The Role and Function of Quasi-Empirical Methods in Mathematics”, 
Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education 4 (2004): 412 
11  “Statement of Philosophy and Publishing Criteria”, accessed June 22nd, 2015, 
http://www.emis.de/journals/EM/expmath/philosophy.html 
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that the range of devices mathematicians may employ in their proof presentations 
is highly varied. So it is difficult to give a precise characterisation of what proof 
presentations are that can be applied operationally to particular cases. However, in 
order to explicate our claim about mathematical practice further it will not be 
necessary to do so. Rather than asking the metaphysical question ‘When is a piece 
of discourse a proof presentation?’, for our philosophical purposes we need only 
consider the more modest question ‘When is a discourse offered as a proof 
presentation regarded as acceptable for publication in a peer-reviewed journal?’. 
This suffices to characterise fully the aspect of practice central to the primary 
question that this thesis will address. 
 
The question of when a piece of discourse is acceptable for journal publication is 
still a complex one, and any adequate answer will have both descriptive and 
normative dimensions. For an article to be accepted for publication, a reviewer 
must judge the article to be capable of convincing any competent reader that a 
proof exists by means of reasoning explicitly given in the article itself, together 
with references made to other publications (‘competence’ here includes awareness 
of results regarded as so widely known within this area of mathematics to not 
require separate justification or referencing). This is only a minimal constraint, 
however, and will need to be supplemented with other criteria. 
 
Let us consider things from the perspective of the researcher. As with any 
academic discipline, the process of learning how to write a journal article 
generally relies on familiarity with a number of paradigm examples of what a good 
article looks like, together with experience gleaned from receiving several rounds 
of feedback on initial attempts. Of course, by the time a young researcher is in the 
position to submit articles to this kind of publication they will have constructed a 
great number of proof presentations in other increasingly advanced mathematical 
contexts throughout the course of their academic careers: geometry homework at 
secondary school, A level examination questions in algebra, proof questions in 
example sheets on an undergraduate degree, or qualifying exams after their first 
year of graduate study. We consider how the relevant standards are determined 
across these different contexts, with journal articles regarded as a special case. I 
will discuss four dimensions of variation: level of rigour, level of formality, gaps 
left unfilled, and subsidiary results relied upon. 
 
The concept of rigour will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5, but we give a 
brief account here as well. Rigour is largely a matter of three things: making use of 
a precise (if implicit) understanding of how the mathematical objects, properties 
and operations involved in the proof presentation are being defined; ensuring that 
any assertions made about them are categorically true and do stand in the intended 
place in the logical structure of the argument; and paying attention to all possible 
cases – even if they seem unimportant, unusual, or of little interest. Intuitively, if 
we imagine the written argument as a map of (perhaps only part of) the underlying 
proof, it is rigorous if it represents every piece of the terrain and does so with a 
high degree of accuracy. Hence, rigour is a question of how adequately a proof is 
expressed in our written communication.  
 
Generally speaking, the level of rigour required from a student in their written 
mathematics will increase throughout their education until a high point rigour is 
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reached, perhaps during a first course in analysis. Here expressions such as lim!→! 𝑥! = 2  first receive clear definition and, for example, results are 
established for all functions whatever rather than merely those that behave as we 
would intuitively expect (see Section 5.v). We should distinguish these purely 
educational contexts, where the individual checking the proof already knows the 
answer is true and stringent standards of rigour are required largely for the 
edification of the student, from those front-line research contexts where the result 
may be entirely new, or a conjecture that is not yet Publicly Accepted.  
 
A less rigorous proof presentation may suffice to convince a reviewer that a new 
result is true: for example, it may leave out a case that she can deal with herself. 
But if a reviewer is to approve only arguments that will be found convincing by 
the entire readership of the journal, and facilitate the Public Acceptance of a result, 
she must insist upon the core structure of each argument being presented in an 
incontrovertible and fully rigorous manner. Consider the following passage, taken 
from an A level textbook: 
 
‘For an increasing function in the interval (𝑎, 𝑏), if 𝑥! and 𝑥! are two values 
of 𝑥 in the interval 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏 and if 𝑥! < 𝑥! then 𝑓 𝑥! < 𝑓(𝑥!). 
 
It follows that 𝑓′ 𝑥 > 0 in the interval 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏.’12 
 
 
There is a notational confusion between open and closed intervals here, and in any 
case the property defined – usually known as ‘strictly increasing’, rather than 
‘increasing’ simpliciter – only guarantees the derivative is non-negative 
throughout the interval. 𝑓(𝑥)   =   𝑥!  is a simple counterexample to the claim as 
stated. As mathematics is a subject that lends itself to very precise expression, one 
feels that this sloppiness is a shame even here. But within a research context this 
would certainly not be acceptable in the statement of a result. In pure analysis, a 
mathematician would also be careful to explicitly restrict the scope of the theorem 
to functions that are differentiable throughout the interval before the statement of 
the main result was given. 
 
Even in published journal articles a lack of rigour may occur in some of the 
details, however. Papers are often published where notation is abused, such as 
using x as both a dummy variable of integration and a fixed integral limit. Symbols 
such as ‘𝑑𝑥 ’ or ‘1/∞ ’ are employed despite being given no coherent or 
unambiguous interpretation. And researchers may miss out cases that are seen as 
physically impossible or merely unimportant, especially within applied 
mathematics. These inaccuracies are generally considered undesirable, although 
the occurrence of one or two such lapses may not threaten the acceptability of an 
entire article, assuming they are easily corrected and do not undermine the 
integrity of the central line of argument. 
 
Formality is related to rigour but not to be identified with it, for it is often more a 
matter of expositional style. In a formal proof presentation, the precision with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Keith Pledger and Dave Wilkins, Edexcel AS and A Level Modular Mathematics, C2 
(Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2008), 142. 
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which the mathematical objects are identified in rigorous proof presentations is 
extended more widely across the vocabulary of the whole discourse. This includes 
the parts that have only an explanatory purpose. Compare the two arguments given 
for Theorem 1.2; the combinatorial proof presentation is less formal because it is 
written in natural language, using terms such as ‘consider’, ‘select’ and ‘choose’ 
which describe intentional human actions that are not inherently mathematical in 
nature. The first proof presentation uses only algebra and so is more formal. Yet 
both arguments are fully rigorous; likewise the proof of Theorem 1.3 and the 
second solution to Problem 1.4, which are given even less formal expositions. 
Complete formality would be achieved by writing in a fully regimented style 
according to strict grammatical rules stipulated recursively, similar to a derivation 
in a formal system, in the sense of mathematical logic (see Section 5.vi).  
 
We should be wary of assuming that in more sophisticated contexts a higher level 
of formality is always required. Indeed, the example of the two proofs of Theorem 
1.2 show that sometimes a less formal proof with more explanatory value is 
preferable. Generally speaking, a high level of formality is not a necessity 
prerequisite for journal articles. The following opening paragraph from a journal 
article – written in informal, interrogative language – is fairly typical: 
 
   ‘Fix positive integers 𝑚, 𝑛 and let 𝑓 be a real-valued function defined on 
an (arbitrary) given subset 𝐸 ⊂ ℝ!. How can we tell whether 𝑓  extends to a 𝐶! function 𝐹 on the whole ℝ!? If such an 𝐹 exists, then how small can we 
take its 𝐶!-norm? What can we say about the derivatives 𝜕!𝐹(𝑥) at a given 
point x? Can we take 𝐹 to depend linearly on 𝑓? 
   Suppose 𝐸  is finite. Can we compute an extension 𝐹 whose 𝐶!-norm has 
the least possible order of magnitude? How many computer operations does 
it take?’13 
 
Gaps in proof presentations occur either when a proposition that constitutes part of 
the corresponding proof fails to receive individual expression within the discourse 
itself, or when explanation is left out for steps in the argument that require it.  Let 
us consider the former kind of gap first. We have said that for a journal article all 
cases should be taken into account, and clearly the individual lemmas that form 
the high points of the proof – that is, the conclusions pertaining to discrete 
segments of its structure, in the sense of the Cohen Structure Theorem pictured in 
Diagram 1.1 – should certainly be clearly stated. But on the way to establishing 
these auxiliary claims, not all the steps along the way need receive explicit 
expression. (This selectivity in attention does not indicate a decline in rigour, such 
as leaving a gap in a crucial place that left a whole range of cases unexplored.) For 
instance, the following would certainly be an acceptable gap in a journal article. 
 
   7𝜆 + 6𝜇 =   186       17𝜆 − 7𝜇 =   85 
       ⇒     𝜆 = 12,        𝜇 = 17 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Charles L. Fefferman, Arie Israel, and Garving K. Luli, “Sobolev Extension by Linear 
Operators” Journal of the American Mathematical Society 27 (2014): 69-70  
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In a piece of homework to be completed by a secondary school student, however, 
this ‘gap’ may contain the whole of the question to be answered, and so this would 
not be acceptable (‘Show your working!’). 
 
Generally speaking, the extent to which explanatory gaps in the argument are 
acceptable increases with the mathematical sophistication of the readership, as 
they can fill more and more of the steps themselves. In fact, checking proof 
presentations is often a matter of having a general intuitive ‘feel’ for where the 
weak spots in an argument might be. These are then focused in on, and more 
standard parts may be more or less ignored. The mathematician William Thurston 
writes, ‘I might look over several paragraphs or strings of equations and think to 
myself “Oh yeah, they're putting in enough rigmarole to carry such-and-such 
idea.”’ The existence of gaps is not problematic if the broader underlying logic of 
the argument is transparent: ‘When the idea is clear, the formal setup is usually 
unnecessary and redundant – I often feel that I could write it out myself more 
easily than figuring out what the authors actually wrote.’14 
 
Returning briefly to educational contexts; practicing writing in a way that gives 
explicit expression to every part of a proof is for obvious reasons a good idea if 
one is a novice at constructing rigorous arguments. So as noted, it is often a 
requirement for the first few example sheets in an introductory undergraduate 
analysis course, or a first course in axiomatic set theory. However, as the courses 
progress this insistence will typically be relaxed so as not to become tedious, with 
the implicit modal condition that the student could now fill in all the gaps in the 
arguments if necessary.  
 
The fourth dimension of variability has already been discussed above: proof 
presentations will generally rely on many subsidiary results that are only 
mentioned and not proved explicitly. So usually only part of the entire proof of the 
theorem is required. In the context of a time-limited examination, when faced with 
a question such as ‘Prove the Intermediate Value Theorem’, students must often 
make a judicious guess as to how much they are supposed to derive from first 
principles and which subsidiary results they may simply quote. In a research 
context, however, mathematicians may rely on any result that has gained Public 
Acceptance. In the most common format, citations are indexed numerically with 
reference to a bibliography included at the end. The following passage from the 
same paper mathematical quoted above, which states results without including 
proofs, may be taken as typical: 
 
   ‘Let us compare our present results to what we know about 𝐶!(ℝ! ). 
Switching over to 𝕏 = 𝐶!(ℝ!), we recall the following results [10, 12, 14]. 
 
Theorem 4. For any 𝐸 ⊂ ℝ!, there exists a linear map 𝑇 ∶   𝕏(𝐸) → 𝕏 such 
that 𝑇𝑓 = 𝑓 on 𝐸 and 𝑇𝑓 𝕏   ≤   𝐶 𝑇𝑓 𝕏(!)  for all 𝑓 ∈ 𝕏(𝐸). 
   Moreover, if 𝐸 is finite, then T has bounded depth. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 William Thurston, “On Proof And Progress In Mathematics”, For the Learning of Mathematics 
15 (1995): 32 
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Theorem 5. Let  𝐸 ⊂ ℝ! be finite, and let 𝑁 = #(𝐸). 
   Then there exists subsets 𝑆!,… , 𝑆! ⊂ 𝐸, with 𝐾 ≤ 𝐶𝑁 and with   #(𝑆!) ≤ 𝐶 
for each 𝑘 such that    𝑓 𝕏(!)   ≤   𝐶 ⋅ max!!!!!    (𝑓|!!) 𝕏(!!) for all 𝑓 ∈ 𝕏(𝐸). 
 
Corollary 1. Let  𝐸 ⊂ ℝ! be finite, and let 𝑁 = #(𝐸). Then there exist linear 
functionals 𝜉!,… , 𝜉! ∶   𝕏(𝐸) → ℝ  such that 𝐿 ≤ 𝐶𝑁 , each 𝜉ℓ𝓁  has bounded 
depth, and 𝑐 ⋅ max!!ℓ𝓁!! 𝜉ℓ𝓁 𝑓   ≤    𝑓 𝕏 !   ≤   𝐶 ⋅ max!!ℓ𝓁!! 𝜉ℓ𝓁 𝑓  for all 𝑓 ∈ 𝕏(𝐸).’15 
 
 
There are, of course, other restrictions on acceptability that have not been 
mentioned so far. Practical concerns may be in play: many academic journals have 
word limits for the articles they publish, for example. Journals will have stylistic 
guidelines that might extend to things like formatting. Certain ‘styles of proof’ are 
usual and expected for particular areas of mathematics such as group theory, or in 
analysis where the symbols 𝜀 and 𝛿 have an established usage. Insistence on the 
observation of these conventions enables arguments to be processed faster by the 
journal’s readership. For more competitive journals, the conclusion itself will 
probably have to be interesting too.  
 
In closing, we consider one other issue raised in the literature. David Tall 
distinguishes between three classes of arguments: those which are capable of 
convincing oneself, those which can be used to convince a friend, and those which 
can be used to convince an enemy.16 We can expect some mathematicians to have 
a cautious professional scepticism towards the work of their peers. Yet it is also 
important to note that regarding someone as a professional colleague is again 
different from seeing him or her as an enemy. For example, if a gap in the 
argument occurs then they are unlikely to stubbornly insist that they do not know 
how to traverse it in cases where they could do so easily. And we can expect them 
to charitably invest a fair bit of time trying to understand those sections of a proof 
presentation where they suspect errors might have occurred.  
 
 
1.v. Permanence, Reliability, Consensus and Autonomy 
 
In this section, I will outline four core features that characterise contemporary 
mathematical practice. I will argue that these features are highly desirable, in that 
the working life of mathematicians would be much impoverished without them, 
and the progress of their enquiries would also be impaired. I will therefore refer to 
them as the ‘Practical Virtues’ of contemporary mathematical enquiry. In each 
case I will further argue for a second claim: that the rule of insistence on proof 
before publication is in an important way responsible for their ongoing 
maintenance. Taken together, these two claims show that mathematicians do have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Charles L. Fefferman, Arie Israel, and Garving K. Luli, “Sobolev Extension by Linear 
Operators” Journal of the American Mathematical Society 27 (2014): 72. 
16 David Tall, “The Nature of Mathematical Proof”, Mathematics Teaching 127 (1989): 30. 
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strong (though perhaps not sufficient) reasons for insisting upon proof for the 
Public Acceptance of results. The four Practical Virtues are as follows: 
 
 
Permanence 
 
When a statement becomes Publicly Accepted, it retains this status indefinitely. 
 
Reliability 
 
Publicly Accepted mathematical statements are always true. 
 
Consensus 
 
There is a shared agreement as to which statements are Publicly Accepted. 
 
Autonomy 
 
Competent mathematical researchers can always come to know Publicly 
Accepted results in an intellectually independent way, and mathematicians are 
never permitted to publish results on the basis of trust or authority alone.  
 
 
Firstly, we discuss Permanence. In all of the natural sciences – even the most 
established of the physical sciences – the status of any hypothesis is always to 
some extent provisional. Researchers must always be open to the possibility that 
their most fundamental results will have to be revised in the light of new evidence. 
Historical examples abound: perhaps the most celebrated is Einstein’s discovery of 
the merely approximate and local character of Newtonian mechanics, the most 
outstanding scientific achievement of its age, and long revered as a paradigmatic 
instance of the certainty that scientific work could aspire to. Some current 
scientific theories, such the central causal role of natural selection driving 
evolutionary change in biology, may seem so secure that the chances of their 
displacement are negligible. Yet we can always imagine future discoveries or 
experiments that might lead to this occurring. 
 
The status of an established mathematical result, on the other hand, is not like this: 
results that have become Publicly Accepted are expected to remain part of 
mathematics on a permanent basis. Moreover, this expectation is not mere hubris, 
but is grounded in strong historical precedent. The theorems of Eudoxus and 
Archimedes are still our theorems, though the justifications for them may be quite 
different, and ‘In most sciences one generation tears down what another has built, 
and what one has established, another undoes. In mathematics alone each 
generation adds a new storey to the old structure.’17 
 
It seems plausible to think that this Permanence of Publicly Accepted mathematics 
might be a direct consequence of the second attribute: Reliability. That is, in 
actuality Publicly Accepted claims are rarely overturned simply because such 
results are rarely false: that established mathematics is, by and large, all true. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Herman Hankel, Die Entwicklung der Mathematik im letzten Jahrhundert, 1884. Quoted in 
Lokenath Debnath, Dambaru Bhatta, Integral Transforms and Their Applications (London: 
Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2006), 315. 
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Taken together, Reliability and Permanence thus present an attractive picture of 
mathematical practice: only true results are Publically Accepted, and so over time 
only true – and hence incontrovertible – results are added to the structure.  
 
We should, however, be careful about being so quick in inferring a high degree of 
Reliability from a high degree of Permanence. Although mathematical results that 
have been Publicly Accepted for a substantial period of time are almost never 
overturned, errors are actually quite often found in early drafts of arguments given 
by mathematicians, as well as in the years immediately following their publication. 
A number of examples are given in Section 4.iv. It is true that after surviving for a 
substantial period of time results are unlikely to later be found in error. Yet 
perhaps this is merely because such errors as might now remain must be unlikely 
to be revealed by the checking process, or even because interest in checking them 
simply subsides. 
 
For mathematics that has been widely circulated, internalised and reconstituted, 
however, this suggestion gives expression only to a rather extreme form of 
scepticism. It is unreasonable to claim that there might still be errors in every 
single discourse purporting to present what we surely all believe is a genuine proof 
of Euclid showing that there are an infinity of primes. Too many thinkers have 
internalised the proof and come up with their own novel presentations. This is not 
mere rote checking, but deep and intuitive understanding. This also illustrates 
another topic of Chapter 4: how reliability is often only attained through a kind of 
social process. 
 
So much for mathematics that has been sufficiently checked. However, another 
issue is that out of the huge number of new papers that are published each year,18 a 
large proportion are not read by anyone other than the reviewer. Hence these 
results may not have been checked sufficiently thoroughly, and some of them may 
be untrue. If this is the case, large portions of the literature may not attain the high 
standards of Reliability characteristic of better-known mathematics.  
 
To counter this suggestion, we need to say more about what is required for a piece 
of mathematics to count as Publicly Accepted. For although supplying a proof 
presentation that passes through the peer-review process is a necessary condition 
for Public Acceptance, it is not a sufficient one. Published results may enjoy 
varying degrees of centrality to mathematical research, and if a piece of 
mathematics meets with neglect and is relegated to obscurity, it would then no 
longer count as Publicly Accepted. On the other hand, if a result is included into 
the established body of widely circulated mathematics it will then be scrutinised 
more thoroughly. We may thus be confident that the central body of literature 
mathematicians rely on in producing new research is indeed highly Reliable.  
 
Having given an overview of the Permanence and Reliability of mathematics, we 
now discuss the extent to which these two features are a consequence of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In the 1970’s, Stanislaw Ulam estimated that around 100,000 theorems were proved each year, a 
figure later refined to nearer 200,000. See Stanislaw Ulam, Adventures of a Mathematician 
(Oakland: University of California Press, 1992), 288. This number would likely have now 
increased significantly. 
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insistence upon proof before publication. One observation which might make us 
doubt this connection is that although theorems themselves retain a high degree of 
Permanence, often arguments that are initially taken to support them must later be 
discarded – either because they are found to contain errors, or because they no 
longer meet increasingly demanding standards of rigour. This suggests that 
perhaps mathematicians’ ability to decide if a theorem is true can outstrip their 
capacity for constructing and checking proof presentations. Indeed, full proofs 
were not available for many of the early calculus results discovered in the 18th 
century by Newton, Leibniz, Laplace and Lagrange and others – nor for much of 
Euler’s work on infinite series – because the theoretical foundations underlying 
these areas of mathematics had not yet been fully worked out (see Section 5.v). 
Yet the results derived were, for the most part, true.19  
 
One explanation of Euler’s success is his use of non-deductive methods to 
corroborate his results. He knew he was proceeding on rather shaky theoretical 
ground, and so after performing his summations with algebraic manoeuvres he 
would check his answers with extensive numerical calculations.20 Likewise, the 
new results of the calculus were often directed towards practical applications in 
physics and engineering, the success of which tended to increase confidence in 
them and provided good evidence that they were indeed correct.  
 
However, in the next chapter we shall see that such non-deductive methods do not 
in general provide sufficient grounds for the Public Acceptance of results in 
mathematics. For instance, some results that seem empirically well supported, but 
which are denied Public Acceptance due to lack of a proof, later turn out to be 
false. Through exploring examples, it will become clear that proof does indeed 
play a central role in maintaining the high degree of Permanence and Reliability of 
mathematical literature. 
 
Lastly, we consider why having a highly Reliable and Permanent literature is 
highly desirable and facilitates the progress of mathematical research. One benefit 
of Reliability concerns the dependence on previously established theorems. We 
have mentioned that mathematical arguments usually rely on subsidiary results in 
deriving their conclusions. Of course, both philosophers and scientists of all kinds 
also cite articles and books in support of their claims. But only mathematicians are 
warranted in the immediate acceptance of an auxiliary result just because a 
published article claiming it to be true is cited – even if they have not read the 
article themselves, have not heard of its author, or have not even looked up the 
name of the cited article in the bibliography. Without this reliance on quotation of 
subsidiary results research would be severely slowed down, and journal articles 
would multiply in length (the length of some journal articles is already presenting 
problems for researchers – see Section 1.vi).  
 
A lack of Permanence would also impact upon this aspect of research in a related 
way. If results were accepted only for a time, it would be much harder to keep 
track of which articles were acceptable for a publishing mathematician to cite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Judith Grabiner, “Is Mathematical Truth Time-Dependent?”, The American Mathematical 
Monthly 81 (1974): 358 
20 Grabiner, “Is Mathematical Proof Time-Dependent?”, 358. 
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when seeking to Publically Establish a new claim. The Permanence of 
mathematics is also part of what enables a ‘deeper penetration into the subject-
matter’21 than in other fields of enquiry: because mathematical edifices are largely 
Permanent, over time they can develop to an immense complexity as every area of 
the subject-matter is scrupulously examined. 
 
Lastly, the Reliability of mathematics means that natural scientists and others can 
take mathematical results ‘off the shelf’ without worrying about their veracity. 
They can regard the results they find in mathematics journals and textbooks as true 
simpliciter, and if their theories fail will rarely look to locate the error here. 
 
We move now to our third Practical Virtue: that there is Consensus amongst 
mathematicians about which results have been Publicly Accepted and may now be 
stated as true without qualification. This third feature of practice is clearly 
connected to the previous two. It is in part because believing results proved in 
peer-reviewed mathematical journals is a Reliable source of gaining knowledge 
that such results are found convincing by all. Such Consensus, where rational, is 
merely the subjective acknowledgement of the objective phenomenon of 
Reliability. And if results moved in and out of Public Acceptance over time this 
would likely lead to widespread disagreements during the transitional periods.  
 
To emphasise the high degree of Consensus within mathematics, consider first the 
range of disagreement amongst contemporary philosophers. In the analytic 
tradition today there are dualists, reductive and non-reductive materialists and 
idealists in the philosophy of mind; consequentialists, Kantians, contractarians, 
virtue and natural rights theorists, and non-cognitivists in ethics; formalists, 
constructivists, nominalists and Platonists in the philosophy of mathematics, and 
so on for each subdiscipline. Moreover, these disagreements constitute the 
permanent condition of academic philosophy.  
 
This lack of Consensus does imply that philosophers lack the resources to discover 
true answers to the questions they pursue. However, it does suggest that 
philosophers find it difficult to formulate arguments that are able to establish 
lasting consensus amongst all of their academic colleagues about the truth and 
rational justifiability of their particular philosophical position.22 This remains the 
case even though consensus may be achieved in a negative direction; Gettier’s 
paper on the justified true belief account of knowledge is perhaps a notable 
example of this.23 
 
In mathematics, however, such disagreement is the exception rather than the rule. 
Consider the difference between an undergraduate course in moral philosophy on 
the one hand, where one can expect to learn about key historical figures such as 
Mill, Bentham, Kant, Aquinas and Aristotle, the different conceptions of morality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Arthur Jaffe and Frank Quinn, ““Theoretical Mathematics”: Toward A Cultural 
Synthesis Of Mathematics And Theoretical Physics”, Bulletin of the American Mathematical 
Society 29 (1993): 2 
22 Alasdair Macintyre, “On Having Survived the Academic Moral Philosophy of the Twentieth 
Century”, in What Happened in and to Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Fran 
O’Rourke (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2013), 18. 
23 Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123. 
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they have each articulated, and the arguments supporting their positions; and an 
undergraduate course in mathematical analysis on the other, where one can expect 
a concise and ahistorical presentation of what everyone agrees are the established 
theorems and true results pertaining to the central questions in that area. Moreover, 
unlike in natural science where consensus is perhaps maintained only temporarily 
by a group of researchers operating under a shared paradigm in the course of what 
Thomas Kuhn has called ‘normal science’, in mathematics the agreement reached 
is Permanent.24 
 
We now discuss whether insistence on proof does play a central part in 
maintaining the Consensus just described. Historical evidence suggests it does: in 
periods where proof has not been available, such as the early development of the 
calculus in the 17th and 18th century, Consensus has often been lacking. Let us 
consider the matter further. What is at issue is whether the policy of proof prior to 
publication will lead to mathematicians agreeing that published results are 
categorically true. Clearly, if a mathematician agrees that a proof has been given, 
they must join the Consensus: deductive reasoning always rationally compels 
assent. So the question reduces to whether mathematicians do in general believe 
that the discourses published in journal articles are successful proof presentations. 
 
Generally speaking, mathematicians reading a published argument will agree that 
it gives expression to a proof. If there are serious doubts about the adequacy of a 
proof presentation, then a retraction of the article may be recommended, and a 
more satisfactory presentation sought. This rarely happens, however. Recall that 
one necessary criterion for a discourse to count as an acceptable proof presentation 
is that the peer reviewer judges that it will be found convincing by the entire 
readership of that journal. Moreover, mathematicians can operate effectively 
whilst only publishing articles meeting this criterion – one that would be far too 
restrictive and demanding for other disciplines such as philosophy. If the proof 
presentations published in a particular journal were often found unconvincing by 
mathematicians, action would be taken to rectify the situation to keep the 
reputation of the journal intact.  
 
This agreement is also aided by the standardisation of proof presentations 
mentioned in Section 1.i. There are accepted classes of manoeuvres that will not 
be questioned, and standard lines of attack that all working mathematicians have 
been trained to use. This further reduces the chances of disagreement.  
 
Let us now consider the attitude of the entire mathematical community to a 
published result, as opposed to just those that have read the article. It not true that 
the mere existence of a proof presentation that has passed the peer-review checks 
compels assent to a result on pains of brute irrationality: we have already noted 
that sometimes such discourses contain mistakes. However, for the most part, we 
can expect widespread agreement to occur, given that mathematicians constitute a 
community of professionals pursuing shared goals (recall here Tall’s distinction 
from Section 1.iii).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 10. 
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The benefits of Consensus amongst mathematicians are again clear. As with 
Reliability, it is important for the practice of citing other articles when invoking 
subsidiary results. If the auxiliary results needed were not agreed to be Publically 
Accepted by all researchers, then the effectiveness of collaborative mathematical 
research would be reduced here. It is not sufficient that the literature is highly 
Reliable and cited results are always in fact all true: this also needs to be 
acknowledged in practice.  
 
The fact that there is a more or less permanent Consensus about answers to 
fundamental questions and the truth of basic results also means that 
mathematicians are free to pursue intensively specialised research and are not 
forced to spend time and energy warring with competing schools within the 
discipline. This is again similar to Kuhn’s account of the necessary conditions for 
normal science to progress, although as we have already said in mathematics such 
agreement is Permanent, and not periodically interrupted by crises wherein it is 
subject to fragmentation.25  
 
Before moving on to the fourth Practical Virtue of mathematical practice, a caveat 
must be added. Throughout history there have been disagreements of sorts 
between competing schools within mathematics: alternative paradigms and 
approaches; questions of how best to formulate concepts, which theorems are 
interesting, which objects or problems are the most important to study; aesthetic 
judgements and questions of explanatory value, and so on. Consider also the rival 
attempts to rigorise the calculus: geometric, algebraic, arithmetic (again, see 
Section 5.v). However, apart from occasional exceptions, such as the 
disagreements with classical mathematics of intuitionists led by Brouwer about 
what constitutes an acceptable mathematical argument, which were in any case 
fringe, these divergences all occur prior to the stage at which the question of 
finding a proof arises.  
 
What is always agreed upon is that the conclusion is indeed a consequence of the 
premisses and rules of inference employed. For instance, rival mathematical 
systems such as alternative formulations of geometry are not incompatible in the 
way that rival philosophical theories concerning which set of actions are morally 
justified or rival scientific hypotheses about the nature or cause of a particular 
physical phenomenon are. They merely signify that a change in subject matter has 
occurred, and hence do not express the kind of disagreement amongst practitioners 
relevant to Consensus.26 There are of course disagreements about the best or most 
fruitful way to proceed, but generally speaking once a set of starting points and 
tools are agreed upon – and in contemporary mathematics it is usually possible to 
be clear what these are – disputes between contending parties may be resolved by 
seeing which of them can find a proof for their claims. 
 
The fourth and final Practical Virtue I will draw attention to is Autonomy. This 
feature of mathematical practice has two components. Firstly, any competent 
mathematical researcher can in principle come to find their own explicit reasons 
for believing any Publicly Accepted claim simply by reviewing the relevant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 66. 
26 Ernest Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1978), 32. 
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literature – for example, the article in which it was first announced as true. 
Secondly, no mathematician is ever permitted to publish a result on the basis of 
their personal authority alone. When journal referees judge that a printed argument 
constitutes a sufficient basis for publication, they never rely upon trust in the 
testimony of the publishing mathematician. The Consensus just described is thus 
spontaneous rather than coerced; this is what the philosopher Jody Azzouni has 
called ‘The benign fixation of mathematical practice’.27 
 
A clarification must be added here, stressing the partly modal and partly social 
nature of this Practical Virtue. It may be the case that no mathematician has 
personally scrutinised proof presentations for all or even a large proportion of the 
mathematical results they believe and regard as Publicly Accepted: this is not what 
is intended. Rather, what is important is that any competent mathematician could 
in principle find their own reasons to support any one of their Publicly Accepted 
mathematical beliefs simply by referring to a suitable place in the existing 
literature, and that Publicly Accepted results are supported by explicit 
argumentation that has been thoroughly checked by at least a sizable number of 
mathematicians, so that results are never put forth merely on the basis of trust or 
authority alone. 
 
Insisting on proof prior to publication of results is clearly an effective way of 
maintaining Autonomy because reading such a discourse enables any competent 
reader to know its conclusion in an intellectually independent way. (‘Competence’ 
here again includes being able to fill in the gaps in the proof presentation, which 
may require substantial work.) It is also hard to see how Autonomy could be 
adequately maintained without this restriction: if an argument is supported merely 
by inductive evidence rather than proof, we will be required to accept the 
judgement of the author that the evidence is conclusive in this instance (see 
Section 2.v for further explanation of this point). 
 
Autonomy is valuable for its own sake, and also for maintaining the other three 
Practical Virtues. For instance, authority is often less effective in maintaining 
lasting Consensus. Russell writes, ‘Have no respect for the authority of others, for 
there are always contrary authorities to be found.’28 In contrast to this, whilst a 
student is still learning to think mathematically, or to understand the use of some 
new concept, some reliance on the authority of a teacher may be necessary. 
Results or techniques must be presented in some particular order, and the 
justification of a principle might take a lesson too far afield at the stage when it is 
first needed. But at some point in their development towards becoming an 
independent mathematician, students usually begin to insist on their own reasons 
for believing results they are taught.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Jody Azzouni, “How and Why Mathematics is Unique as a Social Practice”, in 18 
Unconventional Essays on the Nature of Mathematics, ed. Reuben Hersh (New York: Springer, 
2006), 208. 
28 Bertrand Russell, “A Liberal Decalogue”, in Autobiography (London: Routledge, 2009), 534. 
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1.vi. Recent Developments in Mathematics 
 
In this section I will discuss two recent developments in mathematical practice: 
that proof presentations for Publicly Accepted results now sometimes run to 
exorbitant lengths, and that in the discovery of proofs for Publicly Accepted 
results mathematicians are sometimes now permitted to make essential usage of 
computers to check though the argumentation, in such a way that no explicit, 
surveyable written proof presentation is produced. Through discussing a pair of 
case studies for each, I shall argue that in these contexts the effectiveness of proof 
in establishing and maintaining the Practical Virtues is significantly impaired.  
 
First we discuss how the proof presentations mathematicians give are now 
sometimes extremely long, which threatens to thwart the checking process. 
Modern mathematical research has now reached a point of incredible depth and 
complexity, and as deeper and more complex results have been discovered, 
increasingly long proof presentations have appeared in the literature in recent 
decades. Some examples follow: 
 
• In 1995, Andrew Wiles’ celebrated proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem 
was published in a paper over 100 pages long.29 
 
• Between 1983 and 2004, Neil Robertson and Paul Seymour published a 
proof of the Robertson-Seymour Theorem over the course of some 
twenty papers. Also known as the Graph Minor Theorem, this result 
says that in any infinite collection of graphs there is a pair such that one 
is a minor of the other. The proof presentation totaled over 500 pages.30 
 
• In the 1980’s, a proof of the Almgren Regularity Theorem in geometric 
measure theory was given by Frederick Almgren. His manuscript 
totaled 1728 pages and was later published in an edited form in a book 
of nearly 1,000 pages.31 
 
• In the year 2000, Laurent Lafforgue proved Lafforgue’s Theorem, part 
of a series of conjectures in various parts of algebra known as the 
‘Langlands Program’. The proof was published in three papers totaling 
around 600 pages. Lafforgue received a Fields Medal for his efforts.32 
 
• In 2006, a proof of the Strong Perfect Graph Theorem appeared in the 
Annals of Mathematics. Published by Maria Chudnovsky, Neil 
Robertson, Paul Seymour and Robin Thomas, the presentation totaled 
nearly 180 pages.33 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Andrew Wiles, “Modular Elliptic Curves and Fermat’s Last Theorem”, Annals of Mathematics 
142 (1995): 443-551. 
30 Reinhard Deistel, Graph Theory (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2010), 333.  
31Frederick Almgren, Almgren's Big Regularity Paper, ed. Vladimir Scheffer and Jean Taylor 
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2000). 
32 Gérard Laumon, “The Work of Laurent Lafforgue”, International Congress of Mathematicians 1 
(2002): 94. 
33 Maria Chudnovsky et. al., “The Strong Perfect Graph Theorem”, Annals of Mathematics 165 
(2006): 51-229. 
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Shortly we shall discuss a proof presentation whose length is far greater still; 
before that we turn to our first of four case studies. 
 
In a 1979 paper, De Millo, Lipton and Perlis discuss what was then a recent 
example of the effects of the growing length and complexity of proof 
presentations. Two sets of researchers – one American, one Japanese – had 
independently made claims regarding the same homotopy group, for which they 
each thought they had discovered proofs. However, the two claims contradicted 
each other. So at least one group of researchers must have been mistaken. But 
because of the length and complexity of the arguments offered by both groups of 
researchers, it was not obvious where the mistake was. So, the research groups 
exchanged publications, and each tried to find an error in the others’ work. Yet 
despite the obvious motivation for finding a mistake, neither team of researchers 
was able to discredit the argument given by the other. A third group later presented 
an argument supporting the American team, leading the Japanese mathematicians 
to temporarily withdraw to check over their research.34 
 
In this instance, then, the fact that proof was insisted upon was not enough to 
establish Consensus between the two groups of researchers: the discourses they 
supplied were of such a length that they could both be plausibly put forth as proof 
presentations, and mathematicians were for a long time unable to distinguish 
which if either of these claims was correct. Moreover, it also illustrates a 
suggestion made earlier: perhaps the degree of Reliability of accepted results – and 
especially of results sustained only by very long proofs such as these – is actually 
lower than we may think, because errors are often very difficult to detect – even 
though for longer arguments one would think the occurrence of at least one minor 
error would become increasingly likely. 
 
Our second case study is another theorem from the literature that has generated 
debate about mathematical practice. This concerns the classification of finite 
simple groups35 – the so-called ‘Enormous Theorem’. Finite simple groups are in a 
sense the building blocks for all groups, in the same way that all natural numbers 
can be decomposed into their prime factors, although for groups the 
decomposition series is not necessarily unique.36 The Enormous Theorem states 
that every finite simple group belongs to one of the following four categories: a 
cyclic group of prime order, an alternating group of degree at least 5, a group of lie 
type, or one of 26 ‘sporadic’ groups which do not fit into these three classes.  
 
The majority of the proof of this theorem was discovered in the years 1950-1980, 
leading to Daniel Gorenstein – the chief architect of the proof – describing it as the 
‘thirty years war’.37 However, some parts of the argument date back as far as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Richard De Millo, Richard Lipton and Alan Perlis, “Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems 
and Programs”, Communications of the ACM 22 (1979): 272. Sadly, the authors do not supply a 
reference, so the eventual outcome of the debate is unclear. 
35 A group is simple iff it has no non-trivial normal subgroups. A subgroup H of a group G is 
normal iff it is invariant under conjugation:   ∀𝑔, ℎ ∈ G,          ℎ ∈ H    ⇔     𝑔ℎ𝑔!! ∈ H. 
36 The Jordan-Hölder Theorem shows it is unique up to permutation and isomorphism, however.  
37 Ronald Solomon, “On Finite Simple Groups and Their Classification”, Notices of the AMS 42 
(1995): 231. 
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1899.38 Under Gorenstein’s leadership, the effort required contributions from over 
100 mathematicians from many different countries around the world. Gorenstein 
announced discovery of a complete proof in 1983, and began publication in 1994 
with Lyons and Solomon.39 Actually, at this time part of the proof for quasithin 
groups was not yet complete, and was only dealt with in 2004 by Aschbacher and 
Smith.40 Though this was thought to be the last gap in the argument, a second 
minor gap emerged in 2008 and was corrected by Solomon and Harada.41 
 
The proof attracted interest even prior to its publication. Despite the daunting 200-
page chunks in which the preprints were issued, many individuals and seminar 
groups persevered with reading the parts of the proof that were presented up to 
1975. Over the next five years, however, at least 3,000 compact pages of 
mathematical argumentation were circulated, which ‘simply overwhelmed the 
digestive system of the group theory community.’42 The length of the final proof 
presentation was staggering – Gorenstein estimated it to be around 15,000 pages. 
A shorter second-generation proof presentation has since been under construction 
– though the expected length is still around 5,000 pages. One reason for this 
exorbitant length is that the classification itself is so complex.43 
 
The Enormous Theorem is important for group theorists because it enables ‘divide 
and conquer’ strategies for proving general results about finite simple groups: 
mathematicians may simply show that such a claim holds for finite simple groups 
of each kind. It has therefore been cited in further journal articles and is clearly 
Publicly Accepted by mathematicians. However, the modal ‘in principle’ 
qualification of Autonomy must be stretched to breaking point here: the average 
mathematician simply cannot be expected to work through even a 5,000-page 
second-generation presentation of the proof. If mathematicians’ hard-won 
Consensus is not to fragment, then most practitioners must simply believe the 
result on the collective testimony of those group-theorists who have worked on it, 
and of those enthusiasts who have been willing to invest substantial portions of 
their lives checking through it.  
 
In addition to a loss of Autonomy, there are clearly also questions about the 
Reliability of the result. Solomon writes ‘Is the database correct? Is there a 27th 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ronald Solomon, “A Brief History of the Classification of Finite Simple Groups”, Bulletin of the 
American Mathematical Society 22 (2001): 315. 
39 Daniel Gorensten, Richard Lyons and Ronald Solomon, “The Classification of the Finite Simple 
Groups, Part 1”, American Mathematical Society Surveys and Monographs 40.1 (1994). 
40 Michael Aschbacher and Stephen Smith, “The Classification of Quasithin Groups: I. Structure of 
Strongly Quasithin 𝜅 -groups”, Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 111 (2004). Michael 
Aschbacher and Stephen Smith, “The Classification of Quasithin Groups: II. Main Theorems: The 
Classification of Simple QTKE-groups”, Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 112 (2004). 
41 Koichiro Harada and Ronald Solomon, “Finite groups having a standard component 𝐿 of type 𝑀!" or 𝑀!!”, Journal of Algebra 319 (2008), 621–628 
42 Ronald Solomon, “On Finite Simple Groups and Their Classification”, 236. 
43 The sporadic groups alone comprise 5 Mathieu groups, the 3 Conway groups, the 3 Fischer 
groups, the Higman-Sims group, the McLaughlin group, the Held group, the Rudvalis group, the 
Suzuki sporadic group, the O’Nan group, the Harada-Norton group, the Lyons group, the 
Thompson group, the 4 Janko groups – the fourth of which was the last to be discovered, in 1976 – 
the baby monster group, and the Fischer-Griess Monster group, which has an order of 
808017424794512875886459904961710757005754368000000000. 
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sporadic simple group? I seriously doubt it, but it would be chutzpahdich to assert 
that a 5000-page 40-year human endeavor is beyond the possibility of human 
error.’44 Indeed, mathematicians’ confidence in the result is partly based on the 
fact that no new groups have been discovered in recent years after the initial errors 
mentioned earlier came to light. For the average mathematician, this is a move 
away from explicit, deductive reasons for belief and towards relying on testimony 
and non-deductive evidence.  
We move on to a second pair of case studies, now concerning computer-based 
mathematics. Over the last few decades, many important results have become 
Publicly Accepted on the basis of arguments that make essential use of computers. 
These computers may be used merely to check through large amounts of 
computations, but they may also have a more involved role and even construct 
substantial sections of the reasoning behind the argument. Results whose 
justifications are of this nature that have been widely reported in the public domain 
include the verification that games of draughts will be drawn if both players play 
optimally,45 that a Rubik’s Cube can always be solved in 20 moves or less,46 and 
that the solution to a Sudoku puzzle needs at least 17 clues.47 We now discuss the 
proof of a more weighty mathematical result in detail. 
 
In the 1850’s, Francis Guthrie – who was then a student at University College 
London – discovered a way of colouring the map of England’s counties using four 
colours such that no two counties sharing a common border receive the same 
colour. Consider a general map divided into regions. Do four colours always 
suffice to achieve this result? In essence, the claim that they do is our third case 
study: the famous Four Colour Theorem. We need only replace the intuitive idea 
of a map with the more precise concept of the infinite Euclidean plane containing 
a planar graph drawing – that is, a finite number of points or vertices joined by 
non-intersecting curves of finite length with endpoints at the vertices,48 which thus 
divide the plane into one infinite region and a finite number of finite regions. After 
making no progress with the general result, Francis discussed it with his brother 
Frederick, who shared it with his teacher, the eminent mathematician Augustus De 
Morgan. The problem was later studied by other mathematicians including Cayley 
and Minkowski. In 1879, Kempe gave an argument purporting to establish the 
theorem, but a flaw was found after 11 years by Heawood in 1890.49 
The essence of Kempe’s argument was as follows. Firstly, given any graph 
drawing in the plane, we construct a dual graph drawing by placing a vertex on the 
interior of every region and joining vertices contained in two regions iff those 
regions share a common border, as shown in the diagram below. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Solomon, “A Brief History of the Classification of Finite Simple Groups”, 347. 
45 Justin Mullins, “Checkers 'solved' after years of number crunching”, New Scientist, 19th July 
2007. The argument is due to Jonathan Schaeffer, who had been working on the problem for 18 
years. 
46 Tomas Rokicki et. al., “The Diameter of the Rubik’s Cube Group is Twenty”, Siam Journal on 
Discrete Mathematics 27 (2013): 1082-1105. 
47 “Mathematicians Solve Minimum Sudoku Problem”, MIT Technology Review, 6th January 2012. 
The proof was found by Gary McGuire, Bastian Tugemann and Gilles Civario. 
48 Farey’s theorem tells us that we can replace this phrase with ‘straight line segments’. 
49 John Mitchem, “On the History and Solution of the Four-Color Map Problem”, The College 
Mathematics Journal 12 (1981), 108-116.  
	   32	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This reduces the problem to that of colouring the vertices of a given planar graph 
drawing with four colours so that no two adjacent (i.e. connected with an edge) 
vertices receive the same colour. For technical reasons it is also useful to 
‘triangulate’ the graph drawing by adding more edges until the boundary of each 
region has exactly three edges. This move is clearly permissible because it serves 
only to restrict the possible colourings. 
 
Kempe’s argument now proceeds as follows. Firstly he proved that any 
triangulated planar graph with at least 5 vertices must have either a vertex50 of 
degree 3, 4 or 5. Then he argued by mathematical induction. Suppose there are 
graphs that cannot be four-coloured. Let 𝐺 be one of these graphs such that the 
number of vertices of G is as small as possible. Clearly, if such a graph exists it 
must have at least 5 vertices, and so will have a vertex of degree 3, 4 or 5. Suppose 𝐺 has a vertex 𝑣 of degree 3. If we remove this vertex and the three edges incident 
to it, the resulting graph will have fewer vertices than 𝐺, so by the definition of 𝐺 
it must be four-colourable. But when we add 𝑣 back in, only at most three of the 
four possible colours will be used up by its neighbours, leaving one colour 
available for 𝑣 (see Diagrams 1.8-1.10 below).  
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The degree of a vertex is defined as the number of edges incident to it. 
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Kempe tried to show that similar procedures – although rather more complex, and 
involving technical devices known as ‘Kempe Chains’ – could be employed for 
vertices of degrees 4 and 5. Because every graph must contain a vertex of one of 
these degrees, then we can employ at least one of the three sub-arguments to show 
that 𝐺 is four-colourable after all, which is a contradiction. So in fact no such 
graph 𝐺 can exist, and all graphs are four-colourable. But as already mentioned, 
there was a flaw in his argument: in 1890, Heawood produced a graph for which 
Kempe’s procedure for a vertex of degree 5 did not work, although the graph itself 
could easily be four-coloured by other means.51 
 
Almost a century later in 1976, a proof of the theorem was finally discovered by 
Haken, Appel and Koch.52 The logical structure of their proof is similar to 
Kempe’s argument, using minimal counterexamples and extending colourings of 
the graph drawings produced when parts of them are removed, or replaced with 
smaller structures that have fewer vertices, leaving fewer vertices overall. Though 
this is a slight oversimplification, for our purposes, we can imagine the structure 
that is replaced as comprising the interior of a cycle or ‘ring’, as in Diagrams 1.8-
1.10 above. A structure to be deleted is called a ‘primary configuration’, and that 
which replaces it is called a ‘secondary configuration’. When a configuration 𝐻 
comprises the total interior of a ring in 𝐺 in this way, we say that 𝐺 ‘contains’ 𝐻.53 
A primary configuration H is said to be ‘reducible’ if for any four-colouring of 𝐺 
with a ring containing just 𝐻 it is always possible to extend a modified version of 𝐺, with 𝐻 removed and some particular secondary configuration that has fewer 
vertices than 𝐻 added in its place, to a four-colouring of 𝐺 itself.  
 
Lastly, to complete the proof we need to make use of the concept of 
unavoidability. A set 𝑆 is unavoidable if every graph 𝐺 with at least 5 vertices 
must contain some member of 𝑆. Hence, we need only find an unavoidable 
reducible set to prove the theorem. Unfortunately, the smallest such set the three 
mathematicians could find had nearly 1900 elements.54 Moreover, some of these 
configurations were themselves rather complicated, especially compared with the 
simple one-vertex subgraphs Kempe had tried to make do with. Yet even in 
Kempe’s attempted proof presentation the arguments for reducibility were quite 
complex – indeed, enough so to enable his mistake to go unnoticed for eleven 
years. The argumentation needed to complete the final proof was so complicated 
as to elude construction by hand: it required around 1200 hours of computation 
time on what was then a high-speed computer.55 Moreover, the computer was not 
just performing simple checks but had to construct many fairly complicated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Percy Headwood, “Map-Colour Theorem”, Quarterly Journal of Mathematics, 24 (1890): 332–
338 
52  Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken, “Every Planar Map is Four Colourable, Part I: 
Discharging”, Illinois Journal of Mathematics 21 (1977): 429-490. Kenneth Appel, Wolfgang 
Haken and John Koch, “Every Planar Map is Four Colourable, Part II: Reducibility”, Illinois 
Journal of Mathematics 21 (1977): 491-567. 
53 This implies but is not equivalent to the subgraph relation; a number of authors seem to conflate 
these two concepts. 
54 Frank Bernhart, “A Digest of the Four Colour Theorem”, Journal of Graph Theory 1 (1977): 
207. 
55 Bernhart, “A Digest of the Four Colour Theorem”, 207. 
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individual arguments, each analogous to the one given above for a vertex of 
degree three, in order to show reducibility in each case. 
 
The essential use of computers in finding the proof caused much debate, but the 
result gradually gained Public Acceptance by mathematicians. Unlike the Group 
Classification Theorem, there seems now to be no question about its truth. William 
Thurston writes, ‘I interpret the controversy as having little to do with doubt 
people had as to the veracity of the theorem or the correctness of the proof’,56 and 
indeed as shall see in Section 5.vi the proof has now been formalized and verified 
by Georges Gonthier.57 Yet the example again serves to undermine Autonomy, 
because individual mathematicians are not able to come to believe the four-colour 
theorem for their own direct reasons that are understood in detail, but rather only 
because of the ‘testimony’ of a computer. This has led some philosophers such as 
Thomas Tymoczko to conclude that mathematicians’ knowledge of the Four-
Colour Theorem should not be considered a priori, as it is based only the outcome 
of a kind of empirical computer-based experiment.58 
 
Our fourth and final case study is Thomas Hales’ proof of the Kepler Conjecture. 
This is the claim that of all the possible methods of packing identical spheres into 
space, the one shown below is the most efficient (as intuition might suggest).59  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 William Thurston, “On Proof and Progress in Mathematics”, For the Learning of Mathematics 
15 (1995): 29. 
57 The meaning and implications of this claim will also be made clear in Section 5.vi. 
58 Thomas Tymoczko, “The Four-Colour Problem and its Philosophical Significance”, The Journal 
of Philosophy 76 (1979): 57-83. 
59 Thomas Hales, “A Proof of the Kepler Conjecture”, Annals of Mathematics 162 (2005): 1065-
1185. 
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Hales submitted his argument – which again relied heavily on computers – to the 
prestigious journal Annals of Mathematics mentioned above, where his case was 
considered for three years. Eventually, the journal came to a decision that has been 
integrated into an explicit policy relating to cases like this, and which now features 
on their website. The editors state that arguments which make essential use of 
computers will be considered for publication only for ‘exceptionally important 
mathematical theorems’, wherein the Annals may publish the ‘human’ part of the 
proof, which reduces the problem to one solvable by a computer program, as well 
as storing the computer code and supplementary documentation on its website. 
They also write that ‘The computer part may not be checked line-by-line, but will 
be examined for the methods by which the authors have eliminated or minimized 
possible sources of error’.60 
 
Similarly to the previous case study, and to all other cases where results are only 
established in a way that relies on automated computer-based methods, the reasons 
for belief available to individual mathematicians for believing the Kepler 
Conjecture cannot be characterised at a detailed mathematical level, but only in 
terms of the properties and capabilities of certain computer systems and why the 
outputs they have given reveals that some such detailed set of mathematical 
reasons for belief must be available. Clearly, this is an undermining of the 
Autonomy enabled by more traditional methods. 
 
 
1.vii. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we have seen how contemporary mathematics incorporates a rule 
whereby mathematicians are always required to give a proof presentation in order 
to unqualifiedly assert as true new results in serious mathematical publications – 
and hence that proof is necessary for the Public Acceptance of results. The rational 
justification of this rule – whether mathematicians should continue to submit to it 
– will be the central question discussed in this thesis. 
 
Adherence to this rule is centrally important for maintaining the four Practical 
Virtues of mathematical practice: Permanence, Reliability, Consensus and 
Autonomy. Moreover, these are important for the continuing progress of 
mathematical enquiry itself. This suggests that a partial rational justification for 
the rule is available at this stage. Yet we have also seen that where new results are 
established through proof presentations that are excessively long, or rely 
essentially on computers, proof furnishes only a less effective means to securing 
them. So despite the continued insistence on proof, the Practical Virtues are in 
danger of declining in future. 
 
It was also pointed out that in earlier periods when deductive techniques could not 
be fully relied upon mathematicians such as Euler used non-deductive methods as 
effective aids to their research. The next chapter, then, we present an overview of 
non-deductive methods in mathematics, together with an assessment of their 
suitability for justification in the context of both Public and Private acceptance.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  “Statement by the Editors on Computer Assisted Proof”, accessed 23rd June 2015, 
http://annals.math.princeton.edu/board 
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2. Non-deductive Arguments 
 
 
This chapter provides a general discussion of non-deductive methods and their role 
within mathematical practice. Perhaps their most important use lies in the 
discovery of plausible conjectures that are later proved, and as a check on our 
deductive work. Yet the use of non-deductive methods may also leave us strongly 
inclined to yield Private Acceptance to a conjecture prior to a proof having been 
found, especially when computers have been used to generate extensive data. It 
also appears that mathematicians themselves have come to Privately Accept 
claims such as the Goldbach Conjecture on these kinds of grounds alone. 
However, I will argue that with the possible exception of certain probabilistic 
methods – whose reliability can be explicitly evaluated – non-deductive arguments 
are unsuitable for justification in the context of Public Acceptance. Their use here 
would lead to the further deterioration of the four Practical Virtues given in 
Chapter 1: Permanence, Reliability, Consensus, and Autonomy. 
 
 
2.i Non-deductive Methods  
 
A non-deductive method is a mathematical technique that does not yield a proof, 
though it may have some other function: for example, it could be a source of 
plausible new conjectures. Non-deductive methods may be organised into 
categories: inductive, experimental, visual, analogical. Rather than giving a 
complete definition of non-deductive methods, I will instead briefly discuss and 
give examples of each of these four kinds of non-deductive method in turn. The 
list is not intended to be exhaustive, and the categories may overlap.  
 
One example of an inductive procedure is to take a general claim we think is 
plausible and then check a large number of cases. For example in number theory, 
if we have a conjecture we think holds true for all natural numbers, we can check a 
large number of them to verify it these particular instances. Mathematicians 
sometimes use the term ‘empirical evidence’ to describe such a collection of data, 
in contrast to its usual philosophical use in connection with sensory experience, 
although here the adjective ‘quasi-empirical’ will be preferred.  
 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that a vast amount of this kind of inductive 
work has been carried out in the case of the Goldbach Conjecture. This will be 
discussed in much greater detail in Section 2.v below. A different use of this kind 
of technique was exemplified in 1995 with the discovery of the Bailey-Borwein-
Plouffe formula, which gives an exact expression for the 𝑛th digit of 𝜋 in base 16 
without calculating any other digits. The formula is as follows: 
 
 𝜋 = 116! 48𝑖 + 1− 28𝑖 + 4− 18𝑖 + 5− 18𝑖 + 6!!!!  
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This advance was only made possible by extensive searching using a procedure 
called the PSLQ integer relation algorithm, although once the formula had been 
discovered the proof was fairly straightforward.61 
 
Experimental reasoning in the narrow, literal sense means to employ a physical 
simulation to explore some area of pure mathematics. For instance, the 19th 
Century Belgian physicist Joseph Plateau made extensive studies with soap films 
stretched over wire frames, exploiting their material properties to derive results in 
geometry concerning minimal surfaces under given boundary conditions. The 
construction of such a surface is now known as a Plateau Problem, and further 
progress has been made in this direction since. 62  Consider another, related 
example: when a soap film forms a closed surface in space with no holes, 
enclosing a fixed volume of air, it soon takes the familiar shape of an 
approximately spherical bubble. Because this shape is the outcome of surface 
tension and pressure forces acting on the film, this suggests that the sphere is the 
figure of given surface area that encloses the largest volume in space (a result 
proved by Hermann Schwarz in 1884).63 
 
Another example of an experimental technique in being deployed in mathematics 
is Leonard Adleman’s algorithm in graph theory, which uses the physical 
properties of DNA molecules to find Hamiltonian paths in a given graph. This will 
be discussed in detail in Section 6.i. A third example gives a solution to the 
problem in graph theory of finding the shortest path(s) between two vertices. We 
use rings to represent each vertex and connect all adjacent vertices with pieces of 
string of the same length. If we then pull apart the two rings corresponding to the 
points we are interested in, the taut strings show us where the shortest path lies. 
 
Experimental reasoning in this literal sense is now fairly rare in mathematics: 
journals like Experimental Mathematics use the term only to indicate that non-
deductive evidence is playing a merely analogous role to experimentation within 
the nature sciences. Yet many results in Euclidean geometry were first discovered 
in the context of practical mensuration problems that arise in astronomy, 
navigation, farming, surveying and commerce. Indeed, traditionally the origin of 
geometry – literally, ‘land-measurement’ – is said to lie in Ancient Egyptian 
attempts to ensure a fair reallocation of land amongst the people after the annual 
flooding of the Nile river had washed away all recognisable landmarks.64 
 
One use of the human visual system in mathematics is to draw an accurate 
diagram of a given geometrical setup and observe that two quantities visually 
appear to bear some relation to one another. For instance, two angles might appear 
equal in size, or two line segments of equal length. Once this has been noticed a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 David Bailey, Peter Borwein and Simon Plouffe, “On the Rapid Computation of Various 
Polylogarithmic Constants”, Mathematics of Computation 66 (1997): 903-913. 
62 Jenny Harrison, “Soap Film Solutions to Plateau’s Problem”, Journal of Geometric Analysis”, 24 
(2014): 271-297.  
63 Frank Morgan, “Soap Bubble Clusters”, in Expeditions in Mathematics, ed. Tatiana Shubin, 
David Hayes and Gerald Alexanderson (Washington: Mathematical Associate of America, 2011), 
165. 
64 Proclus, A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, trans. Glenn Morrow (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 52. 
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deductive proof of the relation can then be sought. Diagrams can also play various 
other roles in finished geometrical discourses, such as providing a convenient 
psychological prop to the reader, or even featuring essentially in the exposition of 
a proof itself.65 A classic example of the use of diagrams is Socrates’ conversation 
with a slave boy in the Meno. We shall also see in Section 2.iii that the scope of 
diagrammatic reasoning in geometry has also been enhanced by technological 
developments in recent years. 
 
One example of reasoning by analogy might be to appeal to a similarity that is 
exploited in constructing new conjectures. For instance, we can often usefully 
compare geometrical objects we want to know about to their analogical 
equivalents in other dimensions: the sphere to the circle; the cube to the square. 
We said above that of all solids with fixed surface area the sphere encloses the 
most volume in space. This makes it reasonable to investigate the claim that of all 
the closed curves of fixed length in the plane the circle encloses the most area. 
Finding such a curve is known as the ‘isoperimetric problem’, and has been 
discussed since antiquity. We can also fruitfully generalise the problem to 𝑛 
dimensions. 
 
Another example of analogy is when mathematicians notice a broad similarity of 
structure between two apparently very different domains, such as the ring of linear 
maps from an n-dimensional vector space 𝑉 over a field 𝔽 to itself, with binary 
ring operations given by the composition and pointwise addition of these maps, 
and the ring of 𝑛  ×  𝑛 matrices with entries from 𝔽 under matrix multiplication and 
addition. After establishing this connection explicitly by giving an isomorphism, 
we can prove results about linear maps by looking at corresponding results about 
matrices (or conversely). But even prior to this kind of explicit theoretical work 
being carried out, such a connection may suggest new conjectures that can be 
proved on an individual basis. 
 
Lastly, a final example of reasoning by analogy is provided by the fragment on 
lunes of Hippocrates of Chios, the earliest substantial mathematical text from 
Ancient Greece whose origin has been ascertained with certainty.66 A lune is a 
figure formed by the intersection of circular arcs, with one side convex and 
another concave: its name thus derives from a resemblance to the new moon. In 
the fragment, Hippocrates was able to calculate the area of various lunes, which at 
the time meant to quadrate them: that is, to construct a square whose area was of 
equal magnitude.  
 
Consider the diagram below. From Pythagoras’ Theorem and the fact that angles 
in a semicircle are right angles, we have that 𝐴𝐶! = 𝐴𝐵! + 𝐵𝐶! = 2𝐴𝐵!. Since 
Hippocrates was willing to assume the principle that the areas of circles are in the 
same ratio as the areas of squares constructed upon their on their diameters – 
which was probably only proved later by Eudoxus, using what later became 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Marcus Giaquinto, “Visualizing in Mathematics”, in Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, ed. 
Paolo Manders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 22-42. 
66 Though it may have received some modification from Simplicius, who preserved the fragment 
from Eudemus’ History. See Jacques Brunschwig and Geoffrey Lloyd, ed., The Greek Pursuit of 
Knowledge (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003), 245. 
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known as the ‘method of exhaustion’ – it follows that the semicircle with diameter 𝐴𝐶 has twice the area of the semicircle with diameter 𝐴𝐵. But the quarter-circle 𝐴𝑂𝐵𝐹 has half the area of the former semicircle, and so its area is equal to that of 
the latter semicircle. As the segment ADBF is common to both, it follows that the 
two shaded regions are of equal area: that is, the area of the lune 𝐴𝐹𝐵𝐸 is equal to 
that of the triangle 𝐴𝑂𝐵. This is in turn equal to the area of a square constructed 
upon the line segment 𝐴𝐷 (not drawn). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amongst those figures whose area Hippocrates was able to find is the one given in 
Diagram 2.2 below: both the thin lune at the top and the shaded circle at the centre 
were quadrated at the same time.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Diagram 2.1. The figure AFBE is amongst the most famous of 
Hippocrates’ Lunes. Its area is equal to that of a rectilinear figure: the 
shaded triangle AOB.  
The diagram is taken from Piers Bursill-Hall’s unpublished lecture notes 
from a History of Mathematics course at the University of Cambridge. 
Diagram 2.2. Hippocrates used a very complicated 
procedure to square this lune and circle together. 
Piers Bursill-Hall 
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An important mathematical problem at the time was to quadrate or ‘square’ the 
circle. As said above, the Ancient Greek conception of area was essentially tied to 
rectilinear area, so the fact that no one had been able to solve this problem was a 
cause for concern. Its insolubility might have indicated that their whole concept of 
area was problematic when applied to curvilinear shapes. 
 
Aristotle later accused Hippocrates of thinking he had squared the circle, having 
shown how to square some individual lunes as well as a lune and a circle 
together.67 Of course, this would have been a mistake, though it seems implausible 
that a mathematician of Hippocrates’ stature would make such a careless error, and 
Aristotle’s accusation is perhaps unfair. Yet the quadration of some lunes on their 
own, as well as other lunes together with a circle, would have seemed to suggest 
that areas of circles are in some sense analogous to areas of lunes, furnishing a 
kind of heuristic, philosophical argument by analogy that the Greek conception of 
area can be extended to circles. However, it turns out that only some lunes can be 
squared by ruler-compass construction, whereas others can’t. In 1882, the 
Lindemann-Weierstrass Theorem put an end to any hopes of squaring the circle 
using ruler-compass methods by showing that 𝜋 is transcendental, so quadrature of 
the lune in Diagram 2.2 by itself must indeed be impossible.  
 
Non-deductive methods such as given in these examples have always been of great 
use to mathematicians, both in contemporary research and throughout history. 
Practitioners often arrive at conjectures using heuristic techniques; without a 
conjecture to aim at it is again usually far from clear how to go about employing 
deductive methods. Moreover, we shall see in the next section that the scope of 
non-deductive methods often extends to discovering proofs as well. Consider also 
a few quotations by some eminent mathematicians: 
 
‘Even in the mathematical sciences, our principle instruments to discover the 
truth are induction and analogy.’ – Laplace68 
 
‘In the Theory of Numbers, it happens rather frequently that by some 
unexpected luck, the most elegant new truths spring up by induction.’ – 
Gauss.69 
 
‘As we must refer the numbers to the pure intellect alone, we can hardly 
understand how observations and quasi-experiments can be of use in 
investigating the nature of the numbers. Yet in fact, as I shall show here with 
very good reasons, the properties of the numbers known today have been 
mostly discovered by observation, and discovered long before their truth has 
been confirmed by rigid demonstrations.’ – Euler70 
 
Focusing on finished pieces of mathematics may lead us to overlook this 
importance, however: only the deductive proof is sent for publication, and the 
heuristic work is then discarded.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Aristotle, “Sophistical Refutations: Book 11”, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 1, 
trans. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 291.  
68 Quoted in Pólya,  Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Volume 1, 35. 
69 Ibid., 59. 
70 Ibid., 3. 
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As well as their role in discovery, a second use of non-deductive methods is as a 
check on our deductive work. In Section 1.v we noted that this is particularly 
important when the foundations or underlying concepts have not yet been 
clarified, and consequently some key techniques have not yet been shown to be 
sound. Here we mentioned Euler’s work on infinite series and the physical 
applications of the calculus. Yet even when the theoretical foundations have been 
secured, non-deductive methods can provide useful corroboration: ‘Generally, our 
mathematical certainty does not rest exclusively on either logico-deductive 
methods or quasi-empiricism but on a healthy combination of both.’71 This is 
especially important for the kinds of cases we pointed out in Section 1.vi, where it 
is difficult to tell if a very long or computer-based argument is sound. 
 
 
2.ii Non-deductive Techniques in the Context of Discovery 
 
Let us focus the discussion by concentrating on a particular problem. 
 
Problem 2.1.  
 
Alison and Josh are standing at the top of a flight of 10 stairs. Alison can jump 
down one or two stairs at a time (for example, she could get to the bottom by 
taking five jumps of two stairs at a time). In how many distinct ways can Alison 
get from the top of the stairs to the bottom? Josh can jump up to 10 stairs in one 
go. In how many distinct ways can Josh get from the top of the stairs to the 
bottom?72 
 
We interpret the question in the natural way, to mean there is a landing at the top 
and the bottom of the stairs, both of which they must each visit, and 9 distinct flat 
standing areas on the intermediate steps, none of which are essential to visit, so 
that there are 10 vertical sections in total. There does not seem to be anything 
special about the number 10, so let us generalise the problem to 𝑛 steps and then 
focus on simpler cases. Let 𝐴(𝑛) be the number of ways in which Alison can 
climb down a flight of 𝑛  stairs (i.e., a flight of stairs with (𝑛 − 1)  distinct 
platforms in addition to the upper and lower landings).  
 
If we are not sure how to proceed in calculating 𝐴(𝑛), we can begin by generating 
some numerical data. We note by enumerating all cases that 𝐴(1) = 1, 𝐴(2) = 2 
and 𝐴(3) = 3. So far this is consistent with a number of conjectures, such as 𝐴(𝑛) = 𝑛 for all 𝑛, but if we calculate the fourth term 𝐴(4) = 5 this solution is 
excluded. When we work out 𝐴(5) = 8 , some readers might spot a pattern 
emerging: the Fibonacci numbers! At this stage we could check by calculation that 𝐴(6) = 13, but actually I already feel fairly convinced of the conjecture that 𝐴 𝑛 = 𝐹!!! for all 𝑛, and therefore that it will be a better use of time to now set 
about proving the conjecture, rather than generating any more data. The Fibonacci 
numbers are characterised by the recurrence relation 𝐹! = 𝐹!!! + 𝐹!!! and so as 
the initial terms match up it suffices to prove that  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 De Villiers, “The Role and Function of Quasi-Empirical Methods in Mathematics”, 411 
72 UKMT Senior Mentoring Scheme, 2013-2014, Sheet 1, Q3. 
	   42	  
𝐴(𝑛) = 𝐴(𝑛 − 1)+ 𝐴(𝑛 − 2)  for  𝑛 ≥ 3.   
 
Aha! If Alison begins her journey by traversing just 1 step, she has 𝐴(𝑛 − 1) 
unique ways to finish her trip, whereas if she starts with 2 steps, there are 𝐴(𝑛 − 2) unique ways to finish off. No combination of steps could feature in both 
categories, beginning with both 1 and 2 steps, and for her a journey of any length 
must begin with a single or double step, so the result we need follows. Lastly, we 
calculate 𝐴(10) = 89. 
 
This solution is a typical example of the quasi-empirical approach: looking at 
simpler cases, getting stuck in and working out a few examples, trying to find a 
pattern that can be exploited, but ultimately not knowing in advance where this 
search will lead. This can be contrasted with a more considered, self-aware mode 
of proceeding where a definite strategy is always present. An experienced problem 
solver would probably begin by using recursion straight away, and might regard 
the somewhat cumbersome and messy inspection of more individual cases than 
strictly necessary as a last resort to be used only when other options had been 
exhausted. Let us now consider the case of Josh. 
 
We may again proceed quasi-empirically. We work out a few values of 𝐽(𝑛), the 
number of ways Josh can traverse the 𝑛 stairs if he is able to jump up to 𝑛 stairs at 
a time, in order to acquire some data as the basis for a conjecture. We note that 
again 𝐽(1) = 1 and 𝐽(2) = 2, but this time have that 𝐽(3) = 4 and 𝐽(4) = 8. This 
immediately suggests the conjecture 𝐽 𝑛 = 2!!! . We could check by 
enumerating cases that 𝐽(5) = 16, but at this stage I again have a strong feeling 
that this is a waste of time and effort and that it is instead more profitable to go 
straight to attempting to prove the conjecture. The degree of felt confidence is 
remarkable given that we have only checked a few small values!  
 
We may recall that that 2!!! is the number of subsets of a set of size (𝑛 − 1), or 
the number of ways to make (𝑛 − 1) independent binary choices. There are also (𝑛 − 1) intermediate platforms, each of which Josh can choose to land on or not. 
Aha! The number of ways of climbing down the stairs is just the number of ways 
Josh can select which of the (𝑛 − 1) optional step-platforms he would like to land 
on, whilst avoiding the rest. Having spotted this proof of our conjecture, we can 
now calculate that 𝐽(10) = 512. 
 
An alternative route through the second part of Problem 2.1 would be to look for a 
recursion straight away, by analogy with the first part of the problem. Similarly to 
before, we have that 𝐽(𝑛) = 𝐽(𝑛 − 1)+ 𝐽(𝑛 − 2)+. .+𝐽(1)+ 1  for 𝑛 ≥ 2 , 
depending on whether Josh makes an initial leap of 1,2,3,…  , or 𝑛 − 1  steps, or 
instead jumps down the whole flight of steps in one go, which can be done in 
exactly 1 way.  
 
Again, in order to proceed from this recursion to a closed expression for 𝐽(𝑛) we 
might work out a few values and then notice that it doubles each time. 
Alternatively, it might occur to us that because 𝐽(𝑛 − 1)   =   𝐽(𝑛 − 2)+. .+𝐽(1)+1  we can write 𝐽(𝑛)   =   𝐽(𝑛 − 1)+ [𝐽(𝑛 − 2)+. .+𝐽(1)+ 1]   =   2𝐽(𝑛 − 1)   =
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2!!!𝐽(1)   =   2!!! as 𝐽(1)   = 1. This way of proceeding is perhaps more pleasing 
than making use of quasi-empirical data, although in this case it involved a bit 
more work than the previous argument. The final proof based on subset selection 
was very concise indeed. 
 
Let us now make a few observations that connect this example to the central 
themes of this chapter. Firstly, one interesting feature of these solutions is that the 
quasi-empirical work not only led us to discover the answer but helped us find the 
proof as well. When the quasi-empirical work yielded the first few terms of the 
Fibonacci sequence in the first part, this suggested using recursion. When it led us 
to the formula 2!!! in the second part, our earlier observation that there were (𝑛 − 1) distinct platforms between the two landings gave an opportunity to spot 
the crucial analogy with constructing subsets. This is reminiscent of a famous 
quote by Riemann, suggesting that getting to the answer is often the most difficult 
part: ‘If only I had the theorems – then I should find the proofs easily enough!’73 
 
Another advantage of carrying out the quasi-empirical work was that it provided 
an important check on our deductive counting arguments. Teaching experience 
discloses that students who are new to learning combinatorics usually make a large 
number of mistakes that must be corrected with training and practice. These 
include counting members of a set multiple times when enumerating the members 
of that set, or giving a formula that breaks down for boundary cases such as 𝑛 = 1. 
For such students, although perhaps only to a lesser extent for more experienced 
problem-solvers, the inductive work of checking a few special cases directly will 
increase their confidence in the result. And surely this is a reasonable procedure 
for them to employ, and the corresponding increase in confidence is rational. 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps the mark of a very experienced problem solver not to 
bother with any such calculations. So it would seem that how much quasi-
empirical work it is reasonable to do as a check depends on the mathematical 
experience and ability of the enquirer.  
 
We can also see that in both cases the reasonableness of the decision to stop 
calculating more data and turn instead to attempting to prove a conjecture hinged 
on having gained at least some degree of confidence in the truth of that conjecture, 
based on the hope that the observed pattern would continue. Reaching the correct 
decision here can be very important: both the process of generating more data 
unnecessarily and attempting to prove a false conjecture will result in wasted time 
and energy. This is even more important when considering the much more 
complicated problems professional mathematics study, and here perhaps a 
research grant or even a career might be at stake. So the question of whether a 
body of quasi-empirical evidence warrants investing time looking for a proof is of 
central importance for day-to-day mathematical research. 
 
Yet although a decision is required here, the choices we make will seldom if ever 
be unequivocal. If the reasonableness of switching to looking for a proof after 
producing my initial data had been challenged, or if someone did not share my 
intuitions about the prior plausibility of the conjecture for the first part, I would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Quoted in Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976), 9.  
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at a loss as to how to convince them. After all, only five terms were calculated 
here, and we had already dismissed a failed conjecture that worked for the first 
three. There is simply no way in which the reasonableness of our confidence at 
this stage could have been established with anything like the finality with which 
the proof later supplied established the truth of the conjecture itself. Of course, in 
practice I may never be challenged: usually I will simply make a private 
judgement about how to proceed. This suggests that this kind of inference is more 
suited to the context of Private Acceptance rather than Public Acceptance. Then if 
I am wrong only my own time and energy is wasted. If I am correct, only the final 
proof will be given, and the heuristic work will go unpublished. 
 
 
2.iii. Computers and Non-Deductive Methods as Warrant 
 
In Section 1.vi of the last chapter, we saw how the use of computer-based methods 
has impacted on the effectiveness of proof. In contrast, I will in this section show 
how the potential for non-deductive methods has been greatly enhanced over the 
last few decades by the increase in available computing power they have supplied. 
Indeed, one may even go so far as to liken the influence of the computer upon 
quasi-empirical investigation in mathematics to the telescope affecting cosmology 
or the microscope biology and chemistry. For the two examples given in this 
section, the non-deductive work will be sufficiently compelling to make us 
strongly inclined to believe the results they lead to. This moves us beyond mere 
discovery and into the context of justification.  
 
Compared to the unaided human intellect, the computational power supplied by 
modern computers is in many respects vast. In number theory, mathematicians can 
verify conjectures for huge numbers of integers in a fraction of a second with only 
the press of a few buttons, and easily perform calculations that often would have 
been intractable or at least taken inordinate amounts of time a few decades ago. 
Programs such as the PSLQ integer relation algorithm mentioned earlier have been 
developed to spot numerical patterns automatically. Websites such as Wolfram 
Alpha supply users with a wide range of information relating to mathematical 
input of any description, be it numerical or qualitative.74 And analogous graphical 
techniques have also been developed, although here the human visual system is 
still an impressive instrument. 
 
One especially interesting development in computer methods is the geometrical 
environments alluded to in Section 2.i, which include Cabri, Sketchpad and 
Cinderella. These programs enable geometers to set up a single interactive 
diagram on a computer and freely alter variables such as the direction or length of 
a line segment, the radius of a circle, or the position of a point. In doing so, the 
possible range of variations of a diagram falling under a given specification can be 
explored far more efficiently than by relying on traditional pencil-and-paper 
methods. The diagrams these programs produce are very accurate and can be 
constructed quickly and easily. A more recent application is Apollonius, which we 
will now use to tackle another concrete problem. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 http://www.wolframalpha.com 
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Problem 2.2.  
 
Circle ϒ! lies inside circle ϒ! and touches it at 𝐴. From a point 𝑃 (distinct from 𝐴 ) on ϒ! , chords 𝑃𝑄  and 𝑃𝑅  of ϒ!  are drawn touching ϒ!  at 𝑋  and 𝑌 
respectively. Show that ∠  𝑄𝐴𝑅 = 2  ×  ∠  𝑋𝐴𝑌.75 
 
 
Firstly I used Apollonius to construct an interactive diagram, following the set-up 
described in the question (labels added separately). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The point 𝑃 and the unlabeled white dot marking the centre of ϒ! can be moved 
interactively to alter the diagram. After playing around with these parameters for a 
while, it became visually apparent that a stronger claim was also true: joining 𝑃 
and 𝐴, I guessed that ∠𝑃𝐴𝑌 = ∠𝑌𝐴𝑅 and ∠𝑃𝐴𝑋 = ∠𝑋𝐴𝑄. This claim is stronger 
in the sense that the theorem to be proved follows immediately from it, but also 
simpler in that it comprises two smaller claims we can prove separately and which 
involve only triangles rather than quadrilaterals. Hence, the proof of them is likely 
to be fairly easy to find, given that the stronger claim is true. After adding the line 
segment 𝐴𝑃 on Apollonius, varying the position 𝐴 and the radius of ϒ! results in a 
visual experience that very strongly inclines one to believe that the new conjecture 
is indeed true. Unfortunately I cannot reproduce this experience for the reader 
here, but have included a few static images instead: 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 UKMT Senior Mentoring Scheme, 2012-2013, Sheet 1, Question 6 
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Figure 2.3.  Implementation of problem 2.2 in Apollonius  
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Let us now attempt to prove the stronger claim using circle geometry. Let 𝑍 be the 
point where 𝐴𝑃 meets ϒ!, as in the hand-drawn diagram below, where I have also 
added the line 𝑌𝑍 to enable us to make use of the Alternate Segment Theorem 
later on. Lastly, we draw in the mutual tangent to both circles at 𝐴, and define 𝑇 as 
some arbitrary point on the lower half of this tangent (i.e. on the opposite side to 𝑄 
of the line segment 𝑃𝐴 produced, as shown). Let ∠𝑃𝐴𝑌 = 𝑥 and ∠𝐴𝑃𝑅 = 𝑦. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 
Figure 2.6 
Figure 2.5 
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By comparing the two triangles 𝐴𝑅𝑌 and 𝐴𝑃𝑅 we have that the angle ∠𝐴𝑌𝑅 is 
equal to ∠𝐴𝑃𝑌 + ∠𝑃𝐴𝑌 = 𝑥 + 𝑦, because both must yield 180˚ when added to the 
sum of ∠𝐴𝑅𝑌 and ∠𝑅𝐴𝑌. Using the Alternate Segment Theorem on ϒ! with the 
tangent line 𝑃𝑅 and the triangle 𝐴𝑌𝑍 gives us that the angle ∠𝐴𝑍𝑌 is equal to ∠𝐴𝑌𝑅, and so is also equal to 𝑥 + 𝑦 from before. This is also the size of ∠𝑌𝐴𝑇 by 
the same theorem applied with ϒ!, the tangent line 𝐴𝑇, and the same triangle 𝐴𝑌𝑍. 
Lastly, applying the Alternate Segment Theorem with ϒ!, the tangent line 𝐴𝑇, and 
the triangle 𝐴𝑃𝑅 tells us that the angle ∠𝑅𝐴𝑇 is equal to ∠𝐴𝑃𝑅   =   𝑦, so that angle ∠𝑌𝐴𝑅   = ∠𝑌𝐴𝑇 − ∠𝑅𝐴𝑇 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 − 𝑦 = 𝑥   =   ∠𝑃𝐴𝑌  as required. The proof 
that ∠𝑄𝐴𝑋   = ∠𝑃𝐴𝑋 is almost identical.76 
 
Let us now consider another example, this time from number theory. 
 
Problem 2.3. 77 
 
Does there exist a positive integer, 𝑛, such that (2+ √2)! differs from an integer 
by no more than 10!!?   
 
 
My initial thoughts upon reading this are that such integers will exist because the 
distance from each element of the sequence to the nearest integer is likely to take 
random values from the interval (0,1/2) as we multiply by a non-integer at each 
step. However, it is not clear how to start looking for a rigorous argument for this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Enthusiastic readers are recommended to obtain a version of Apollonius and use this approach to 
solve problems 2 and 6 on sheet 3 of the senior mentoring scheme, 2014-2015.  
77 UKMT Senior Mentoring scheme, 2013-2014, Sheet 1, problem 8. 
Figure 2.7. Scanned drawing of Problem 
2.2 with constructions. 
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claim. So let us instead begin by using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to calculate 
the first few values of the expression and then looking for a pattern. 
 
 
 n        (𝟐+ 𝟐)𝒏 
 
 
 
1               3.4142135624 
2             11.6568542495 
3             39.7989898732 
4           135.8822509939 
5           463.9310242292 
6         1583.9595949289 
7         5407.9763312574 
8       18463.9861351716 
9       63039.9918781715 
10     215231.9952423430 
11     734847.9972130290 
12   2508927.9983674300 
13   8566015.9990436600 
14 29246207.9994398000 
15 99852799.9996718000 
  
 
Examining these data, we see that from the 5th row onwards the decimal expansion 
always begins with .9, from the 9th row .99, and is then .999 in the final three rows. 
So looks as though my initial guess was correct, but for the wrong reasons: it 
appears that 𝑠(𝑛)   =    (2+ √2)! actually gets progressively closer to an integer at 
every step! In another case, this kind of heuristic argument might have led us to 
the wrong answer here. After making an initial attempt to find a formula in terms 
of 𝑛 for the integer nearest to the value of the expression, which was unsuccessful, 
it occurred to me to calculate the difference between the expression and the next 
integer up – as for the calculated values in the table the expression is always less 
than the integer closest to it (apart from the first term). Call this difference 𝑓(𝑛). 
 
 
 n                   (𝟐+ 𝟐)𝒏    𝒇(𝒏) 
   1              3.4142135624 0.5857864376 
2             11.6568542495 0.3431457505 
3             39.7989898732 0.2010101268 
4           135.8822509939 0.1177490061 
5           463.9310242292 0.0689757708 
6         1583.9595949289 0.0404050711 
7         5407.9763312574 0.0236687426 
8       18463.9861351716 0.0138648284 
9       63039.9918781715 0.0081218285 
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10     215231.9952423430 0.0047576570 
11     734847.9972130290 0.0027869712 
12   2508927.9983674300 0.0016325708 
13   8566015.9990436600 0.0009563416 
14 29246207.9994398000 0.0005602203 
15 99852799.9996718000 0.0003282130 
   
 
Looking at these figures we might also notice that they seem to decrease by 
around the same proportion each time, suggesting that we should calculate the 
ratio between terms: 
 
 
 n                   (𝟐+ 𝟐)𝒏               𝒇(𝒏)         𝒇(𝒏) 𝒇(𝒏− 𝟏) 
    1              3.4142135624 0.5857864376 
 2             11.6568542495 0.3431457505 0.5857864376 
3             39.7989898732 0.2010101268 0.5857864376 
4           135.8822509939 0.1177490061 0.5857864376 
5           463.9310242292 0.0689757708 0.5857864376 
6         1583.9595949289 0.0404050711 0.5857864376 
7         5407.9763312574 0.0236687426 0.5857864376 
8       18463.9861351716 0.0138648284 0.5857864378 
9       63039.9918781715 0.0081218285 0.5857864387 
10     215231.9952423430 0.0047576570 0.5857864458 
11     734847.9972130290 0.0027869712 0.5857864789 
12   2508927.9983674300 0.0016325708 0.5857867410 
13   8566015.9990436600 0.0009563416 0.5857887761 
14 29246207.9994398000 0.0005602203 0.5857951978 
15 99852799.9996718000 0.0003282130 0.5858640937 
    
 
Initially, the ratio is always equal to the first term 0.5857864376…  , although this 
pattern changes somewhat later in the list. Examining the rest of the table, it seems 
that we can attribute this to a rounding error of some sort. The zeros that appear at 
the end of the numbers from the 10th line onwards suggest that only about 15 
decimal digits are stored in total.  
 
At this stage, I spotted that 0.5857864376 is the beginning of the decimal 
expansion of (2− 2). If (2− 2) is in fact the exact value of both the first term 
and the ratio of each pair of adjacent terms, then 𝑓(𝑛) must be equal to (2− √2)!  
for each positive integer 𝑛. We therefore arrive at the following conjecture: 
 (2+ √2)!   +   (2− √2)!  is an integer for all positive integers 𝑛. 
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This claim can now proved by considering the binomial expansion of the two 
bracketed expressions. Terms with an even power of √2 will themselves be 
integers, and terms with an odd power of √2 in the first expression will be 
cancelled out by corresponding terms in the second expression, which will be 
identical except for having a negative sign. So all we need now do to solve 
Problem 2.3 is to pick 𝑛  such that (2− √2)!   <   10!!. This can easily be done 
with logarithms (𝑛   =   26 is the first solution). 
 
Let us now reflect on these two examples and see what conclusions can be drawn 
with regards to the central questions of this chapter. Firstly, consider the geometry 
problem solved using Apollonius. By varying the parameters continuously I was 
able to spot an invariant, and this led to a related conjecture that turned out to be 
easy to prove. Of course, without experience in solving geometry problems I may 
not have known to capitalise on this discovery. But without Apollonius I would 
not have noticed the invariant at all: it stood out visually because everything else 
was changing around it as I varied the parameters.  
 
When combined with the developed intuitive and visual abilities of a specialist 
geometer, this new mode of discovery – varying the parameters and looking for 
invariants or other interesting patterns – can often lead to results that would 
otherwise be very hard to come by. For example, Adrian Oldknow has used the 
application Sketchpad to discover a number of results including that the Soddy 
centre, incentre and Gergonne point of a triangle are collinear, and June Lester has 
used the same application to discover that the two Fermat points, the nine-point 
centre, and the circumcentre of a triangle always lie on a circle (now know as the 
Lester circle). De Villiers has also discovered generalizations of the Fermat-
Torricelli point of a triangle and of Neuberg's Theorem.78 As a consequence of 
these kinds of applications, in 2004 Villiers stated that research in traditional 
Euclidean geometry was undergoing an ‘exciting revival’, and mentioned Philip 
Davis’ prediction of a ‘resurgence’ in triangle geometry.79  
 
Experience of teaching students to construct geometric proofs, such as the proof 
required in Problem 2.2, discloses that a common mistake is to rely on features 
that do not belong to the problem essentially, but rather are only specific 
properties of the diagram that the student happens to have drawn to represent it. 
Programs like Apollonius can therefore rationally increase our confidence in our 
geometrical reasoning, because we can continuously deform the diagram until we 
have had a visual experience that has included representatives of all the possible 
kinds of cases that might have invalidated it.  
 
So far this fits with the traditional roles of non-deductive methods in mathematical 
research outlined earlier: a non-deductive check on our deductive methods. 
However, even prior to the discovery of a proof the pull of the visual experience 
towards believing the conjecture was already quite strong, especially after I had 
drawn in the construction line 𝐴𝑃. And it feels as though this time the induced 
confidence is reasonable. After all, I varied each of the parameters across the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 De Villiers, “The Role and Function of Quasi-Empirical Methods in Mathematics”, 401. 
79 Ibid, 401. 
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entire possible range of their values, thus checking a large number of diverse 
representative cases, and the stated invariant appeared to hold true throughout.  
 
In a paper that specifically addresses this issue, the geometer Michael Fox 
describes what he thought at first was a generalisation of the Six-Circles Theorem 
for pentagons with an incircle, which he announced at the Mathematical 
Association’s Annual Conference in 2006. Sadly, the conjecture – which would 
have been a beautiful theorem – turned out to be false. John Silvester later pointed 
out that although the two circles Fox conjectured to be touching always visually 
appeared to do so as he varied the parameters, they are actually offset by a tiny 
amount, below the threshold of visual perception (the discrepancy is reported as 
about 0.12%). Fox writes, ‘The lesson should be clear: in geometry do not believe 
your eyes.’80 Hence, the visual argument for Problem 2.2 does not rationally 
compel assent with the same authority as the proof that is later supplied. 
 
With access to Microsoft Excel available, finding the solution to Problem 2.3 was 
rather easy and indeed almost mechanical. The only interesting parts were 
deciding to look at the ratio of successive terms and spotting the decimal 
expansion of 2− √2. The process was greatly facilitated by Excel’s built-in 
devices like relative cell references: just by clicking and dragging a formula we 
can create a whole column of data. Without access to a computer, it is likely that I 
would never have bothered with this particular quasi-empirical approach, even if I 
had the latest scientific calculator. I would have had to think of the proof using the 
Binomial Theorem from scratch, and this might have taken me much longer. 
 
In some ways Problem 2.3 is again a fairly typical example of the received view of 
mathematical practice. The non-deductive work both provided us with the right 
answer and led us to the discovery of the proof itself, though it will not feature in 
the final presentation of the argument, which may simply begin from the 
observation that (2+ √2)!   +   (2− √2)! is an integer for all positive integers 𝑛. 
However, as before the quasi-empirical work also moved us beyond merely 
discovering a conjecture that was sufficiently plausible to warrant further 
investigation. The fact that 𝑓(𝑛) decreases by a factor of roughly (2− 2) for all 
of the values checked seems like compelling evidence that the conjecture was true, 
and even more so given that the similar expression (2+ 2) occurs prominently 
in the question.  
 
Nevertheless, until we reach the point where a specific integer with the requisite 
property has actually been constructed, the confidence that can be rationally 
induced by the data still falls short of complete certainty. It is possible – although 
perhaps highly unlikely – that such patterns arise simply by chance.  This tendency 
to expect a pattern to continue can be sometimes be exploited, however: it is 
famously easy to fool people with little experience of number theory into thinking 
that the expression 𝑓 𝑛 = 𝑛! + 𝑛 + 41 is prime for each positive 𝑛, even though 
it is clearly composite whenever 41|𝑛, because surprisingly it is in fact prime for 𝑛 = 1,2, . . ,39, and they are unlikely to check values outside of this range. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Michael Fox, “Using the Geometer’s Sketchpad, Part 1: General Issues”, Mathematical in 
School, 37 (2008), 3. 
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In both these cases we have moved beyond simply making an intelligent 
assumption for the practical purpose of deciding what to do next. For both 
problems in this section I felt it appropriate to describe my own psychological 
state, which was induced by the non-deductive evidence alone, using the term 
‘belief’, intended in its fullest sense. Yet as psychologically convincing as this 
evidence was, in both cases it lacked the finality that came with explicit proof. 
Although we might expect the effect on mathematically literate adults to be one of 
belief, if someone were to dissent from our judgement we could not convict them 
of straightforward irrationality as we could if they were to knowingly reject a 
deductively valid argument, even if we might be surprised at their reaction. This 
given, the non-deductive evidence will be less effective in securing Consensus 
amongst the readership of such an argument. 
 
 
2.iv. The Influence of Background Knowledge 
 
Let us investigate another example. This time we will see that the apparent 
evidential import of the same body of non-deductive evidence for a claim seems to 
vary with the degree of background knowledge of the enquirer. Again, this shows 
that although some individuals may find a body of non-deductive evidence 
compelling, other with a different level of experience or background knowledge 
may be less convinced. Non-deductive techniques of this nature are therefore less 
effective in securing Consensus amongst mathematicians. 
 
Problem 2.4.  
 
Consider the set of regular polygons in the plane, with fixed perimeter  𝑝. Which 
of these has the largest area? 
 
This is sometimes called the ‘fencing problem’ because it might be motivated by 
considering the task of determining the largest area a farmer can enclose in a field 
using only a certain amount of fencing.  
 
We begin by calculating the area of enclosed by a regular polygon with 𝑛  sides. 
By drawing construction lines connecting each vertex to the centre of the enclosed 
region, we can divide it into 𝑛 isosceles triangles with the unequal side (unless 𝑛 = 6, whence the triangles are equilateral) equal to 𝑝/𝑛 and subtended by an 
angle of 2𝜋/𝑛 radians. We can again split each of these into two right-angled 
triangles by joining the midpoint of the unequal side to the opposite vertex. This 
gives us 2n right-angled triangles with dimensions as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. The polygons are each 
composed of 2𝑛 triangles congruent to 
(or reflections of) the one given here. 
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The area of this triangle is !!!!!!"#   !!  and of the polygon therefore !!!!!"# !! .  
 
As 𝑝! is a constant that can be factored out of the expression, we will from now on 
assume without loss of generality that it is equal to 1 (this simplification could also 
have been made immediately by scaling the diagram). As before, we can begin 
quasi-empirically, by calculating the area of regular 𝑛-gons for a few different 
values of n. 
 
n Area 
 
n Area 
    
3 0.048112522 
 
13 0.078022298 
4 0.062500000 
 
14 0.078237255 
5 0.068819096 
 
15 0.078410502 
6 0.072168784 
 
16 0.078552180 
7 0.074161478 
 
17 0.078669522 
8 0.075444174 
 
18 0.078767803 
9 0.076318817 
 
19 0.078850940 
10 0.076942088 
 
20 0.078921894 
11 0.077401983 
 
21 0.078982935 
12 0.077751058 
 
22 0.079035827 
 
 
It seems from the data that the area is strictly increasing with n. If this pattern 
continues then Problem 2.4 must be a trick question. There will be no single 
answer, but only an infinite sequence of polygons whose area strictly increases: 
 
Conjecture 2.5.  
 
For 𝑛 ≥ 3, let 𝑝! denote the area of a regular polygon with 𝑛 sides and of unit 
perimeter. Then 𝑛 > 𝑚  ⟹   𝑝! > 𝑝! 
 
 
We have only looked at a small number of cases, so giving our assent to this 
conjecture might be premature. Let us test it for a few larger values. 
 
   n      Area 
 
   n       Area 
 
1000 0.079577210 
 
2000 0.079577406 
1100 0.079577255 
 
2100 0.079577412 
1200 0.079577290 
 
2200 0.079577417 
1300 0.079577317 
 
2300 0.079577422 
1400 0.079577338 
 
2400 0.079577426 
1500 0.079577355 
 
2500 0.079577430 
1600 0.079577369 
 
2600 0.079577433 
1700 0.079577381 
 
2700 0.079577436 
1800 0.079577391 
 
2800 0.079577438 
1900 0.079577399 
 
2900 0.079577440 
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The pattern has indeed continued for the checked values. After producing these 
data I then used an Excel spreadsheet to check the pattern for every value of 𝑛 
from 3 up to 10,000. The pattern continued throughout this entire range, strongly 
suggesting that the sequence 𝑝! is indeed given by an increasing function of n. 
 
Perhaps one reason why the numerical evidence is particularly convincing here is 
because it seems plausible that – to put the matter crudely – all that ‘matters’ is the 
‘size’ of n, its brute numerical magnitude. However, more number-theoretic 
properties of 𝑛 are relevant to some geometrical questions about polygons. In his 
Disquisitiones Arithmeticae, published in 1801, Gauss showed that an 𝑛-sided 
polygon is constructible using only ruler and compass if 𝑛 is the product of a 
power of 2 and any number of distinct of Fermat primes, and correctly conjectured 
that this was also a necessary condition.81 
 
In response to this reservation, someone who was still firmly convinced by the 
heuristic argument might say: ‘Such number-theoretic properties could be 
mathematically relevant in some sense, yes, but not to its area.’ Again, it would 
not be that surprising to find systematic correlations between number-theoretic 
properties of 𝑛 and properties of 𝑝!: whether the latter is a quadratic irrational, 
say. ‘Yes, but not as to the magnitude of the area!’ they may retort. But it is not 
clear there are sufficient grounds for this claim; it is always hard to know in 
advance which properties will be relevant. We shall see in the next section that 
many patterns that continue for a very long time nevertheless break down 
eventually. At this stage there could still be other possibilities we have not yet 
thought of; a reader might even be better informed than we are here and so for 
these reasons find the argument unconvincing. 
 
Let us now consider how judgements about the import of the evidence are likely to 
be affected by having prior knowledge of two related results. The first such result 
we shall consider is the Isoperimetric Theorem, mentioned in Section 2.i: 
 
 
Theorem 2.6.  The Isoperimetric Theorem 
 
The area of a plane figure having fixed perimeter 𝑝 is maximal if and only if the 
figure is a circle. 
 
 
Again, we may restrict our attention to the case 𝑝 = 1. Now, we can supplement 
the numerical findings with an observation easily supplied by imagination. As 𝑛 
gets larger, the polygon will eventually become visually indistinguishable from – 
but never actually identical to – a circle with circumference 1. Moreover, the 
‘degree of resemblance’ also increases with 𝑛. A circle of perimeter 1 has an area 
of 1/(4𝜋)   =   0.0795774715459478… which is in fact very close to – although 
of course slightly larger than – the last value calculated in our table of polygon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 A Fermat prime is a prime of the form 2!! + 1. A proof of necessity was published in 1837. 
Pierre Wantzel, “Recherches sur les moyens de reconnaître si un Problème de Géométrie peut se 
résoudre avec la règle et le compas.” Journal de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées 1 (1937): 
366–372. 
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areas. The Isoperimetric Theorem tells us that 𝑝! < 1/4𝜋 for each 𝑛, and putting 
this together with the numerical and visual data the conjecture that 𝑝!  is a strictly 
increasing sequence, perhaps now tending to 𝜋/4, becomes even more seductive. 
Moreover, had we known this in advance (and again perhaps the reader is in this 
position already), it is reasonable to think that we would have found the quasi-
empirical data more convincing to begin with. 
 
We now consider the impact of knowing a second result. To derive this, we use a 
procedure employed by Eudoxus in the first half of the 4th century BCE, following 
from the ideas of Antiphon and Bryson, and which is now known as the ‘method 
of exhaustion’ (although this name dates from the seventeenth century, and it is 
unlikely that the Greeks had anything so explicit and coherent to warrant the label 
‘method’).82 Eudoxus was able to use this technique to prove a number of results 
in plane and solid geometry, including the theorem that the areas of circles as in 
the same ratio are as squares constructed on their diameters, which was mentioned 
in connection with Hippocrates in Section 2.i. Though we will use the same 
construction, we proceed in a rather different direction, using modern techniques. 
Consider the following proposition, a reformulation of Euclid X.1. 
‘If from any magnitude there be subtracted a part not less than its half, and if 
from the remainder one again subtracts not less than its half, and if this 
process of subtraction is continued, ultimately there will remain a magnitude 
less than any preassigned magnitude of the same kind.’83 
 
Now, we begin with an equilateral triangle circumscribed by a circle of unit 
circumference. Let the area of this be 𝑐!. We construct a sequence 𝑐!  inductively 
by doubling the number of sides of the polygon inside the circle, as in the diagram 
below, and taking their successive areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Pascal Boyer, The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1959): 33-34, 36. 
83  Uta Merzbach and Carl Boyer, A History of Mathematics (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons), 
82 
 
Figure 2.8. Each of the sides is replaced with two equal, shorter sides. 
Here 𝑄𝑅 is replaced with 𝑄𝐴 and 𝐴𝑅, each touching the circle at 𝐴. 
Piers Bursill-Hall. 
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We can see from the diagram that the difference between the areas of the polygons 
and that of the circle decreases by a factor of more than two each time. Although 
the Greeks hadn’t our conception of a limit, we can easily see from Euclid X.1 that 
 lim!→! 𝑐! = 𝜋/4 
Because the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, it follows that 
the perimeter of each polygon is less than 1. So each of these polygons is smaller 
in area to the corresponding enlarged polygon with perimeter 1, and it follows that 𝑐! < 𝑝!×!!!! for each n. By the sandwich rule for the convergence of sequences 
and the Isoperimetric Theorem, we also have that lim!→! 𝑝!×!!!! =   𝜋/4 
Moreover, the limit approaches from below, so there must be a subsequence that is 
strictly increasing. This gives us the following result: 
Theorem 2.7.  
There exists a subsequence 𝑝!(!)  such that 𝑛 > 𝑚   ⇒   𝑝!(!) > 𝑝!(!). 
 
Though Conjecture 2.5 is not yet proved, this theorem – which establishes that 
some infinite subsequence of the regular polygons has the property expressed in 
the conjecture – makes the numerical data given earlier even more compelling. 
And again, it is likely that someone who already knew Theorem 2.7 would have 
found the initial evidence for Conjecture 2.5 more convincing, all other things 
being equal, than a second enquirer who did not. 
 
Let us now draw some conclusions from the results of this section. When 
Theorems 2.6 and 2.7 were taken into account, the non-deductive data became 
progressively more convincing. Hence it is likely that individuals who had prior 
knowledge of or perhaps even substantial experience working with these or other 
related claims would in consequence have automatically been more convinced by 
the quasi-empirical data, because Conjecture 2.5 would have seemed more 
plausible in and of itself (the reader may indeed have found themselves in this 
position). We might also recall Alison’s descent down the flight of stairs in 
Problem 2.1, where knowledge that the Fibonacci numbers often appear in these 
kinds of problems made our initial conjecture more enticing after checking only a 
few values.  
 
This illustrates how individuals with different levels of knowledge and experience 
may react to the same quasi-empirical evidence differently. This may occur even if 
they are otherwise similar in their goals and intentions, psychological make-up, 
belief-forming mechanisms, and attitudes towards risk. Beyond these 
psychological questions of influence, our background knowledge can also affect 
how rational it is to believe a conjecture on the basis of a given body of evidence. 
The non-deductive evidence will have no effect on us if we already know a proof 
or a counterexample. This given, such methods are clearly less suitable for 
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maintaining Consensus amongst a diverse body of mathematical researchers with 
different backgrounds, who are thus likely to diverge in their judgements. 
 
Lastly, even when we have explicitly reflected on the truth of the two auxiliary 
results some sliver of doubt about our conjecture may remain, and although it 
seems that it would take a particularly stubborn person to continue to withhold 
assent at this point, we would not know how to go about convincing someone who 
was still left unsatisfied. But how elegantly these anxieties are alleviated by 
discovering a proof: 
 
Let     𝑓 ∶    (0, !!] → ℝ    be given by   f(x)  =  !!!! !"# !  . 
 
 
Then we have that  
 𝑓′ 𝑥 = 𝑑𝑑𝑥 14𝜋𝑥 tan 𝑥 = 14𝜋 𝑑𝑑𝑥 𝑥 cos 𝑥sin 𝑥  
 = 14𝜋 cos 𝑥 − 𝑥 sin 𝑥 sin 𝑥 − 𝑥 cos! 𝑥sin! 𝑥  
 = 14𝜋 cos 𝑥 sin 𝑥 − 𝑥  sin! 𝑥  
 < 14𝜋 sin 𝑥 − 𝑥  sin!  (𝑥) < 0 
   
as   𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑥) < 𝑥 for 𝑥 ∈ (0, !!]. 
 
 
This means that 𝑓(𝑥) is a decreasing function of 𝑥. Switching to a new variable 𝑡   =   𝜋/𝑥 we get a function 𝑔: [3,∞) → ℝ which is now strictly increasing, so if 𝑡! > 𝑡!  then 𝑔(𝑡!) > 𝑔(𝑡!). But 𝑔 𝑛 =   𝑝!  for all integers 𝑛 ≥ 3, and so the 
truth of Conjecture 2.5 follows. This argument will be found convincing in and of 
itself by any competent reader, independently of their background knowledge and 
experience. It is thus far more effective for establishing Consensus that the result 
is true, and there can no longer be rational concern about its Reliability. 
 
 
2.v. The Goldbach Conjecture  
 
Our next example is a claim of some historical significance, which has fascinated 
mathematicians for centuries: the Goldbach Conjecture. We will see that although 
some specialist mathematicians have yielded Private Acceptance to the conjecture 
on the basis of non-deductive evidence alone, it is not clear whether such 
inferences are sufficiently Reliable. Moreover, these arguments for the truth of the 
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claim are in some degree dependent upon the authority of the specialists making 
the judgement, undermining Autonomy. We will thus see that Public Acceptance 
of the result is not yet appropriate – as has been born out in practice. 
 
 In a letter to Christian Goldbach, dated 30th June 1742, Euler writes: 
 
‘… every even integer is a sum of two primes. I regard this as a completely 
certain theorem, although I cannot prove it.’84 
 
This is the famous Goldbach Conjecture (herein ‘GC’). Euler was following a 
since-abandoned convention that 1 is a prime: for us the conjecture pertains only 
to even integers greater than 2.  
 
Conjecture 2.8. (Goldbach Conjecture)  
 
Let 𝑛 be an even integer greater than 2. Then 𝑛 can be expressed as the sum of 
two (not necessarily distinct) primes. 
 
 
Since its emergence from the Goldbach-Euler correspondence, GC has been 
subject to quasi-empirical investigation on a massive scale. Several 
mathematicians have checked that it is not falsified by large initial segments of the 
natural numbers, and in 2013 a lower bound of 4×10!" for any counterexample 
was given.85 Despite all of this inductive evidence it seems that a proof is not 
forthcoming. Number theorist and Fields medalist Alan Baker stated in a 2000 
interview that ‘It is unlikely that we will get any further without a big 
breakthrough. Unfortunately there isn’t such a big idea on the horizon.’86 
 
As already mentioned earlier, some mathematicians have given full Private 
Acceptance to GC, notwithstanding the lack of a proof, and not only Leonhard 
Euler. Indeed, Echeverria has claimed that ‘the certainty of mathematicians about 
the truth of GC is complete’.87 And in 1922 the eminent number theorists John 
Littlewood and Godfrey Hardy were willing to assert that ‘there is no reasonable 
doubt that the theorem is correct’,88 all before the conjecture had even been 
checked up to 10!. GC thus provides another example of the extension of non-
deductive methods to the context of justification – one endorsed by a substantial 
number of mathematicians. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Władysław Narkiewicz, The Development of Prime Number Theory: From Euclid to Hardy and 
Littlewood (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2000), 333. 
85 Tomás Oliveira e Silva, Siegfried Herzog, and Silvio Pardi, “Empirical Verification of the Even 
Goldbach Conjecture and Computation of Prime Gaps up to 4×10!" ”, Mathematics of 
Computation 83 (2013): 2033-2060. 
86 Anjana Ahuja, “A million-dollar maths question”, The Times, March 16, 2000). 
87 Javier Echeverria, “Empirical Methods in Mathematics. A Case-Study: Goldbach’s Conjecture”, 
in Spanish Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. G. Munévar (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1996), 19-55. 
88 Quoted in Alan Baker, “Non-deductive methods in mathematics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, accessed 10th August 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathematics-
nondeductive/ By coincidence, the author of the article has the same name as the mathematician 
quoted. 
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Psychologically speaking, the data gathered by Tomás and others do seem 
convincing. Let us then consider how we might work these data into the 
presentation of an argument that establishes the truth of GC. We know that an 
admittedly huge initial run of the even natural numbers have been checked and are 
consistent with GC. What general principle could be invoked to move us from 
these data to the truth of the conjecture itself? One line of thought which might 
come naturally here is that if there were a special property belonging to some 
integers, possession of which by an integer entailed that it could not be split into 
the sum of two primes, then integers with this property would have already been 
encountered by now: surely a sample of size 4×10!" is sufficiently representative. 
However, consider the following problem.89 
 
Problem 2.9.  
 
Is it true that 991𝑛! + 1 is never a perfect square? 
 
 
Suppose that we had calculated this expression for a huge initial segment of the 
natural numbers, well beyond Tomás’ investigation for GC – every value up to 10!" , say – and the expression was never a square. According to the same 
reasoning as above, this would suffice to demonstrate the conjecture that no such 
numbers exist. But this conjecture is actually false: the first counterexample is 𝑛   =   12,055,735,790,331,359,447,442,538,767   ≈   1.2×10!".  Moreover, this is 
no isolated example: historically there have been many other plausible-seeming 
claims in number theory that have turned out to have only huge smallest 
counterexamples. Here are three others: 
 
 
• In 1769, Euler conjectured that for all integers 𝑛 and 𝑘 greater than 1, if 
the sum of 𝑛 𝑘th powers of non-zero integers is itself a 𝑘th power, then 𝑛 
is greater than or equal to 𝑘.90 A counterexample for 𝑘 = 5 was found91 
in 1966: it is now easy to verify via computer that 144! = 27! + 84! +110! + 135!. A counterexample92 for 𝑘 = 4 is 422481! = 95800! +217519! + 414560! 
 
• In 1885, Thomas Joannes Stieltjes conjectured in a letter to Hermite 
that the following claim was true.93 Define the Mertens function as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Adapted from Joseph Rotman, Journey into Mathematics: An Introduction to Proofs (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998), 20. 
90 Leonard Eugene Dickson, History of the Theory of Numbers, Vol. 2 (Chelsea: New York, 1952), 
658. 
91 L. J. Lander and T. R. Parkin, “Counterexample to Euler’s Conjecture on Sums of Like Powers”, 
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 72 (1966): 1079. 
92 Roger Frye, “Finding 95800! + 217519! + 414560! = 422481!  on the Connection Machine”, 
Proceedings of Supercomputing 88 (1988): 106-116. 
93 Reprinted in Thomas Stieltjes, “Lettre a Hermite de 11 Juillet 1885” in B. Bailaud and H. 
Bourget, Correspondance of d’Hermite et Stieltjes (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1905), 160-164.  
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𝑀 𝑛 =    µμ(𝑘)!!!!! , where µμ 𝑛  is the Möbius function.94 Then for 
all 𝑛 > 1 , 𝑀 𝑛 < 𝑛 . This conjecture is known to imply the 
Riemann Hypothesis, but in 1985 the existence of a counterexample 
between 10!"  and 𝑒!.!"×!"!"  was proved by Andrew Odlyzko and 
Herman te Riele.95 
 
• In 1919, George Pólya conjectured that at least half of the natural 
numbers less than any given natural number 𝑛 have an odd number of 
prime factors when counted with multiplicity.96 The conjecture was 
disproved by Colin Brian Haselgrove in 1958.97  The first explicit 
counterexample 𝑛 = 906,180,359  was given by Russell Sherman 
Lehman in 1960.98 The smallest counterexample is 𝑛 = 906,150,257, 
found by Minoru Tanaka in 1980.99 
  
 
There are also very large numbers used in mathematical proofs: for example, 
Graham’s number and Moser’s number, which require special notation to express. 
Presumably these numbers are the smallest we are aware of having certain 
interesting properties. Some of these conjectures or others like them could be 
relevant to the truth of GC: the suggestion is at least not obviously implausible.  
 
These kinds of examples raise a concern about the Reliability of believing the 
conjecture on this basis alone and make it seem unlikely that there is any general 
principle that enables us to complete the argument. Indeed, because number-
theoretic properties of the integers are not in general uniformly distributed – the 
prime numbers have asymptotically zero density, for example – they are not 
conducive to this kind of treatment, and there is prima facie no special reason to 
assume the property of satisfying GC to be an exception. We can find arbitrarily 
long sequences of consecutive integers with no primes: (𝑛 + 1)!+ 2, (𝑛 + 1)!+3,… , (𝑛 + 1)!+ 𝑛 + 1   is a run of 𝑛 composite numbers for any natural number 𝑛. Yet no conclusion about the non-existence of prime numbers follows. But there 
might not be anything particularly special or indicative about the first run of 4×10!" integers with respect to GC; our data may be highly biased. 
 
One potential objection to what I have said so far is to note that the account I have 
given of the evidence is unfair. Confidence in the result actually only increased 
when it was pointed out that the number of ways of expressing 𝑛 as the sum of two 
primes appears to increase with 𝑛. Consider the following table of 𝐺(𝑛), the 
number of Goldbach partitions of n, for a few small values of 𝑛. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 I.e. µμ(𝑛)=0 if 𝑛 is a multiple of a square number other than 1, µμ 𝑛 = 1 if n is square-free with 
an even number of prime factors, and  µμ 𝑛 = −1 if 𝑛 is square-free with an odd number of prime 
factors. 
95  Andrew Odlyzko and Herman te Riele, “Disproof of the Mertens Conjecture”, Journal für die 
reine und angewandte Mathematik 357 (1985): 138-160. 
96 George Pólya, "Verschiedene Bemerkungen zur Zahlentheorie", Jahresber Deutschen Math.-
Verein 28 (1919): 31-40. 
97 Colin Haselgrove, "A Disproof of a Conjecture of Pólya", Mathematika 5 (1958), 141-145. 
98 Russell Lehman, "On Liouville's Function", Mathematics of Computation 14 (1960): 311-320. 
99 Minoru Tanaka, “A Numerical Investigation on Cumulative Sum of the Liouville Function”, 
Tokyo Journal of Mathematics 3 (1980): 187-189. 
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 𝒏   𝑮(𝒏)      𝒏   𝑮(𝒏)      𝒏   𝑮(𝒏)      𝒏   𝑮(𝒏)  
           
4    1 
 
32    2 
 
60    6 
 
88    4 
6    1 
 
34    4 
 
62    3 
 
90    9 
8    1 
 
36    4 
 
64    5 
 
92    4 
10    2 
 
38    2 
 
66    6 
 
94    5 
12    1 
 
40    3 
 
68    2 
 
96    7 
14    2 
 
42    4 
 
70    5 
 
98       3 
16    2 
 
44    3 
 
72    6 
 
100    6 
18    2 
 
46    4 
 
74    5 
 
102    8 
20    2 
 
48    4 
 
76    5 
 
104    5 
22    3 
 
50    4 
 
78    7 
 
106    6 
24    3 
 
52    3 
 
80    4 
 
108    8 
26    3 
 
54    4 
 
82    5 
 
110    6 
28    2 
 
56    3 
 
84    8 
 
112    7 
30    3 
 
58    4 
 
86    5 
 
114 1   0 
 
 
 
Moreover, if we plot 𝐺(𝑛)  for the first 10!  values of 𝑛  a beautiful pattern 
emerges: 
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The strange regularity of the pattern does add some strength to the claim that 𝐺(𝑛) 
tends to get bigger with 𝑛. But this evidence is really no more conclusive, despite 
the richness and psychological power of the visual pattern. It is not clear that 𝐺(𝑛)’s being large mitigates the possibility that 𝐺(𝑛 + 1) = 0, and the claim that 
this rather pleasing pattern will continue is itself only supported inductively. It 
appears, then, that this additional evidence will be of no help in reconstructing a 
convincing argument for GC. Yet the opinions of Littlewood and Hardy on matters 
concerning number theory are not to be dismissed lightly. How best can we 
account for their confidence?  
 
As an attempt at a complete elucidation of the grounds upon which Littlewood, 
Hardy and other mathematicians have come to believe GC, the presentation I have 
given so far is indeed highly misleading, and indeed necessarily so. For Littlewood 
and Hardy’s confidence will not have been grounded in explicit inference from 
inductive evidence based on some general theoretical principle, or perhaps some 
variant of inductive logic. Rather, they will have come to an intuitive judgement 
about the plausibility of the conjecture in light of all the available evidence they 
possessed. And as the discussion in the previous section illustrates, this judgement 
will itself have been informed and influenced by many other things they had 
known, believed and experienced up to that point in their mathematical careers. 
Likewise for any contemporary number theorist who now believes the truth of GC. 
We give three examples of related theorems, prior knowledge of which may have 
affected our assessment of the import of the quasi-empirical data. 
 
Theorem 2.10. (Ternary Goldbach Conjecture)  
 
Let 𝑛 be an odd integer with 𝑛 > 5. Then 𝑛 is the sum of three (not necessarily 
distinct) primes. 
 
 
The Ternary Goldbach Conjecture was stated by Goldbach himself in an earlier 
letter to Euler.100 It is sometimes also known as the Weak Goldbach Conjecture, 
because it is a simple corollary of GC, as Euler noted (e.g., if 𝑛 is odd and 𝑛 > 5, 
and if GC is true, then (𝑛 − 3) must be the sum of two primes). Although the 
proof the theorem was not completed until the efforts of the Peruvian 
mathematician Harald Helfgott in 2013,101 Littlewood and Hardy were themselves 
able to show in 1923 that given the generalized Riemann Hypothesis the 
conjecture was true for sufficiently large numbers,102 and it is likely that this 
achievement would have not only increased their confidence in the ternary 
conjecture, but also in the stronger result GC itself.  
 
Theorem 2.11.  
 
Let 𝑛 be an even integer greater than 2. Then 𝑛 is the sum of a prime and a 
second number that is the product of at most two primes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Leonard Eugene Dickson, History of the Theory of Numbers, Vol. 1 (Chelsea: New York, 1952) 
101 Harald Helfgott,  “The Ternary Goldbach Conjecture is True”, 2013. arXiv:1312.7748 
102  Godfrey H. Hardy and John E. Littlewood, “On Some Problems of “Partitio Numerorum” III: 
On the Expression of a Number as the Sum of Primes”, Acta Mathematica 44 (1923): 1-70. 
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Clearly, this result by Chen Jingrun is progress from another direction: it seems 
that mathematicians are homing in on the full result GC.103  
 
Theorem 2.12.104 
 
The set of even integers that cannot be represented as the sum of two primes has 
asymptotic density 0. 
 
 
This claim bears directly on the import of the non-inductive evidence: it seems to 
makes it more reasonable to attempt the inductive strategy, because 
counterexamples must eventually become very sparse over a long enough initial 
segment. Yet its exact implications remain unclear: have we checked a sufficient 
number of cases for the evidence to now be compelling, or will the asymptotic 
density condition become effective only much later on? 
 
Viewing mathematicians’ attitude towards non-deductive evidence as stemming 
from intuitive judgements based on professional experience means that we need 
not commit them to any dubious general principle about all number theoretic 
claims inviting belief when they are verified for a large enough initial segment of 
the natural numbers. Yet it also seems to preclude the presentation of an explicit 
argument that is compelling unto itself. It is impossible for the whole evidential 
and psychological history of an intuitive judgement to be externalised from the 
mathematician making it and published alongside the conjecture. The Public 
Acceptance of GC on this basis would therefore undermine Autonomy. 
 
We have also seen a glimpse of the wide range of different factors that might 
affect our intuitive judgements when a sizeable number of researchers direct their 
attention to a problem. So again there may be issues with Consensus as different 
experts weigh in about how convincing the data are. There will indeed always be 
further insights available – be they related conjectures, historical examples, or 
theoretical considerations. And discovery of each of these may cause judgements 
about the evidence to shift back and forth over time, also damaging Permanence. It 
seems then that mathematicians are rationally justified in withholding Public 
Acceptance of GC, even though it may be widely Privately Accepted by 
mathematicians. 
 
 
2.vi. Acceptance Without Proof 
 
In this chapter, we have seen that non-deductive evidence can give 
psychologically compelling grounds for believing a mathematical claim. In the last 
section, we also saw that mathematicians themselves have yielded Private 
Acceptance to GC on these kinds of grounds alone. Consider another historical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Chen Jingrun, “On the Representation of a Large Even Integer as the Sum of a Prime and the 
Product of at Most Two Primes”, Kexue Tongbao 11 (1966): 385-386. 
104 Carl Pomerance and Richard Crandal, Prime Numbers: A Computational Perspective (New 
York: Springer, 2001), 17. 
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example. In his Opera Omnia, Euler conjectures that the divisor function105 𝜎(𝑛) 
satisfies the following recurrence relation:106  
 𝜎(𝑛) = 𝜎 𝑛 − 1 + 𝜎 𝑛 − 2 − 𝜎 𝑛 − 5 − 𝜎 𝑛 − 7 + 𝜎 𝑛 − 12 + 𝜎 𝑛 −15 −… 
 
 
where the signs alternate in twos. The sum continues until the arguments for 𝜎 
become negative, and he asks us to define 𝜎(0) as equal to 𝑛 if this expression 
occurs in the sum. The sequence 1,2,5,7,12,15,… of numbers subtracted from 𝑛 is 
given recursively: the differences between successive terms are 𝟏, 3,𝟐, 5,𝟑, 7,𝟒, 9,𝟓, … i.e. an alternation of the natural numbers and the odd 
numbers starting with 3.  
 
After explaining the content of his conjecture, Euler verifies the formula for 𝑛 = 1 
through to 𝑛 = 20. He then writes, ‘I think these examples are sufficient to 
discourage anyone from imagining that it is by mere chance that my rule is in 
agreement with the truth’.107 After considering that he might have given the wrong 
formula for the series of subtracted numbers, he uses his claim to correctly predict 
that 𝜎 101 = 102 and 𝜎 301 = 352, and then comments that ‘The examples I 
have just developed will undoubtedly dispel any qualms which we might have had 
about the truth of my formula.’108 Euler later considers a related result: 
 1− 𝑥 1− 𝑥! 1− 𝑥! 1− 𝑥! …   =   1− 𝑥 − 𝑥! + 𝑥! + 𝑥! − 𝑥!" − 𝑥!" +… 
 
 
where the patterns of minus signs and exponents of x are the same as in the 
recurrence relation given above. This time he writes that in order that to establish 
this result ‘It suffices to undertake this multiplication and to continue it as far as it 
is deemed proper to become convinced of the truth of this series.’109 He goes on: ‘I 
have proposed the same question to some of my friends with whose ability in these 
matters I am familiar, but all have agreed with me on the truth of this 
transformation of the product into a series, without being able to unearth any clue 
of a demonstration.’110 Euler then describes the result as a ‘truth’ that is ‘known’ 
but ‘not yet demonstrated’.111 
This kind of Private Acceptance in the absence of proof is in fact fairly common, 
both historically and in contemporary mathematics. Consider now the remarks of 
the Hungarian-born American mathematician Paul Halmos, who in a 1984 article 
gave a description of his experiences of what working as a practicing 
mathematician is actually like: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 𝜎(𝑛) is defined for natural numbers 𝑛  as the sum of the (positive) divisors of 𝑛, so that  𝜎 7 =8 and 𝜎(12) = 28 
106 Leonhard Euler, Opera Omnia. Quoted in George Pólya, Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, 
Volume I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 92-94. 
107Ibid., 94. 
108 Ibid., 95. 
109 Ibid., 96. 
110 Ibid., 100. 
111 Ibid., 100. 
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Mathematics – this may surprise you or shock you some – is never deductive 
in its creation. The mathematician at work makes vague guesses, visualizes 
broad generalizations, and jumps to unwarranted conclusions. He arranges 
and rearranges his ideas, and he becomes convinced of their truth long before 
he can write down a logical proof.112 
 
After quoting Halmos, De Villiers goes on to write that ‘a very high level of 
conviction may sometimes be reached even in the absence of a proof’. Yet despite 
this importance in generating Private Acceptance and in guiding research more 
generally, there has always been a strong feeling amongst mathematicians that 
non-deductive arguments are never a sufficient basis for the Public Acceptance of 
new results. (This is of course a principle consequent upon the insistence on proof 
for Public Acceptance discussed in Chapter 1.)  Consider Euler again, later on in a 
passage quoted earlier (Section 2.i): 
 
“The kind of knowledge which is supported only by observations and is not 
yet proved must be carefully distinguished from the truth; it is gained by 
induction, as we usually say. Yet we have seen cases in which mere 
induction led to error. Therefore, we should take great care not to accept as 
true such properties of the numbers which we have discovered by 
observation and which are supported by induction alone.”113 
 
To make sense of his other remarks, and his use of (a term translated by) 
‘knowledge’, it is reasonable to assume that Euler’s phrase ‘accept as true’ means 
something like Public Acceptance rather than Private Acceptance here.  
 
Since Euler’s time, however, we have seen that the development of the personal 
computer has increased the potential scope of non-deductive methods immensely. 
Consequently, there has been some suggestion that the long-upheld rule of proof 
for Public Acceptance should be revised to accommodate new routes to 
justification. De Villiers discusses the views of the mathematician Branko 
Grünbaum, who used the computer application Mathematica to ‘explore and 
verify’ some geometric results: 
 
Do we start trusting numerical evidence (or other evidence produced by 
computers) as proofs of mathematics theorems? ... if we have no doubt—do 
we call it a theorem? ... I do think my assertions are theorems ... the 
mathematical community needs to come to grips with new modes of 
investigation that have been opened up by computers.114 
 
In the remainder of this section I will use the insights from the examples discussed 
earlier in the chapter to argue that there are good reasons for mathematicians to 
continue to reject at least the majority of these methods – with the possible 
exception of some probabilistic algorithms – as a basis for the Public Acceptance 
of results. The argument will proceed through consideration of our four Practical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Paul Halmos, “Mathematics as a creative art”, in Mathematics: People, Problems, Results, Vol 2 
(California: Wadsworth, 1984), 23 
113 Quoted in George Pólya, Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Volume I (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1954), 3. 
114 Branko Grünbaum, “Quadrangles, Pentagons, and Computers”, Geombinatorics 3 (1993): 8. 
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Virtues of mathematical practice: Permanence, Reliability, Consensus, and 
Autonomy.  
 
As Euler points out, many conjectures for which apparently convincing evidence 
is available have turned out to be false. If these conjectures had been Publicly 
Accepted, then clearly the mathematical literature would have become less 
Reliable as a result, and Permanence may have suffered too. If journals are to 
permit mathematicians to unqualifiedly assert results on the basis of non-deductive 
methods alone, it is therefore important that these methods are known to be 
adequately reliable guides to the truth of the results they are being used to support. 
 
Just as proof presentations must be found acceptable by the entire readership of a 
journal, so too must other mathematicians agree that the methods used to justify a 
published claim are indeed Reliable. Yet as we saw in the last two sections, both 
experience and background knowledge can affect intuitive judgements about 
whether a body of evidence warrants regarding a result as established. Such 
judgements are therefore unlikely to be unequivocal, even once all the available 
information is taken into account. In this chapter I have in several places expressed 
a hope that my intuitive views about the different examples would be shared; yet 
the reader may have found himself or herself disagreeing in places. So if 
assessment of whether a given method is acceptable was to be carried out on an 
intuitive and unsystematic basis, it is likely that Consensus would soon fragment.  
 
Similarly, as new evidence appears and is taken into account, individual 
mathematicians may change their minds about whether a conjecture has been 
adequately supported as time goes on. The Permanent character of mathematics 
would thus be eroded if results were to be Publically Accepted on such as basis. 
 
A related point concerns Autonomy. Consider, for example, the claim of Davis 
and Hersh that the non-deductive evidence available for the Riemann Hypothesis 
is ‘so strong that it carries conviction even without rigorous proof’.115 Perhaps they 
are warranted in making this claim, but how could a non-specialist decide either 
way? Whether intuitive judgements are justified in a particular case is never 
ascertainable by an external observer, because the ultimate evidential, experiential 
and psychological basis of the judgement is always ultimately inscrutable. 
Rigorous proofs presentations, on the other hand, can be checked by any 
competent mathematician, even if they are not a specialist in that area of 
mathematics and could not have come up with the argument themselves. Compare 
this with chess: I can perhaps read about and understand a match played by 
Kasparov or Fischer, despite being unable to originate the same moves myself; 
certainly I can check that all the moves were legal. 
 
Consider again Euler’s expansion of the product into a series given above, and the 
clear appeal to authority his remarks contain. The question of how far it is 
‘deemed proper’ to continue working out terms of the series is not answered 
objectively or systematically. Rather, he justifies his own stopping point by 
reporting an agreement between the intuitive judgements of his friends, whom he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Philip Davis, Reuben Hersh and Elena Anne Marchisotto, The Mathematical Experience: Study 
Edition (New York: Berkhäuser, 2012), 411. 
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states are sufficiently mathematically able to count as qualifying as competent 
judges, a claim which again rests only upon his own testimony. 
 
In these kinds of cases, the explicit mathematical justification given is not in and 
of itself sufficient to compel assent, and the arguments are completed only through 
the intuitive judgements of the specialist, in whose authority the justification for 
the claim then partly rests. This may create practical problems in educational 
contexts: suppose we have a student who is particularly recalcitrant and refuses to 
be convinced by any amount of quasi-empirical evidence. We would then have no 
further recourse than asserting our authority. However, if we can successfully 
show them that a proof is available then this will rationally compel assent whether 
the student wishes to co-operate or not (again c.f. Tall). 
 
What would be needed in order to preserve the four Practical Virtues is a shared, 
systematic way of telling whether a given body of non-empirical evidence is 
sufficient to warrant the acceptance of a conjecture. These techniques must be 
sufficiently stringent to remove any issues about Reliability, and the verdicts they 
render must be stable over time, so as to maintain Permanence. To preserve 
Autonomy the evaluative techniques must be such that any competent 
mathematician can apply them: this will require them to be fully transparent and 
given by a definite procedure. Lastly, in order to be suitably precise and to 
maintain Consensus, the verdict rendered must be unequivocal. If grounded in 
natural language they will lack the necessary precision and objectivity. The 
outcome will therefore need to take a numerical value. Such quantitative relations 
between evidence and conjecture are the province of the theory of probability.  
 
It is also clear that the existence of techniques meeting all of these requirements 
will only be possible if our non-deductive methods themselves are delineated 
sufficiently sharply. Otherwise, it is impossible to be systematic and we are back 
to the kind of skill embedded in specialists’ intuition. Yet so far we have 
encountered mainly opportunistic investigations that yielded data that were 
construed as evidence only in hindsight: not really methods as such, in the sense of 
a definite procedure that can be applied to many problems. In the coming chapters, 
then, we will focus our attention on definite algorithms whose reliability can be 
determinately evaluated using probabilistic techniques.  
 
 
2.vii. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have examined a number of examples of the use of non-
deductive methods in the context of justification. Issues were raised about the 
epistemic security of these techniques, about the unequivocality of judgements that 
are often sensitive to experience and background knowledge, and the need for 
reliance on the judgement of specialists that a given body of evidence is sufficient 
to warrant assent. Where these reservations apply, non-deductive methods are 
always unsuitable for justifying mathematical claims in the context of Public 
Acceptance, on pain of the rapid deterioration of Permanence, Reliability, 
Consensus and Autonomy – though individual mathematicians may in some 
instances be warranted in Privately Accepting claims on this basis alone. 
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I have also argued that the only kind of non-deductive methods which might 
permit the preservation of the Practical Virtues when employed in the context of 
Public Acceptance are probabilistic algorithms: definite procedures for which a 
provable, quantitative assessment of reliability is available. Happily, in the next 
chapter we shall see that such methods do in fact exist and find application in 
many different areas of mathematics. 
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3. Randomised Algorithms 
 
 
This chapter discusses the growing class of computer-based mathematical 
algorithms that make essential use of randomness. In the cases we are most 
interested in, the algorithms do not guarantee us the correct answers, giving us 
strong but less than conclusive reasons for accepting the solutions they provide. 
Our focus will be further restricted to algorithms that enable us to give a 
quantitative, objective evaluation of the strength of the evidence they supply: 
precisely what was found crucially lacking for the non-deductive methods 
presented in the previous chapter. The most important of these for the present 
enquiry will be a version of the Rabin-Miller Algorithm that is very likely to 
produce a prime number, with a probability of failure that can be precisely 
bounded, and in principle made smaller than any fixed positive number. 
 
 
3.i. Las Vegas and Monte Carlo Algorithms 
 
We begin with a brief introduction to randomised algorithms. Various 
precisifications of the term ‘algorithm’ have been attempted, but for our purposes 
it will suffice to say that an algorithm is a finite ordered list of discrete 
instructions, which collectively provide an effective means to achieving some 
specific goal.116 Each instruction must be clear enough for us to be able to tell 
when we have completed it, and its completion must always be possible. We 
restrict discussion to algorithms for carrying out some distinctly mathematical 
task, such as multiplying two natural numbers, solving an algebraic equation, 
finding a prime number, or extracting a root. For these mathematical algorithms, 
the instructions will be given in terms that are explicit enough to be conducive to 
implementation on a computer.  
 
The word ‘algorithm’ comes from Algoritmi, the Latinised form of the name al-
Khwārizmī, a ninth century Persian mathematician who wrote treatises giving 
rules for performing arithmetic operations on integers using the Hindu Numeral 
system, and for solving linear and quadratic equations. In this spirit, we begin with 
a presentation of the modern ‘completing the square’ algorithm for solving 
quadratic equations. Instructions are accompanied by a demonstration with a 
concrete example. 
 
 
Algorithm 3.1. Completing the Square 
 
1. Collect all the terms to one side, writing higher powers of 𝑥 first:   
 3𝑥! − 42𝑥 + 144 = 0 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Attempts to characterise algorithms in more detail have been made by Chomsky, Kleene, 
Turing, Gödel, Minsky and others. 
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2.  Divide each term through by the 𝑥! coefficient:  
  𝑥! − 14𝑥 + 48 = 0 
 
3. Subtract the constant term from both sides, leaving only 𝑥 terms on the 
left-hand side: 
 𝑥! − 14𝑥 = −48 
 
4. Add the square of half of the 𝑥 coefficient to both sides: 
 𝑥! − 14𝑥 + 49 = 1 
 
5. Write the left-hand side as the square of a linear expression in 𝑥. 
 𝑥 − 7 ! = 1 
 
6. Take square roots of both sides, allowing for the negative root on the right-
hand side. 
 𝑥 − 7   =       ±1 
 
7. Subtract the remaining constant term on the left-hand side from both sides: 
 𝑥       =     7± 1 = 6  𝑜𝑟  8 
 
 
Here the requisite precision has been achieved using a combination of explicit 
instructions and illustration. It is a platitude amongst teachers of mathematics that 
practical competence in such techniques is best achieved using repetition with 
numerical examples in addition to explicit elucidation. Computers, on the other 
hand, can follow any coherent and sufficiently precise set of instructions we give, 
and to do so perfectly the first time round. However, when written in code, the 
steps must be in a specific format that is more explicit than the natural language 
description given above. 
 
In implementing an algorithm on a computer, we program that computer in such a 
way that when an input of specified form is given it performs a series of 
determinate calculations corresponding to the algorithm. This yields an output that 
is displayed for the user to see. For instance, when we input coefficients (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) a 
suitably programmed computer might then calculate the solutions of the 
corresponding quadratic equation, or inform us of the number of distinct real 
solutions. An algorithm in this sense thus constitutes a definite method for solving 
a specific class of mathematical problems. 
 
We define a randomised algorithm as one where at least one instruction is of the 
form ‘Select a random entry from the set 𝑆’. The selection is assumed to be 
unbiased, in that each member of 𝑆 has an equal chance of being selected, and 
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each selection is independent. We will also assume that 𝑆 is finite.117 As well as an 
initial input given explicitly by the user, randomised algorithms may therefore 
require these randomly selected inputs to be supplied at any time during their 
implementation.  
 
In a pioneering 1976 paper, the mathematician Michael O. Rabin – one of the most 
important exponents of randomised algorithms – gave some of the first concrete 
examples of randomised algorithms in computational geometry and number 
theory, as well as clarifying some of the underlying concepts. One of these 
algorithms was designed to find solutions to the closest pair problem; that is, given 
a set 𝑆 of n points in a metric space, to find a pair of minimal distance apart.118 
Many variants of this algorithm now exist, some of which are now able to keep 
track of the changing solutions as points are added and subtracted from 𝑆.119  
 
Interest in randomised algorithms has increased tremendously in recent years. 
Such algorithms are now available for many tasks in diverse areas of pure and 
applied mathematics, such as number theory, combinatorics, graph theory, sorting 
problems, numerical analysis, statistical physics, and in performing simulations.120 
Motwani and Raghaven suggest two reasons for this surge in interest: randomised 
algorithms are often much faster than their deterministic equivalents, and typically 
have a very simple structure that is often surprisingly easy to describe and 
implement.121  
 
This dramatic increase in speed and simplicity is of interest to us because of our 
observation in the first chapter that the growing length of mathematical 
argumentation has been in some respects problematic. If their applicability is 
sufficiently broad, perhaps these randomised algorithms can help mathematicians 
to maintain the four Practical Virtues of mathematical enquiry. Let us now 
consider a concrete example of a randomised algorithm.  
 
In 1959, the British computer scientist Tony Hoare discovered a way of sorting an 
ordered set 𝑆 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… , 𝑥!  of 𝑛  real numbers into ascending order. 122  His 
solution to the problem used recursion. We select an element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆, called the 
‘pivot’. We then Partition 𝑆/{𝑥} into two ordered subsets  𝑆! and 𝑆! such that 𝑥 is 
greater than each element of 𝑆!, but less than or equal to each element of 𝑆!. 
Clearly, if we can order both smaller subsets 𝑆! and 𝑆! then our task is complete. 
So we attempt to sort 𝑆! and 𝑆! using the same method. Because the subsets get 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 The precise meaning of this random selection will be explored in great detail in chapter 6 (see 
Sections 6.ii–6.v). 
118 Michael Rabin, “Probabilistic Algorithms”, in Algorithms and Complexity: New Directions and 
Recent Trends, ed. J. F Traub (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 21-39. 
119 Mordecai Golin, Rajeev Raman, Christian Schwarz, and Michiel Smid, “Randomized Data 
Structure for the Dynamic Closest Pair Problem”, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 
27 (1998): 1036-1072. 
120 For a survey, see Richard M. Karp, “An Introduction to Randomized Algorithms”, Discrete 
Applied Mathematics 34 (1991): 165-201. See also See Rajeev Motwani and Prabhakar Raghaven, 
Randomized Algorithms, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), ix, 23-24. 
121 Motwani and Raghaven, Randomized Algorithms, ix, 6-7. Superiority can be provable: see ibid. 
74. 
122 Sir Charles ‘Tony’ Hoare, “Algorithm 64: Quicksort”, Communications of the ACM 4 (1961): 
321. 
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strictly smaller each time, eventually we get to subsets of size 1 or 0, which 
obviously don’t need sorting. So as long as we keep track of the pivots and how 
the members of the smaller subsets are ordered in relation to them, we are done. 
 
A further question remains before we can implement this algorithm: how do we 
choose the pivot? One idea is to always select the element from a specific place in 
the ordered set 𝑆, such as the first entry. However, this procedure yields a poor 
choice when the list is already sorted, which may happen frequently in practice. A 
better strategy may be to select the pivot randomly from 𝑆.123 
 
Algorithms such as Randomized Quicksort that in principle always yield a correct 
output but may have unpredictable running times are called ‘Las Vegas’ 
algorithms. The term was introduced by László Babi in 1979, in a paper about 
finding colour-preserving isomorphisms between vertex-coloured graphs.124 Most 
authors also include the condition that the expected running time – taken over all 
possible values of the randomised input – must be finite for each initial input. 
Other early examples of Las Vegas algorithms include the algorithms for solving 
the closest pair problem mentioned above, Berlekamp’s algorithm for factoring 
polynomials over large finite fields,125 randomised methods for finding square 
roots of integers modulo a prime 𝑝,126 Zippel’s algorithm for finding the GCD of 
two polynomials,127 and algorithms for finding a cut of minimal cardinality in an 
undirected multigraph.128  
 
Another important subclass of these methods is Monte Carlo algorithms. A 
randomised algorithm is Monte Carlo if it sometimes gives an incorrect solution to 
the task it is designed to solve.129 Following the instructions exactly is thus not a 
logically sufficient guarantee of completing the task, and a list of completed 
operations corresponding to the performance of a Monte Carlo algorithm is never 
isomorphic to a proof that a correct solution has been found. Unlike Las Vegas 
algorithms, Monte Carlo algorithms therefore never yield grounds regarded as 
sufficient for the Public Acceptance of the solutions they provide. Examples of 
Monte Carlo algorithms include further procedures for finding graph 
isomorphisms,130 and a randomized version of the Schreier-Simms Algorithm for 
computing a base131 and a strong generating set132 for a finite permutation group. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Motwani and Raghavan, Randomized Algorithms, 3-4.  
124 László Babai “Monte-Carlo Algorithms in Graph Isomorphism Testing”, Technical Report of 
the DMS 79 (1979). 
125  Elwyn Berlekamp, “Factoring Polynomials over large finite fields”, Mathematics of 
Computation 24 (1970): 713-735. 
126 Crandal and Pomerance, Prime Numbers, 93-94. 
127 Richard Zippel,  “Probabilistic Algorithms for Sparse Polynomials”, in Symbolic and Algebraic 
Computation, ed. Edward Ng (New York: Springer, 1979), 216-226. 
128 Motwani and Raghavan, Randomized Algorithms, 8. A multigraph is a graph that may have 
more than one edges between any pair of vertices. A cut is a set of edges who removal will split a 
given undirected graph or multigraph into two or more components.  
129 A Monte Carlo algorithm may have a determinate running time and so not be Las Vegas – for 
instance, the Rabin-Miller Algorithm given below. 
130 Babai, “Monte-Carlo Algorithms in Graph Isomorphism Testing.” 
131 A base for a permutation group 𝐺 acting on a set 𝑋 is a set 𝐵 ⊂ 𝑋 such that only the identity 
element 𝑒! ∈ 𝐺 fixes every element of 𝐵. 
132 For a definition, see Ákos Seress, Permutation Group Algorithms (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 55. 
	   73	  
This calculation is important because it allows swift computation of the order and 
other properties of the group, as well as determination of group membership.133 As 
we shall see later with the Rabin-Miller Algorithm, there are also important 
applications of Monte Carlo algorithms in finding large prime numbers. 
 
The algorithms considered in the rest of this chapter all have a certain kind of 
structure, which we will call Iterative Monte Carlo (IMC) algorithms. An IMC 
algorithm takes some mathematical object 𝑥 and attempts to determine whether or 
not it has a given property 𝑃. For instance, an IMC might complete a task such as 
‘Given a number 𝑛, determine if 𝑛 is prime’ or ‘Given a graph 𝐺, determine if 𝐺 is 
planar’. It is therefore an algorithm for solving a decision problem: that is, a 
problem for which the answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Furthermore, the operation of an 
IMC will consist in running a finite number of identical tests, each of which has 
two outcomes: ‘pass’ or ‘fail’. The IMC outputs ‘no’ if the object 𝑥 fails any of the 
tests, and ‘yes’ if and only if it passes all of them. 
 
The IMC tests for the algorithms given in the next few sections all work as 
follows. Firstly, given our object 𝑥, there will be a set 𝑆! associated with 𝑥, such 
that if  𝑥 in fact lacks the property 𝑃 we are testing for then 𝑆! will always contain 
a number of elements called ‘witnesses’. A witness is an entity whose existence 
shows that  𝑥  does not in fact possess the property 𝑃 . For instance, a factor 𝑥 > 𝑎 > 1 of an integer 𝑥 is a witness to 𝑥’s not having the property of being 
prime. Each test then works by randomly selecting an element 𝑎 ∈ 𝑆!  and 
checking whether 𝑎 is a witness. If 𝑎 is not a witness, then 𝑥 passes the test for 
that iteration of the algorithm. If it is a witness, the algorithm outputs ‘no’.134 If 
witnesses are known to be abundant for elements that lack the property 𝑃, the fact 
that an object 𝑥 has passed many such tests provided good evidence that 𝑥 does 
have the property 𝑃. 
 
Monte Carlo algorithms for decision problems are subject either to two-sided 
errors, wherein the program may be in error when answering either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 
or to one-sided errors, wherein only receipt of one of the two outputs is 
inconclusive. However, the kind of IMC algorithm just described is only subject to 
one-sided errors: the output ‘no’ is always conclusive, but the output ‘yes’ is not 
so. This is because not every element of 𝑆!  need be a witness, so we may 
incorrectly come to believe that 𝑥  has the property 𝑃  by being unlucky and 
missing all the witnesses when we randomly select elements from 𝑆!. However, 
for the cases we are interested in we will be able to attach a quantitative value to 
the probability of this happening. In the next section, we continue exploring IMC 
algorithms by considering a class of methods for verifying a wide variety of 
mathematical claims: the hypergeometric algorithmic identity theory of the 
mathematician Doron Zeilberger. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Ibid., 64. 
134 Richard M. Karp, “An Introduction to Randomized Algorithms”. 
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3.ii. Algorithmic Identity Theory and Polynomial Comparison 
 
Doron Zeilberger has discovered a very general method for proving identities 
between sums of generalised hypergeometric 𝑞-hypergeometric terms.135 In the 
most basic kind of case, a function 𝐹(𝑛, 𝑘) is hypergeometric if !(!!!,!)!(!,!)   and  !(!,!!!)!(!,!)   are each rational functions of n and k, and is a q-hypergeometric term if 
these ratios are rational functions of 𝑞, 𝑞! and 𝑞!. 
 
An example of a hypergeometric identity is: 
 
Identity 3.2. 
 (−1)! 2𝑘𝑛 + 𝑘 ! = 3𝑛 !𝑛!!!!!!!  
 
 
Two examples of q-hypergeometric identities are as follows: 
 
Identity 3.3. 
 
Let (𝑞)! ≔ 1− 𝑞 1− 𝑞! … 1− 𝑞! . Then 
 𝑞!!(𝑞)!(𝑞)!!! = (−1)!𝑞(!!!!!)/!(𝑞)!!!(𝑞)!!!!!!!!!!!!  
 
 
Identity 3.4.  
 
Let 𝐻! be given by 𝐻! = 𝐻! 𝑞 = (!!!)(!!!) (!!!!)(!!!!)… !!!!!!!! . Then 
 2(−𝑞!!!)!1+ 𝑞!!!!! 𝐻!
! 4(−𝑞)!(1+ 𝑞!)!𝐻!!!𝐻! 𝐻!!!𝐻!!!!!! = (−𝑞)!!!!!!!
!
 
 
 
Letting n tend to infinity, Zeilberger derives the following results: 
 
Identity 3.5. 
 
Let (𝑞)! be as in 7. Then 
 𝑞!!(𝑞)! = 1− 𝑞!!!! !!(1− 𝑞!!!!)!!!!!!!!!!  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Doron Zeilberger, “Theorems for a Price”, Notices of the AMS 40 (1993): 978-981. 
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Identity 3.6. 
 𝑞!!!!!!!
! = 1+ 8 𝑞!(1+ −𝑞 !)! .!!!!  
 
 
These last two identities are themselves equivalent to two famous theorems of 
number theory. Identity 3.5 is equivalent to the first Rogers-Ramanujan identity, 
which asserts that the number of partitions of an integer into parts that leave 
remainder 1 or 4 mod 5 is equal to the number of partitions into parts that differ 
from each other by at least 2. Identity 3.6 is equivalent to a theorem of Jacobi that 
says that the number of decompositions of an integer into the sum of 4 squares is 
equal to 8 times the sum of all its divisors other than those that are multiples of 4. 
 
Hypergeometric and q-hypergeometrics identities encompass or are equivalent to a 
huge range of mathematical theorems. Later Zeilberger showed that his techniques 
can be applied to sums involving more variables, and to integrals as well as sums, 
extending their scope even further.136 The approach can now be used on ‘most of 
the identities between the classical special functions of mathematical physics’, and 
indeed ‘all “natural identities” we are now aware of’.137 
 
Although we shall not go into too much detail here, essentially the idea is that the 
algorithm gives a way of reducing the proof of any such identity to that of proving 
a finite identity amongst rational functions, and hence to an identity between 
specific finite polynomials by multiplying up denominators. Zeilberger then 
further reduces this to showing the existence of a solution to a large system of 
inhomogeneous linear equations with symbolic coefficients – i.e., with coefficients 
that are themselves functions of further auxiliary variables. 
 
Systems of linear equations with numerical coefficients are easy to solve, but if the 
coefficients are symbolic then the problem can swiftly become computationally 
intractable. Zeilberger therefore suggests proceeding as follows.138 We substitute 
numerical values for the variables comprising the symbolic coefficients, and then 
check whether the corresponding system of numerical equations is soluble. If it is 
not, we have found witnesses to the identity being false. However, suppose that we 
continue to substitute in further values for the symbolic coefficients, and this 
yields a soluble system each time. This strongly suggests that the symbolic system 
also has a solution, as it is unlikely that an arbitrary system of inhomogeneous 
linear equations with more equations than variables will be soluble.  
 
Next we give a related but much simpler example of an IMC algorithm, where in 
this case we can associate the procedure with a determinate probability of error. 
Suppose we have two complicated algebraic expressions for a pair of real 
polynomials 𝑔!,𝑔! ∈ ℝ[𝑥], each of degree 𝑑. Suppose further that we believe, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Doron Zeilberger and Herb Wilf, “An Algorithmic Proof Theory for Hypergeometric (Ordinary 
and ‘q’) Multisum/Integral Identities”, Inventiones Mathematicae 108 (1992): 575-633. 
137 Zeilberger, “Theorems For a Price” 
138 Ibid. 
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though perhaps are not certain, that 𝑔! ≡ 𝑔!. We have the following algorithm for 
testing this claim, discovered independently by Jack Schwartz and Richard 
Zippel.139 
 
Firstly, define 𝑓 = 𝑔! − 𝑔! . Clearly, our claim is equivalent to the assertion 
that  𝑓 is the zero polynomial. If there is some 𝑟 ∈ ℝ such that 𝑓 𝑟 ≠ 0, then  𝑟 is a 
witness to the falsity of this conjecture. Moreover, if 𝑓 is non-zero then it has 
degree at most  𝑑, and hence at most  𝑑 roots in ℝ, with every other element of ℝ 
being a potential witness. Now let 𝑆 = {±1,±2,… ,±𝑑}. If  𝑓  is not the zero 
polynomial, then at least half of the members of 𝑆 will be witnesses. We therefore 
pick a finite sequence (𝑟!, 𝑟!,… , 𝑟!)  of 𝑛  members of 𝑆  independently and at 
random, and check each of them to see whether they are witnesses. Assuming 
that  𝑓 is not the zero polynomial, and that the 𝑟! are selected independently, we 
have the following result: 
 
Lemma 3.7.  (Schwartz-Zippel) 
 
Let 𝑓 be a non-zero polynomial of degree at most 𝑑 and {𝑟!,… , 𝑟!} be selected 
randomly and independently from 𝑆 = {±1,±2,… ,±𝑑}. Then: 
 ℙ 𝑓 𝑟! = 0, 𝑓 𝑟! = 0,… , 𝑓 𝑟! = 0   ≤      12! 
 
Clearly, as we increase n it becomes increasingly unlikely that any given non-zero 
polynomial  𝑓 will pass all n tests. So if 𝑓 passes every test for some sufficiently 
long finite sequence (𝑟!, 𝑟!,… , 𝑟!) we have randomly generated, then this strongly 
suggests that the condition on 𝑓 used to derive the above probability statement 
must be false: that is, that 𝑓 must be the zero polynomial.  
 
 
3.iii. Hypothesis Testing and Statistical Inference 
 
Let us now see the Schwartz-Zippel algorithm in action in the context of a 
concrete example. Suppose that 𝑔! is defined as follows: 
 𝑔! 𝑡 = (𝑥! + 13𝑥)! − 2𝑥 + 3 ! − 4𝑥 − 1 ! + 13 
 
Suppose further that we want to know its coefficients explicitly. I attempt to 
expand the brackets by hand and get the following polynomial as a result: 
 𝑔! 𝑡 = 𝑥!" + 78𝑥!! + 2535𝑥!" + 43940𝑥! + 428415𝑥! + 2227758𝑥!+ 4826809𝑥! − 32𝑥! − 240𝑥! − 720𝑥! − 1096𝑥! − 802𝑥 − 231 
 
If I have done the expansion correctly, then we should have that 𝑔! ≡ 𝑔!, so that 𝑓 
will be the zero polynomial and no witnesses to the claim 𝑓 ≢ 0 will exist. Yet so 
much numerical calculation and symbolic manipulation was involved in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Zippel, “Probabilistic Algorithms for Sparse Polynomials”. Jack Schwartz, “Fast Probabilistic 
Algorithms for Verification of Polynomial Identities”, Journal of the ACM 27 (1980): 701-717. 
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algebra that the possibility of a mistake having been made when expanding the 
brackets cannot be ruled out. This given, it is clearly useful to have a way of 
checking that the expansion is correct. Now, let 𝑆   =    {±1,±2,… ,±12}. We 
generate 15 members of 𝑆 at random using a random number generator and 
calculate the value of 𝑓(𝑟!) in each case. 
 
 
       𝒓𝒊                      𝒈𝟏(𝒓𝒊)                          𝒈𝟐(𝒓𝒊)                    𝒇(𝒓𝒊)    
 
 
	  4	   98867321361	   98867321361	   0	  
-­‐3	   729000087	   729000087	   0	  
	  2	   728983157	   728983157	   0	  
	  12	   728999985648897	   728999985648897	   0	  
	  9	   60254725476351	   60254725476351	   0	  
	  1	   7526415	   7526415	   0	  
-­‐10	   730418189	   730418189	   0	  
	  3	   12230531307	   12230531307	   0	  
	  7	   7529534579427	   7529534579427	   0	  
-­‐10	   730418189	   730418189	   0	  
-­‐10	   730418189	   730418189	   0	  
-­‐6	   5489090181	   5489090181	   0	  
-­‐3	   729000087	   729000087	   0	  
-­‐12	   7067697	   7067697	   0	  
-­‐11	   115853991	   115853991	   0	  
 
 
Intuitively speaking, the fact that no witnesses were found after fifteen attempts is 
highly persuasive unto itself: given this evidence, it seems very unlikely – though 
not strictly impossible – that 𝑓 is not the zero polynomial. But further to this we 
can also use Lemma 3.7 to attach a quantitative value to the evidence. If 𝑓 were a 
non-zero polynomial, the probability of it having passed all of our tests would be 
less than !!!" ≅ 0.0000305. This would be a somewhat miraculous occurrence, so 
it is reasonable to believe that I have expanded the brackets correctly after all.  
 
This argument does seem convincing. But as with the quasi-empirical evidence for 
the Goldbach Conjecture in the previous chapter, we should spell out more 
carefully what the underlying rules of inference consists in, particularly with 
regards to the significance of the value we have assigned to the probability of a 
false positive. Happily, this time we do have an established inferential framework 
to appeal to. The structure of the argument is essentially that of the hypothesis 
testing or ‘test of significance’ procedure pioneered by the great statistician Sir 
Ronald Fisher. The method runs as follows.140 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 This is the method for a one-tailed test where if the null hypothesis 𝐻! is false then 𝑡 may be 
expected to take a larger value than if it were true. In some cases a two-tailed test also considering ℙ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡!"# 𝐻!  is preferable, though this need not concern us here. 
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Statistical Hypothesis Testing 
 
1. Decide upon a level of significance, 𝛼. 
 
2. State the null hypothesis 𝐻!, and an alternative hypothesis 𝐻!. 
  
3. Decide upon a test statistic 𝑡, the observed value of which will determine 
whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis 𝐻!. 
 
4. Give a sampling procedure that will yield an observed value of 𝑡. 
 
5. Determine the distribution of 𝑡 under the sampling procedure, assuming 
that 𝐻! is true. 
 
6. Carry out the sampling procedure to give an observed value, 𝑡!"#. 
 
7. If ℙ 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡!"# 𝐻! < 𝛼 then reject the null hypothesis 𝐻!. 
 
 
The level of significance 𝛼 here denotes the probability that 𝐻! is rejected, given 
that it is in fact true. This gives us the following procedure for the polynomial 
comparison task. Let   𝑔!,𝑔! ∈ ℝ[𝑡]  each be of degree 𝑑  as before. In the 
description given below the test statistic 𝑡 can take on only two values, namely 0 
or 1. Its distribution is given by Lemma 3.7. 
 
 
Algorithm 3.8. (Modified from the Schwartz-Zippel algorithm) 
 
1. Select 0 < 𝛼 ≪ 1 , the desired level of significance. Let 𝐻!  be the 
hypothesis that 𝑔! ≠ 𝑔! and 𝐻! that 𝑔! = 𝑔!. Define 𝑛 = − log! 𝛼 . 
 
2. Pick an 𝑛-tuple (𝑟!, 𝑟!,… , 𝑟!) at random from 𝑆 = ±1,±2,… ,±𝑑  
 
3. Compute 𝑠 = 𝑔! 𝑟! − 𝑔!(𝑟!) !!!!! . Let 𝑡 = 1  if 𝑠 = 0  and 𝑡 = 0 
otherwise. 
 
4. If 𝑡 = 0, then 𝐻! is true and 𝑔! ≠ 𝑔!. If 𝑡 = 1 then 𝐻! is rejected at the 
level of significance 𝛼.  
 
 
Let us examine the extent to which this procedure meets the demands articulated 
in Section 2.vi for an objective, determinate way of assessing the quality of our 
evidence. Though 𝛼 must be chosen in advance, a potential sceptic is free to 
choose any value they like. Scientists commonly work with the values 𝛼 = 0.05, 
or perhaps 𝛼 = 0.01. But even the rather modest investigation I carried out for the 
bracket expansion task could have accommodated an 𝛼 that was 300 times smaller 
than this latter value. Computers are so fast at performing these algorithms that 
millions of tests can be run in a short space of time, so that given any algorithm 
that has the iterative structure above, leading to an exponential decrease in 
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ℙ 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡!"# 𝐻! , and if 𝐻!  actually is false, we can always acquire sufficient 
evidence for the rejection of 𝐻! for any reasonable choice of 𝛼. 
 
An issue arises, however, in moving to the conclusion that the alternative 
hypothesis 𝐻! is true, given that 𝐻! has been rejected. Whether we are justified in 
doing this depends on further assumptions about the testing framework: most 
crucially, it is sensitive to the prior plausibility of 𝐻! in comparison to 𝐻!. For it 
might be that 𝐻!is prima facie so unlikely that acceptance of it becomes distinctly 
unattractive even if 𝐻!  has been rejected at a highly demanding level of 
significance. We may compare this with the mathematics of clinical trials that scan 
for diseases. Even if reliable tests with only a small chance of giving false 
positives are used, in cases of a condition that is extremely rare it may still be 
unlikely that a person with positive results actually has the disease in question. 
 
This given, hypothesis testing on its own will not enable us to produce a self-
contained argument for the conclusion 𝑔! = 𝑔!. The experiment performed above 
did seem intuitively convincing, however, so let us see how the argument might be 
patched up. What is required is a Bayesian approach whereby we make a 
quantitative assessment of the prior likelihood of 𝐻! being true, which is then 
updated in light of the new evidence furnished by the hypothesis testing procedure. 
But although this technique is of immense value in the empirical sciences, I shall 
argue that within mathematics it is unsuitable in the context of Public Acceptance. 
 
One reason for this unsuitability is of a technical nature. The derivation of ‘almost 
all the important results’141 of Bayesian statistics requires an assumption of logical 
omniscience. But because the identity of two finite polynomials is an a priori 
truth, it follows that we should know the answer in advance. It may be possible to 
give a humanist version of Bayesianism where we can attach non-trivial 
probabilities to mathematical truths. However, this is not the approach we will 
take in this thesis, because there are at least two other problems as well. 
 
Most importantly, there is the notorious problem of determining values for the 
prior probabilities of the null and alternative hypotheses. Doing this correctly here 
requires us to know how the candidate polynomials have been arrived at, which is 
often inscrutable. We might think it would involve an assessment of my personal 
reliability in multiplying out brackets of this complexity. But perhaps I didn’t 
multiply them out by hand at all, and simply used a computer to do the expansion 
for me! Speaking more generally, because such assessments are always merely 
subjective, and never determined by a definite procedure, disagreement will 
inevitably arise about their allocation: this will then be damaging to Consensus.   
 
Secondly, admitting propositions expressing epistemic probability statements into 
the body of Publicly Accepted mathematics is also problematic because they are 
not stable over time. After we have made an assessment of the prior probability, 
asserting a proposition such as ℙ(𝐻!) = 0.6, we update this assessment in light of 
the evidence produced by the testing phase and give a statement of the posterior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141  William Talbott, “Bayesian Epistemology”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 6.1A, 
accessed 11th August 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian 
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probability, such as ℙ(𝐻!) = 0.03. Again, we may then do further testing, causing 
us to update this statement and give the contradictory proposition ℙ(𝐻!) = 0.002. 
 
For the kinds of problems we will now restrict our attention to, however, we will 
soon see that an approach based on ideas from classical or ‘frequency’ statistics is 
available. This avoids these problems without introducing any further apparatus 
than we have already met so far: the techniques given below will require only the 
axioms of probability and the concept of random selection from a finite set. 
 
For the remainder of the chapter, we will focus on a version of the Rabin-Miller 
Algorithm. This will give us a Monte Carlo algorithm for finding a prime number 
in a certain range – as opposed to an IMC algorithm that checks if a certain fixed 
number 𝑛 is prime, which for reasons given above would require us to give a 
‘prior probability’ of 𝑛’s being prime. This algorithm will work by randomly 
selecting a candidate for primality from a predetermined class, and only then 
subjecting this candidate to IMC testing. It will continue to select further 
candidates until one is found which passes all of the IMC tests: it is thus an 
iterated iterated Monte Carlo algorithm.  
 
Because we will give lower bounds for the number of prime numbers in the class 
from which candidates are drawn, we will also be able to give a lower bound for 
the probability that we select a prime number as a candidate. The procedure can 
therefore be associated with a definite, comprehensive probability of error, 
representing the chances that the algorithm outputs a composite rather than prime 
number, without us ever having to assign a prior probability to a specific number’s 
being prime. Moreover, will also see that the probability of error can be made 
smaller than any given positive number by picking an appropriate number of tests. 
 
 
3.iv. The Rabin-Miller Algorithm 
 
In recent decades, there has been tremendous interest in finding efficient 
algorithms for discovering large prime numbers. Records are kept of the current 
largest known primes, all of which have been found by The Great Internet 
Mersenne Prime Search. This project, which has been running since 1997, is a 
collaborative effort whereby around 100,000 volunteers have downloaded free 
software onto their personal computers so as to contribute to the available 
computing power.142 This has led to the discovery of all of the recent largest 
known primes, including the current largest 2!",!!",!"! − 1, which was discovered 
on 25th January 2013.143 
 
Of course, being considered part of mathematics, these achievements are subject to 
the usual restriction to deductive methods discussed in Chapter 1. However, 
finding a steady supply of large prime numbers is also of great practical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142   “Mersenne Number”, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, accessed 11th August 2015, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Mersenne-number 
143 “GIMPS Discovers  48th Mersenne Prime,  2!"##!$%$ − 1 is Now the Largest Known Prime”, 
Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search, accessed 11th August 2015, 
http://www.mersenne.org/primes/?press=M57885161  
	   81	  
importance in modern technological industry – not least because it is necessary for 
maintaining the security of public-key encryption, a method of coding information 
that underlies the data transactions upon which our financial institutions and 
infrastructure crucially depend. This given, there has also been a great deal of 
interest in the discovery of ‘industrial grade’ primes, a phrase coined by H. 
Cohen.144 This is not a determinate mathematical property of a number, but rather 
indicates that it has been selected by a procedure that is sufficiently likely to 
output prime numbers for practical purposes. 
 
In 1977, Robert Solovay and Volker Strassen developed an IMC algorithm for 
testing whether a given number was prime.145 This was of great importance as at 
the time there were no efficient deterministic algorithms available for this task. 
Similarly to the Schwartz-Zippel algorithm given above, it is such that the 
probability that a composite number 𝑛  passes all the tests can be precisely 
bounded, and in principle made as small as desired by running a sufficient number 
of tests. Michael O. Rabin later responded by showing that a deterministic 
primality test146 provided by Miller in 1976 – which depended on the generalised 
Riemann Hypothesis being true – could be adapted to produce another, more 
efficient algorithm for the same task that worked unconditionally, and also within 
precisely specifiable error bounds.147  
 
In his 1980 paper entitled ‘Probabilistic Algorithm for Testing Primality’, Rabin 
describes the algorithm and reports some experiments carried out with Vaughan 
Pratt.148 We are told that at the time ‘the computations were done on a medium-
sized computer’ and that ‘numbers with several hundred binary digits were 
generated and tested’, all taking at most a few minutes to run.149 Rabin used his 
algorithm to correctly identify which of the Mersenne numbers 2! − 1 were also 
Mersenne primes for prime p < 500.  He also correctly identified 2!"" − 153 as 
the largest prime less than 2!"", and likewise 2!"" − 593 as the largest prime less 
than 2!"", as well as discovering what were at the time the largest known pairs of 
twin primes: 𝑝!!!!!"" ×338+ 821  and 𝑝!!!!!"" ×338+ 823.  
 
Let us now examine the Rabin-Miller Algorithm in depth. For any integer 𝑛, we 
define 𝑆! = 1,… ,𝑛 . We first prove the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 3.9. 
 
Let 𝑝 ≥ 3 be prime, and let 𝑝 − 1 = 2!𝑟, where r is odd and s ≥ 1, and let 𝑎 ∈ 𝑆!!!. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Crandall and Pomerance, Prime Numbers, 126. 
145 Robert Solovay and Volker Strassen, “A Fast Monte-Carlo Test for Primality”, SIAM Journal on 
Computing 6 (1977): 84-85. 
146 Gary Miller, “Riemann’s Hypothesis and Tests for Primality”, Journal of Computer and System 
Sciences 13 (1976): 300-317 
147 Michael Rabin, “Probabilistic Algorithm for Primality Testing”, Journal of Number Theory 12 
(1980): 128-138 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid., 136. 
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Then either: 
 
1.)             𝑎! ≡ 1    mod  𝑝,      or 
 
2.)     ∃ 𝑖 ∈ 0,… , 𝑠 − 1  such that 𝑎!!! ≡ −1  mod  𝑝. 
 
 
To prove this, we will need two preliminary results. Firstly, recall Fermat’s Little 
Theorem (FLT) from Chapter 1: if p is prime then 𝑎! ≡ 𝑎  mod  𝑝. Moreover, if (𝑎,𝑝) = 1 as is the case here then we can multiply by the inverse of 𝑎 (modulo 𝑝) 
to get 𝑎!!! ≡ 1  mod  𝑝.   
 
Next, suppose 𝑝 is prime and that 𝑥! ≡ 1  mod  𝑝. Then 
 
 𝑥 − 1 𝑥 + 1 ≡ 0  mod  𝑝 
 ⇒ 𝑝   𝑥 − 1    𝑜𝑟    𝑝   𝑥 + 1   
 ⇒ 𝑥 ≡ 1    or  − 1  mod  𝑝. 
 
 
That is, ±1 are the only square roots of 1, modulo a prime 𝑝. Now, returning to 
Lemma 3.5, we know that 
 𝑎!!! ≡ 1  mod  𝑝 
 
 
from the FLT. We then need only take successive square roots, modulo 𝑝. Either 
we get the value −1 on the right hand side at some stage in this process, in which 
case the second condition holds, or if not we are left with a +1 at the end of the 
process, after taking square roots 𝑠  times, in which case the first condition holds. 
In either case, one of the conditions given in Lemma 3.9 will be met, as required. 
 
The converse of Lemma 3.9 does not hold, however. Given a composite number 𝑛 = 2!𝑟 + 1, there may be integers 𝑎 ∈ 𝑆!!!  such that neither 𝑎! ≡ 1  mod  𝑛 
holds, nor is there an 𝑖 ∈ 0,… , 𝑠 − 1  with 𝑎!!! ≡ −1  mod  𝑛. Here we say that 𝑛 
is a ‘pseudoprime to the base 𝑎’, and that 𝑎 is a ‘strong liar’ with respect to 𝑛.  
 
In keeping with the usage introduced in Section 3.i., we call an 𝑎 ∈ 𝑆! a ‘witness’ 
for a composite number 𝑛 when 𝑎 is not a strong liar with respect to 𝑛: that is, 
when it meets neither of the two conditions given in Lemma 3.9. The existence of 
a witness therefore shows us that 𝑛 is indeed composite. Moreover, in his 1980 
paper, Rabin showed that if 𝑛 ≥ 5 is composite number then at least ¾ of the 
positive integers less than 𝑛 are witnesses to n being composite. In fact, in most 
cases the number of witnesses tends to be far higher, but this suffices as a global 
upper bound. The proof is several pages long and so will be omitted here, but 
interested readers are referred to his paper for details.150  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Rabin, “Probabilistic Algorithms for Primality Testing”, 130-133.   
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Give an integer 𝑛 ≥ 5, we therefore have the following IMC algorithm for testing 
whether 𝑛 is prime. We generate a succession of positive integers (𝑎!,𝑎!,…    ,𝑎!) 
from 𝑆!!!. The integer 𝑛 passes the 𝑖th iteration of the test if  𝑎! is not a witness to 
the compositeness of 𝑛 . As suggested above, the algorithm asserts n to be 
composite if it fails any of the 𝑘 tests, and if it passes all of them then it asserts 𝑛 
to be prime. As the tests are independent, Rabin’s result gives that the probability 
that a composite integer 𝑛 is falsely asserted to be prime by this IMC algorithm is 
less than !!! . As before, we can make this smaller than any given positive 
probability 𝛼, this time by setting 𝑘 = − log! 𝛼 . 
 
Now, to construct our Monte Carlo algorithm for finding a prime number from a 
set 𝑃, which must be known to contain at least a certain proportion of primes, we 
generate a sequence 𝑛!  of candidates for primality by selecting them randomly 
and independently from 𝑃. We subject each successive candidate 𝑛! to 𝑘 iterations 
of the IMC test just described, and the first candidate to pass all tests is asserted to 
be prime by the algorithm. As we shall see below, we will be able to assign a 
definite upper bound to the probability that this algorithm fails to output a prime 
number. And as promised above, the procedure never makes use of claims of the 
form ℙ 𝑛  𝑖𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝛼 , where 𝑛 is a specific number and 𝛼  is a non-trivial 
probability. Indeed, Rabin himself expresses the view that such claims are 
‘nonsensical since 𝑛 is either prime or not.’151 
 
 
3.v. Rabin-Miller in Action  
 
Consider the following experiment. Suppose that we have been informed by an 
oracle – that we may assume to be infallible – that precisely two of the five 
numbers in the set 𝑆 = {503,601,703,803,901} are prime. Suppose further that 
we decide to pick numbers at random from 𝑆, and subject them to 5 iterations of 
the Rabin-Miller Algorithm until we have a number – which could be prime or 
composite – that has passed all 5 tests. The program could in theory run forever: 
we could keep getting composite numbers that fail at least one of the tests. 
However, it clearly terminates with probability 1. 
 
When we run the algorithm, there are two things that can happen. When the 
compiler selects candidates for testing, it will hopefully be the case that the first 
one to pass all the tests is prime, so that the algorithm gives a true prime number 
as output. Alternatively, we could be unlucky: the compiler might pick only 
composite numbers until one such candidate passes all five tests, because at the 
IMC testing phase only strong liars are selected for this candidate. In this case, the 
program will incorrectly assert this candidate to be prime.  
 
Now, the probability of picking a composite candidate is always 3/5 each time, 
and Rabin’s bound gives us that the chances of any composite number passing the 
test 5 times is at most !!! = !!"#$. Thus, the chances of picking 𝑛  composite 
numbers in a row that each fail the test before finding a prime is therefore at least:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Ibid., 129. 
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35 ! 10231024 !   25 
 
 
By summing over 𝑛 and using the formula for geometric series we have the 
following result: 
 ℙ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝑖𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 ≥ 25 30695120 !!!!! = 25      11− 30695120 = 20482051 
 
and hence that  
 ℙ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝑖𝑠  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 ≤ 32051 
 
 
Suppose now that I run the algorithm and the output is 601. Clearly, we can now 
be fairly confident that this number is prime. However, if I were an engineer that 
used this kind of reasoning as a belief-formation mechanism 2051 times in a year, 
I could expect to make around 3 mistakes. If each of these corresponded to one of 
my bridges collapsing, our procedure would not be sensitive enough for this 
application. 
 
Next, let us generalise this procedure; suppose we have 𝑞  integers, of which at 
least 𝑝 are known to be prime (1 ≤ 𝑝 < 𝑞). As before, we pick candidates at 
random from this set, running the Rabin-Miller test k times on each, and outputting 
the first number to pass all the tests. The probability of getting 𝑛 composite 
numbers that are rejected by the test before finding a prime is therefore at least 
 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑞 ! 4! − 14! ! 𝑝𝑞 
 
 
Summing as before, we have that 
 
 ℙ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝑖𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 ≥ 𝑝𝑞 𝑞 − 𝑝 4! − 14!𝑞 !!!!!    
 = 𝑝𝑞    11− 𝑞 − 𝑝 4! − 14!𝑞   = 𝑝4
!𝑝4! + 𝑞 − 𝑝 
 
So that ℙ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 ≤ 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑝4! + 𝑞 − 𝑝 < 𝑞/𝑝4!  
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for 𝑝 ≥ 1. Hence as long as we know that there is at least one prime in our set we 
can make the chances of error in our algorithm as small as we like by increasing 𝑘. 
More precisely, we have the following result: 
 
 
Theorem 3.10. 
 
Let 𝜀 belong to the open interval 0,1 , and let 𝑆 be a finite set of 𝑞 integers, at 
least 𝑝 of which are prime. Define 𝑘 = log! !!" . If we run the Rabin-Miller 
Algorithm with 𝑘 iterations on successive randomly selected elements of 𝑆 and 
output the first to pass all 𝑘 tests, then we have that ℙ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 < 𝜀. 
 
 
When we are looking for numbers that are likely to be prime, the situation is of 
course unlike the artificial example above in that we do not have an infallible 
oracle to tell us that a certain number of our potential candidates are prime. 
However, we can resolve this issue by using one of the many explicit bounds on 
the number of primes ≤ 𝑥, which is denoted by 𝜋 𝑥 . For example, when 𝑥 ≥ 55 
the following inequality holds:152 
 𝑥ln 𝑥 + 2 < 𝜋 𝑥 < 𝑥ln 𝑥 − 4 
 
 
Suppose that 𝑆 = {2!, 2! + 1,… , 2!!! − 1}, the set of numbers with 𝑛 + 1 binary 
digits. Then we have that 𝑞 = 2!. We obtain a value for 𝑝, the expression giving a 
lower bound for the set of primes in  𝑆, as follows. The actual the number of primes 
in 𝑆 is equal to  𝜋 2!!! − 1 − 𝜋(2! − 1). Using Rosser’s result, taking the lower 
bound for the first term and the upper bound for the second, we have that the 
number of prime elements in 𝑆 is at least 
 
 2!!! − 1ln 2!!! − 1 + 2− 2! − 1ln 2! − 1 − 4 
 
 
We can therefore replace 𝑞/𝑝 in the above expression with the larger expression 
 
 2− 1/2!ln 2!!! − 1 + 2− 1− 1/2!ln 2! − 1 − 4 !! 
 
 
We have proved the following theorem: 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Barkley Rosser, “Explicit Bounds for some functions of prime numbers”, American Journal of 
Mathematics, 63 (1941), 211. 
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Theorem 3.11. 
 
Let 𝑛 ≥ 3 , let 𝑆 = {2!, 2! + 1,… , 2!!! − 1} , and let 𝜀  belong to the open 
interval 0,1 . Define the function 𝑓:ℤ! → ℝ!  by the formula 
 𝑓 𝑛 = 2− 1/2!ln 2!!! − 1 + 2− 1− 1/2!ln 2! − 1 − 4 
 
Define 𝑘 = log! !!"(!) . We select successive random numbers from 𝑆 and 
subject them to 𝑘 iterations of the Rabin-Miller Algorithm, outputting the first 
number to pass all 𝑘 tests.  
 
Then we have that ℙ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 < 𝜀. 
 
 
Lastly, we illustrate Theorem 3.11 with an example. Suppose that I want to find a 
prime number that is at least 2!""  but less than 2!"!. Suppose further that I am 
very demanding and will tolerate a probability of error of at most 10!!"". We 
substitute the values 𝑛 = 100  and 𝜀 = 10!!""  into the above formula, giving 𝑓 𝑛 ≅ 0.012464 and 𝑘 = 170. So running 170 iterations of the IMC test for 
each candidate will yield a procedure meeting the desired level of accuracy.153 
 
 
3.vi. Intuition and Cognitive Bias  
 
In this section, we use both a deductive algorithm and the procedure just described 
to try to find prime numbers 𝑝 satisfying 2!" ≤ 𝑝 < 2!". The first algorithm – 
which is based on the Trial Division Algorithm, and always gives a prime number 
when performed correctly – is a Las Vegas procedure that runs as follows. 
 
Algorithm 3.12. 
 
1. Randomly pick a number 𝑛 with 2!" ≤ 𝑛 < 2!" 
 
2. Compute the residue of 𝑛 modulo 𝑘 for all integers 𝑘 with 2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛  
 
3. If 𝑛 ≢ 0  mod  𝑘  for all 𝑘  with 2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 , assert 𝑛  to be prime. If 𝑛 ≡ 0  mod  𝑘 for some such 𝑘, return to step 1. 
 
 
We now consider a Monte Carlo algorithm for the same task. Putting 𝑛 = 25 and 𝜀 = 10!!",!!!  into Theorem 3.13 we get the value 𝑘 = 16,613.  Hence, the 
following Monte Carlo algorithm produces composite output with probability less 
than 10!!",!!!. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 For some interesting empirical results connecting the probability of error with the number of 
tests, see Ivan Damgård, Peter Landrock and Carl Pomerance, “Average Case Error Estimates for 
the Strong Probably Prime Test”, Mathematics of Computation 61 (1993): 177-194. 
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Algorithm 3.13. 
 
1. Randomly pick a number 𝑛 with 2!" ≤ 𝑛 < 2!" 
 
2. Subject 𝑛 to 16,613 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test. 
 
3. If 𝑛 passes all 16,613 tests, assert 𝑛 to be prime. Otherwise return to step 1. 
 
 
Suppose now for some important practical purpose we need to acquire a prime 
number – our lives are threatened by a demon, say, who will kill us unless we 
supply him with a prime in this range. Suppose also that we have a physical 
computer programmed with both algorithms, and so can use either of them to 
supply what we need. Which one should we trust? As an intuition pump,154 I have 
programmed both algorithms in C on my laptop. After extensive testing, wherein I 
convinced myself there were no errors remaining in the code, the algorithms were 
run once each, and the following results produced: 
 
• Algorithm 3.12 outputted the number 𝒏 = 𝟒𝟖,𝟏𝟒𝟎,𝟖𝟏𝟗   
 
• Algorithm 3.13 outputted the number 𝒏 = 𝟔𝟔,𝟗𝟗𝟖,𝟕𝟏𝟑. 
 
 
The reader is now requested to choose one of the two numbers, imagining that 
picking a prime is necessary in order to appease the daemon, and to record their 
choice by writing it down on a piece of paper. My intuitive reactions were as 
follows. With respect to the first integer, I now feel completely sure that it is a 
prime number: checking it against an online database would add nothing to my 
confidence, for example. With regards to the second number, however, I still feel a 
lingering sense of anxiety, exactly analogous to that induced by the quasi-
empirical evidence in the previous chapter. Were I to now check and find that this 
number is indeed prime, I would likely feel a sense of relief, as would someone 
who had taken a risk that had proved to pay off: a sense of reassurance exactly 
analogous to the feeling met with in Chapter 2 when deductive proofs were 
supplied to corroborate the non-deductive evidence. 
 
These intuitions fit well with mathematicians’ actual attitudes towards the two 
algorithms with regards to Public Acceptance. Being Monte Carlo, Algorithm 3.13 
would never suffice to justify a claim in a peer-reviewed journal, but Algorithm 
3.12 would be acceptable in this regard. Yet from a normative epistemological 
point of view, these intuitions are surely bizarre! Rabin remarks in his paper that 
even his much larger error value of 10!!" ‘seems small when compared to the 
frequency of machine errors present in practical computations’.155 There are also 
many other ways in which the numbers produced might turn out to be composite: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 In Dan Dennett’s positive sense of a thought experiment designed to focus our intuitive 
responses on the important features of a problem. See for example Daniel Dennett, Intuition Pumps 
and Other Tools for Thinking (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2013).  
155 Rabin, “Probabilistic Algorithm for Primality Testing, 135. 
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perhaps I have made a programming error or transcribed a number incorrectly 
from the compiler output to this manuscript.  
 
If 66,998,713 does turn out to be composite, and the hardware is somehow known 
not to have malfunctioned, then at this point even the most enthusiastic reader 
must find it more likely that I have fabricated the evidence rather than that the 
asserted sequence of events – the number passing 16,613 tests – had actually 
occurred, especially if they have been exposed to Hume’s arguments in ‘On 
Miracles’. Indeed, even our eyesight will fail us with a probability far higher than 𝜀 = 10!!",!!!, a number that is so small as to defy practical comprehension. Put 
simply, the Monte Carlo nature of Algorithm 3.13 should be the least of our 
worries with regards to error, rather than being the sole determinant of such 
contrasting intuitive responses. 
 
We turn now to giving a partial psychological explanation of that fact that I – and 
perhaps the reader, too – felt far more comfortable with Privately Accepting 
that  48,140,819 was prime rather than that 66,998,713 was prime, and would 
have felt far more comfortable giving this response to the daemon. Philosophers 
often treat such intuitive reactions as an important source of evidence, and in many 
cases this may be reasonable. However, the number 𝜀 = 10!!",!!! is so small that 
our intuitive judgements are unlikely to be reliable. Quantities of this scale are 
well outside of our experience, and so we should not expect to have developed a 
sufficiently fine-grained intuitive sensitivity to the actual risk of error here. 
 
Let us consider the magnitude of this number a little further. We attempt to put the 
quantity  𝜀 into perspective by describing three events that would each occur with 
roughly this probability:  
 
• I take a job at a casino. I work there 5 days a week for 24 years. Every 
working day, as I start my shift, I place money on the roulette wheel 
landing on 13 Black. I win every time I play.  
 
• I decide to spend my retirement playing blackjack with friends. This 
involves me shuffling decks of cards frequently. I do this five times a day 
for a month. I give the cards a thorough shuffle. However, after every 
single shuffling, the cards are always left partitioned into suits, with the 
cards in each suit perfectly arranged in ascending order. 
 
• I try playing the UK national lottery. I buy one ticket each Saturday. I 
continue this every week for 27 years. I win the jackpot every time. 
 
 
These examples might now give the reader a fuller sense of just how unlikely it is 
that we have missed all the witnesses when running Algorithm 3.13, and hence 
that a computer error in either algorithm would be a far more likely occurrence: a 
conclusion that will be argued for carefully in the next chapter. Yet even these 
more tangible scenarios are still quite hard to understand intuitively, and one of 
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these three events may seem more or less likely than the other two, though in fact 
they are roughly equally likely to occur.156  
 
In what must be one of the most widely cited papers in the social sciences, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky discuss heuristic mechanisms that humans use to 
arrive at judgements when the complexity of a problem makes explicit calculation 
impossible.157 They found it quite easy to construct situations where the answers 
given by these heuristics deviates from normative statistical theory, and their 
results have been replicated in many experiments since. It is therefore clear that 
human judgements are vulnerable to systematic error or cognitive biases – just as 
the intuitive responses induced above make little sense from normative 
epistemology considerations. In particular, these researchers found that humans 
are especially bad intuitive statisticians, because our experience is not coded in a 
way that allows us to learn to correct our own errors here (indeed, even 
statisticians were later found to be bad intuitive statisticians!158).  
 
We leave the detailed explanation of faulty judgements of reliability in this 
particular case as an open question, noting only that cognitive psychology both 
suggests it is not surprising and appears to possess the resources needed for an 
explanation. I will however tentatively mention one line of thought that might be 
relevant. One means of coming to intuitive judgements that is discussed in the 
aforementioned paper is the resemblance heuristic, whereby we compare the 
profile of a given case about which a judgement must be made to what we take to 
be properties of a general class. In a famous experiment, they present the 
following question to a number of subjects: 
 
‘An individual has been described by a neighbor as follows: “Steve is very 
shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful but with little interest in people or in 
the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and 
structure, and a passion for detail.” Is Steve more likely to be a librarian or a 
farmer?’159 
 
Most subjects answered that the person was more likely to be a librarian, because 
the neighbour’s description more closely resembles a stereotypical description of 
someone drawn from this profession. Yet there are actually more than 20 times as 
many male farmers as librarians in American, where the study was conducted, and 
as we saw earlier in the chapter this base rate must be taken into account. In this 
case, this makes ‘farmer’ a more reasonable answer. A relevant factor is thus 
ignored, and so the resemblance heuristic can lead us astray in some cases.   
 
In the above experiment, the number 48,140,819 was produced by a deductive 
algorithm, whereas 66,998,713 was produced by an algorithm whose working is 
known not be deductively valid. Moreover, we have already encountered many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 This suggestion was confirmed through an informal experiment wherein I asked some friends to 
express an opinion about the relative likelihoods. Though there was no clear consensus, many 
respondents felt one of the events was much less likely than the others. 
157 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”, 
Science 185 (1974): 1124-1131. 
158 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, (London: Penguin, 2011), 5. 
159 Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 7. 
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situations where deductive methods are epistemically superior to inductive 
methods in supporting mathematics claims. Individuals who have received serious 
mathematical training are therefore likely to have a preference for deductive 
methods over inductive methods, feeling that nothing short of proof is acceptable. 
Thus making use of Algorithm 3.12 is felt to be a better method than employing 
Algorithm 3.13, which is treated with suspicion – even though in this particular 
case the chances of an error arising due to the randomised nature of the algorithm 
was utterly negligible compared to errors caused by other factors, and using this as 
the sole basis for judgement is therefore irrational.  
 
 
3.vii. Conclusion 
 
Some Monte Carlo algorithms are such that errors arising due to their inherently 
randomised nature seem negligible when deciding whether to believe the results of 
the algorithm, because the probability of such errors are manifestly tiny in 
comparison to those of other sources, such as human or hardware failure. In the 
next chapter I shall carefully argue that in some cases the overall probability of 
error – when these other, external sources of error are taken into account – can be 
smaller for such non-deductive algorithms than for their deductive equivalents. In 
particular, we will show that this was true for the experiment conducted in the 
previous section, where the integers 48,140,819 and 66,998,713 were produced 
by deductive and Monte Carlo techniques respectively. 
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4. Two Kinds of Error 
 
 
In this chapter, we will see that for the experiment performed in the last chapter 
the Monte Carlo algorithm provided a more reliable means of arriving at results 
than the Trial Division Algorithm	   –	  a deductive rival that which mathematicians 
would currently regard as acceptable. I argue that mathematicians are under such 
circumstances rationally obliged to yield Private Acceptance to the results of these 
algorithms. I then consider whether Monte Carlo algorithms are suitable for use in 
the context of Public Acceptance. I further argue that the four Practical Virtues of 
mathematical practice – Permanence, Reliability, Consensus, and Autonomy – 
would not be affected by this revision to established practice. 
 
 
4.i. Computer Errors 
In this section, we will review the experiment done in the previous chapter, 
whereby we gave two methods for finding a prime number. These were Algorithm 
3.12, the Trial Division Algorithm, and Algorithm 3.13, which used the Rabin-
Miller test. We consider various sources of error that could have arisen on our 
route to arriving at the two purportedly prime numbers 48,140,819  and 66,998,713, concluding that the latter method was more reliable. 
Firstly, I could have made a mistake in programming the algorithms: that is, the 
programs I have actually produced may not faithfully embody the correct set of 
instructions to be carried out in either case. In this instance, my implementation – 
which may be far from the most efficient – of the Rabin-Miller Algorithm used 
some 128 lines of code, none of which was particularly complicated. The Trial 
Division Algorithm used somewhat less code; around 100 lines. Hence, we may 
take it that the chances of an error arising here are about the same. This case is 
somewhat atypical, because of the unusual simplicity of the Trial Division 
Algorithm: most modern algorithms for finding prime numbers are very complex 
indeed in comparison to the Rabin-Miller Algorithm, and hence programming 
errors are in general far more likely in the deductive case. 
There are also other possibilities for human error in using the algorithm. I had to 
read the answer off the compiler output and transcribe it correctly into this 
manuscript. When I reminded the reader of our two candidates in the opening 
paragraph of this section, I also wrote the numbers down from memory. We might 
hope these kinds of errors are negligible, but if we could put a precise number on 
the probability of their occurrence it would surely dwarf the number 𝜀 =10!!",!!!, our upper bound for the error introduced by the Monte Carlo nature of 
Algorithm 3.13.  
 
Because the chances of programming and other human errors occurring will be 
broadly equivalent in both cases, we disregard these and focus on error introduced 
when the computer runs the algorithm, assuming that it has been programmed 
correctly. Firstly, some useful terminology.  
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Internal Errors 
 
These are errors introduced by the inherently probabilistic nature of Monte Carlo 
algorithms, for which it is possible to receive an incorrect answer even if the 
algorithm is put into practice perfectly. 
 
Implementation Errors 
 
This will be used as a general term for the various kinds of software and 
hardware failures that arise when an algorithm is run on a computer.   
 
So far, we know that Algorithm 3.12 is free from Internal Errors and further that 
the probability of an Internal Error when running Algorithm 3.13 is less than 𝜀 = 10!!",!!!. We now enquire into the relative probabilities of Implementation 
Errors in both cases and compare them to this probability of Internal Error. 
Modern computers are impressive pieces of equipment, but they have not yet 
attained the reliability of HAL9000, the mischievous computer from Stanley 
Kubrick’s film 2001: A Space Odyssey, who boasts that ‘The 9000 series is the 
most reliable computer ever made. No 9000 computer has ever made a mistake or 
distorted information. We are all, by any practical definition of the words, 
foolproof and incapable of error.’ Just like humans, computers can only store and 
perform operations on data with less than perfect fidelity: ‘The computer may slip 
a pulse, its voltages may drop, it may be communicated with over a noisy 
channel.’160 
 
In a paper called ‘Computer Programming for Accuracy’, Mike Yohe lists 38 
types of errors that may occur in running a computer program, including so-called 
‘soft errors’161 that are not the fault of the program itself. These types of error are 
grouped under the seven categories of ‘errors due to hardware limitations, errors 
due to software limitations, error due to hardware failure, errors due to software 
failure, errors due to program failure, errors due to faulty operation, errors due to 
inadequate planning’. 
 
Yohe introduces quantitative methods for giving upper bounds for the effects of 
these types of error, and practical suggestions for avoiding some of them. The 
robustness of systems can also be increased with error-correction software, but this 
has limitations and is itself vulnerable to error. Computer hardware is susceptible 
to numerous unpredictable, often unpreventable or undetectable environmental 
conditions, such as the influence of nearby terminals or even cosmic rays.162 And 
the random decay of chip material releases alpha particles that can change the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160  Philip Davis, “Fidelity in Mathematical Discourse: Is One and One Really Two?”, The 
American Mathematical Monthly, 79 (1972): 256. 
161 J. M. ‘Mike’ Yohe, “Computer Programming for Accuracy”, Proceedings of the 1968 Army 
Numerical Analysis Conference, U. S. Army Research Office, Durham, North Carolina (1968). 
Quoted in Davis, “Fidelity in Mathematical Discourse”, 257.  
162 James Ziegler and William Langford, “Effect of Cosmic Rays on Computer Memories”, Science 
16 (1979), 776-788. 
	   93	  
of a memory cell to a different value.  So the possibility of errors arising is never 
eliminated entirely. 
 
We divide the Implementation Errors that may have occurred when running either 
algorithm into two types: errors caused by the computer’s memory undergoing 
distortion over time; and errors made when the computer performs specific 
operations, such as carrying out a calculation, or retrieving, storing or modifying 
the value of a variable.  
 
The first kind of error can be expected to occur randomly and at a uniform rate, so 
we may model it using a Poisson distribution. The latter kind has a probability 
given by the Binomial distribution. This is known to be approximated by a Poisson 
distribution when the number of operations is sufficiently large, which is certainly 
the case here. So overall both kinds of error can reasonably be modeled with a 
Poisson distribution. We can therefore expect the number of errors of each kind to 
be proportional to the running time of the algorithms, which for simplicity we will 
regard as proportional to its computational complexity.  
 
To show that 𝑝 is prime using the Trial Division Algorithm, we need to check 
through √p − 1 potential divisors 𝑑. For each of these, we need to compute 𝑝  mod  𝑑, which was achieved by subtracting d from p until the residue was found, 
requiring around 𝑝/𝑑  operations. 163  Hence, the total number of operations is 
approximately !! + !! +⋯+ !! ≅ 𝑝 ln√𝑝. We therefore take the total number of 
operations to evaluate a candidate to be O(2! ln 2!/! ), where 𝑛  is the number of 
binary digits of the required output.  
 
The Rabin-Miller Algorithm is much faster, however. Using the repeated squaring 
method of exponentiation, the complexity of evaluating a single candidate is here O(𝑘  ln!(2!)) , where k is the maximum number of values of a we test as 
witnesses, and n is the number of binary digits of a candidate.164  
 
As around 1/ln(2!) of numbers in the set from which candidates are selected are 
prime, we will need on average to try approximately  ln(2!) candidates before 
finding a prime. Disregarding the impact of composite numbers passing all the 
tests in the Rabin-Miller case, this gives us estimates for the overall complexities 
of each algorithm as O(2! ln 2!/! ln 2! )  and O(𝑘 ln!2!)  for the Trial 
Division and Rabin-Miller algorithms respectively. 
 
Substituting in the values 𝑘 = 16,613 and 𝑛 = 26, we see that the approximate 
total numbers of operations are of order 10!" and 10! respectively. Hence, more 
operations will be needed for the Trial Division Algorithm, even though in 
hindsight it must be said that we were rather extravagant with the number of 
Rabin-Miller tests run. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 There are much better ways: see for example Crandall and Pomerance, Prime Numbers, 414, 
algorithm 9.2.10, who write ‘The complexity is the same as a size-𝑁 multiply’, where 𝑁 is the 
base. However, this method is what I used for the experiment. 
164 Gary L. Mullen and Daniel Panario, Handbook of Finite Fields, (Florida: CRC Press, 2003), 
347. We write 𝑓 𝑥 = O 𝑔 𝑥  iff   ∃  𝑀, 𝑥!   ∈   ℝ! with 𝑓 𝑥 ≤ 𝑀|𝑔 𝑥 | for all 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥!.  
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These calculations show that we should expect more of both memory-distortion 
and operational errors when running Algorithm 3.12 than Algorithm 3.13. This 
does not resolve the issue of reliability, however. The occurrence of either kind of 
error is never a guarantee that the algorithm will give us a composite rather than a 
prime number, so for evaluating the chances of this happening we must also see 
how these errors will actually affect the overall output of the algorithm. This will 
require more detailed consideration of how each algorithm works. 
 
We first consider the impact of errors that might have been induced when the 
computer performed specific operations, beginning with the Trial Division 
Algorithm. Once a candidate is selected, it is evaluated as either prime or 
composite. Two kinds of error are possible here. Either the program could falsely 
assert a composite number to be prime, or it could falsely assert a prime number to 
be composite. The latter kind of case is of no concern to us here: in this instance, 
the compiler would simply discard the number and look for another candidate. The 
only circumstance under the computer gives an erroneous output is if a composite 
candidate is falsely deemed to be prime. 
 
Let us consider how this might occur by using the composite number 𝑁 = 799   =  17×47 as an example. The compiler will attempt to divide 𝑁 by the numbers 2, 3, 4,… , 27,28, as √799 ≅ 28.267. Suppose further that the algorithm makes a 
mistake when computing, for example, 799  mod  13. If it incorrectly computes 
this remainder as 0 instead of 6 then it will correctly identify 799 as composite 
(although for the wrong reasons). It will then discard it and look for a new 
candidate. If it computes this remainder as a different non-zero number, other than 
the correct value 6, then the algorithm will still discover that 799 is composite 
when it later successfully divides it by 17, and the error will again have been of no 
consequence. In fact, the only circumstances under which this type of error will 
lead to the compiler falsely asserting that 799 is prime is if it incorrectly calculates 
the value of 799  mod  17. 
 
More generally, the Trial Division Algorithm will only incorrectly assert a 
composite number N to be prime because of a mistake in calculating the 
remainders as it computes 𝑛  mod  𝑑 incorrectly for every number 𝑑 such that 𝑑|𝑁 
and 𝑑   ≤   √𝑁. This probability depends on the specific factorisation of 𝑁. As 𝑁 
can be expected to have around 𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑛𝑁)  factors, then we may expect the 
probability of this occurring to be 𝜀!!"(!"(!)/!  , where 𝜀! is the probability of a 
particular computation of a residue going wrong.165 For our experiment, this value 
was around 𝜀!!.!". 
 
We now consider parallel kinds of Implementation Error when running the Rabin-
Miller Algorithm. Let 𝜀! be the probability that the compiler makes a mistake by 
failing to notice that a given number is a witness to the compositeness of 𝑛. In 
general we know that there are at least  3(𝑁 − 1)/4 witnesses for composite 𝑁, so 
we should expect to pick around 3𝑘/4 witnesses in total when running our 𝑘 tests. 
But this time, we need the compiler to incorrectly fail to identify every single one 
of these as witnesses. We may therefore estimate that the chances of this having 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 In deriving this result, I made use of the Erdős–Kac_theorem. 
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happened in our experiment were less than 𝜀!!"#$%. Whatever the correct empirical 
values of 𝜀!  and 𝜀!  turn out to be, it is clear that the overall chances of an 
operational error causing the Rabin-Miller Algorithm to output a composite 
number are far less than in the deductive case. 
 
As became apparent in Chapter 1, the very strength of proof within the classical 
tradition – its cumulative, deductive structure – becomes a kind of weakness when 
informed by the new computer-based perspective where proofs are much longer 
and the laws of information theory come into effect, because any gap in an 
argument can render a proof invalid. In contrast, we can now see that because IMC 
algorithms work by completing a large number of independent tests, if there is an 
error or glitch that is localised to the performance of just one of these tests then the 
this actually matters very little. As with Internal Errors, the chances of such 
Implementation Errors actually causing an incorrect output decreases 
exponentially with the number of tests. 
 
Data corruptions due to environmental stimuli such as a cosmic ray changing the 
state of a memory cell may affect the running of either algorithm in a variety of 
unpredictable ways. Some might cause an effect of a global nature, whereas others 
might be less significant. For instance, the Trial Division Algorithm requires a 
variable that enables the compiler to keep its place in the sequence of divisors; this 
will start from 2 and increase up to 28 in the case just illustrated. However, 
supposing after the third iteration a cosmic ray causes its value to change from 4 to 36 unexpectedly; then the algorithm will terminate here and not go on to discover 
that 17|799. It will then falsely conclude that 799 is prime, having not found a 
factor by the end of the process.  
 
The Rabin-Miller Algorithm also needs a variable that counts the number of tests 
that have been run, and so interference with the computer’s memory could alter its 
value and cause the algorithm to terminate prematurely. However, most of the 
time when this occurs, a large number of independent tests would have already 
been run by this point. Hence the threat of such errors – in themselves likely to be 
more numerous, due to the longer running time – is greater for Algorithm 3.12. In 
conclusion, because Algorithm 3.13 takes much less time to run and tends to deal 
with errors in a more robust way, we may take it that the probability of an 
Implementation Error is less than for Algorithm 3.12. 
 
Now, let us compare these Implementation Errors to the probability of an Internal 
Error in Algorithm 3.13. The age of the universe is currently estimated to be 
around 4×10!" seconds. Suppose we proceed to run our Monte Carlo algorithm 
250 times per second on a supercomputer. We would on average have to continue 
doing this for a hundred million billion billion billion … billion (with ‘billion’ 
written 1108 times) times the entire age of the universe before we encountered a 
single Internal Error.  It is clear that Implementation Errors must occur in both 
algorithms at a much greater frequency than this. But because we can reasonably 
approximate the total probability of error as the sum of the probability of 
Implementation and Internal Errors, we see that the overall probability of error 
associated with Algorithm 3.13 is in fact less than that for Algorithm 3.12. 
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4.ii. Knowledge and Epistemic Externalism 
 
The conclusions of the previous section suggest that contrary to my initial intuitive 
reaction we would have been wiser to give the daemon the number 66,998,713 in 
the context of the thought experiment described in Section 3.vi. In the next two 
sections, we consider a philosophical objection to forming beliefs on the basis of 
the output of a Monte Carlo algorithm. The objection is that use of such algorithms 
can never lead to knowledge of the corresponding conclusions, where ‘knowledge’ 
is understood in an infallibilist sense. As knowledge is taken to be of central 
epistemic importance, this may provide mathematicians with sufficient reasons to 
reject Monte Carlo algorithms in the context of Private Acceptance. 
 
Consider the kind of intuition appealed to in lottery cases, as discussed by 
Hawthorne and others.166 An individual buys a ticket for the UK national lottery, 
giving him a 1 in 𝐶!!" = 13,983,816 chance of winning the jackpot by correctly 
selecting the 6 winning numbers from a possible choice of 49. It is thus very 
unlikely he will win. However, a logical problem seems to arise if we assert that 
he knows he will not win. For it is plausible to suggest that however we are to 
understand propositional knowledge, it should be closed under conjunction, in the 
sense that if a subject knows propositions 𝐴 and 𝐵 and is familiar with the rules of 
logic and validly infers 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  then he or she knows this proposition too.  
 
Suppose then that our first individual knows his ticket will not win. In this case, a 
second, very wealthy individual could buy all 13,983,816 tickets for the lottery 
and choose every possible combination of numbers. By symmetry with our first 
speculator, he knows for each ticket that that ticket will not win. He therefore 
knows that none of them will win, as knowledge is closed under conjunction. But 
this is preposterous, as in fact he knows that one of them must win. 
 
Based on this kind of example one might conclude that knowledge should be 
understood in an infallibilist sense, at least in certain kinds of cases where this line 
of reasoning applies. There are of course various cogent objections to this move in 
the epistemological literature, but let us concede this point to the infallibilist for 
the sake of mounting the challenge against Monte Carlo algorithms. If infallibilism 
turns out to be untenable, then as we shall see the argument cannot get going.  
 
In cases similar to the lottery example, then, the grounds that a subject possesses 
as the basis for his or her belief do not guarantee that the belief in question is true 
– in this case, the belief we will not win – and as a result we say that the belief is 
not knowledge, even though it is very likely to be true. But a subject who forms 
beliefs on the basis of a Monte Carlo algorithm such as Algorithm 3.13 is clearly 
in a situation that is similar in the relevant respects. So if the infallibilist 
conception of knowledge does applies here too, then such a belief – for example, 
the belief that 66,998,713 was prime that I formed in the last chapter – can 
therefore never qualify as knowledge on the basis of these algorithms alone.  
 
We might initially think that an individual who gained a belief from a 
deterministic program – and again, we may take as an example our belief that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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48,140,819 is prime – would likewise also not be in possession of knowledge. For 
as we saw in the previous section, such programs are subject to a variety of 
hardware, software and human errors. So the passage to belief can also be 
associated with some positive probability of failure. However, I shall now present 
a line of thought that argues this is not so (continuing to assume the infallibilist 
conception of knowledge throughout, again for the sake of argument). 
 
Firstly, we make a distinction between the grounds that a belief is based on, and 
the access we have to those grounds. Consequently, when we believe a proposition 
on the basis of some such grounds, there are two possible sources of error. Either 
the grounds we have for believing the proposition do not guarantee its truth, and 
this is one of the cases where the grounds obtain but the conclusion does not; or, 
whilst the grounds we think we have do indeed guarantee the truth of the 
proposition, we are in fact mistaken about having the grounds we think we have.  
 
Now, consider an analogy with visual perception. Sarah, who is at a wildlife 
enclosure, looks out across a field and sees what appears to her to be, and in fact 
is, a zebra. She thus forms a true belief that there is a zebra in the field. 
Meanwhile, Jeff – who is at an entirely different wildlife enclosure in a different 
part of the country – looks out across a field and also sees what again appears to 
him to be a zebra. However, this time it is in fact not a zebra, but rather a cleverly 
painted mule.167  
 
There is of course a well-known skeptical argument for the conclusion that Sarah’s 
true belief that there is a zebra in the field does not constitute knowledge, because 
the case of Jeff clearly shows that having the experience of seeing what appears to 
be a zebra is not a logical guarantee of the zebra’s actually being there. The case is 
thus construed as similar in the relevant respects to buying a lottery ticket, even 
though this time we are unable to attach so precise a probability to the evidence 
misleading us. Yet this kind of skeptical argument is now found to be 
unconvincing by many philosophers, because we can characterise Sarah’s grounds 
for belief in a different way.  
 
Consider first the logic of how truth conditions attach to verbs relating to 
perception, such as ‘see’. There are two kinds of accounts. According to one sort 
of view, ‘seeing a zebra’ involves only being aware of certain mental entities that 
give us the subjective impression of seeing a zebra. On this account, both Jeff and 
Sarah are seeing a zebra. A second type of account understands seeing as 
successive: that is, that seeing constitutively involving us standing in a certain 
causal relation to the seen object. For it to count as a case of seeing in particular, 
the seen object must therefore actually exist. For theories of seeing of this kind 
there is thus an important logical difference between the two cases: despite the 
subjective indistinguishability of Sarah and Jeff’s experiences, only Sarah but not 
Jeff really sees a zebra. 
 
We need not discuss which of these two types of theories is correct – we simply 
assume the latter kind of account is true for the purposes of the argument  (it is far 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 The example is of course borrowed from Dretske, though he puts it to quite different use. Fred 
Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981). 
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more popular in any case). Now, if we also assume that Sarah’s grounds for 
believing there is a zebra are understood to be that she specifically sees a zebra 
and not merely that she appears to see a zebra, then she does have grounds which 
logically entail the truth of her belief. For as we have already said, if it is to count 
as a case of her seeing a zebra (in the successive sense) then it is necessary for the 
zebra to actually exist. 
 
The focus of the discussion now shifts to the second of the two ways in which an 
error can arise: whether Sarah really does have the grounds she thinks she does. 
We can agree that from her perspective it is possible that she sees a cleverly 
painted mule rather than a zebra, in the sense that this would have been 
subjectively indistinguishable from what actually occurred. However, this would 
require her world to be very different in the relevant respects (assuming here that 
there are no cleverly painted mules in the surrounding area). Hence we may take it 
that this possibility does not undermine her claim to knowledge. After all, her 
mode of access to her evidence is reliable – we may suppose she enjoys good 
eyesight and is here subject to normal viewing conditions – and the acquisition of 
her belief through perception no way involves luck or a violation of epistemic 
rationality (again, skeptical readers are invited to go along with this thought 
merely for the purposes of the argument).  
 
Now, suppose James – a mathematician – discovers a new result in geometry by 
spotting an invariant using Apollonius and is then able to produce a proof for his 
claim. When asked why he believes his theorem to be true, he responds that he 
knows it is true because he has proved it. As we have already noted, the term 
‘proof’ denotes a successive concept. It is therefore natural to understand the verb 
‘prove’ in a successive sense, analogous to the second type of account of seeing. 
The argument he has discovered is in fact sound, he is in general fairly reliable – 
though perhaps not infallible – at telling when this is the case, and he was in no 
way lucky in constructing his argument. Hence, we may say that James knows the 
content of the theorem, even if he had upon occasion been unable to tell that a 
similar-looking mathematical argument was in fact flawed in past instances. 
 
Lastly, we transfer these ideas to the case at hand. Suppose Susan correctly 
programs Algorithm 3.12 onto a computer and then runs the algorithm with no 
Implementation Errors occurring, thus coming to the true belief that a certain 
number is prime. By analogy with the previous two cases, we may characterise the 
grounds of her belief as that a series of computer operations have been performed 
which can easily be converted into the presentation of a proof that the outputted 
number is prime. In the skillful use of the computer to determine this she has made 
use of a kind of faculty that is analogous to the case of perception here, though less 
direct, and we may again understand the operation of this faculty in a successive 
sense. Assuming that she is at least a fairly reliable programmer, and the machine 
the program is implemented on is tolerably robust, our subject has gained access to 
conclusive grounds for her belief through a reliable method that involves no 
violation of epistemic rationality. The belief thus constitutes knowledge. 
 
In contrast, an individual running only Algorithm 3.13 can never have knowledge 
that the outputted number is prime, even if the algorithm is programmed correctly 
and implemented without incident, because his own characterisation of his 
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grounds could be no stronger than the statement of the inconclusive fact that a 
Rabin-Miller program outputted that number. There are no conclusive grounds 
available that he is in a position to gain access to using only this program (it is 
immaterial whether the number is actually prime or not). So only a deterministic 
algorithm and not a Monte Carlo algorithm can yield knowledge. Though we may 
perhaps now know that 48,140,819  is prime, the same cannot be said for 66,998,713. And clearly, the same argument applies in similar cases. 
 
 
4.iii. A Pragmatic Approach to Epistemic Concepts 
 
The conclusions of the above argument – that only the less reliable source of belief 
can enable us to have knowledge – gives us excellent grounds to think that the 
infallibilist conception of knowledge we have partially articulated must be in some 
respects flawed. But let us take it that the argument given above is correct on its 
own terms: that knowledge is to be understood in an infallibilist sense in these 
kinds of cases, that a successive account of the relevant evidential relations holds, 
and hence only Algorithm 3.12 but not Algorithm 3.13 can furnish us with 
knowledge that a particular number is prime. How does this conclusion affect our 
feelings about the results of the experiment performed in the previous chapter? 
The reader is again invited to imagine that he or she has an urgent need to supply a 
prime number in this range for some particularly important application, and to 
revise their earlier choice of either 48,140,819 or 66,998,713 if necessary. 
 
If we take the application of the concept of knowledge – as understood in the 
infallibilist sense – as primary here, the conclusions of the above argument provide 
us with a principled means of choosing. However, we in fact have a variety of 
analytic tools at our disposal: there are other evaluative epistemic concepts such as 
justification, grounds, evidence, and – importantly – the concept of reliability 
itself. We could even simply decide to think in terms of a knowledge-like concept 
that operates under a logic that is fallibilist. As rational agents, we are able to 
reflect on the effectiveness of using a particular framework of concepts when 
formulating and pursuing our goals.  
 
If our primary concern is with finding the daemon a prime number, then, we 
should not prejudice our account by making an a priori assumption that one of 
these concepts in particular, such as knowledge as understood by the infallibilist, 
will give us the most illuminating terms in which to understand our situation or 
best help us assess the possible courses of action open to us. We are not aiming to 
manoeuvre ourselves into the extension of any fixed epistemic concept as such, 
but rather are primarily concerned with a definite practical goal. For any given 
concept we possess, we can always enquire as to its importance and to question 
continuing to yield it the role within our practical deliberations that it may have 
enjoyed hitherto. So we would be prudent to adopt a pragmatic attitude to 
epistemic concepts here, as opposed to insisting on going in ‘knowledge first’ or 
some other approach. 
 
Let us think more carefully about the form that the two options are presented to us 
in. Regardless of whether either or both of the programs did indeed run correctly, 
the choice as it now appears to us, from the first person perspective, is whether to 
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endorse the outcome of Algorithm 3.12 and give 48,140,819 as our answer, or to 
endorse Algorithm 3.13 and give 66,998,713. Notwithstanding how the logical 
analysis of our grounds would appear if the case were described in the abstract, if 
all the facts were known, this is how the options are presented to us. We have no 
direct access to the actual sequence of calculations that have taken place; the 
detailed reasoning process has become externalised into the computer. And the 
epistemic concepts we make use of in making our decision must also be such that 
we can successfully deploy them here and now, within our particular situated 
position, to help us decide. 
 
Now, clearly the concept of knowledge enjoys a central role in both our practical 
and theoretical lives. Yet when we try to employ it in making a decision here, a 
problem arises. Let us deliberate: we may take it that the method by which we 
found 48,140,819 would be such as to yield knowledge, assuming the algorithm 
was programmed correctly and ran with no Implementation Errors. But did this 
happen, and has it yielded us knowledge in this case? Do we now know that 48,140,819 is prime? We have the conditional ‘if the algorithm ran correctly, we 
know; if not, not’, but no direct insight into whether its antecedent is true. 
Compare: the wife of an analytic philosopher asks him whether she should take an 
umbrella to work that day. He pauses, then carefully answers: ‘If it will rain today, 
you should; if not, not.’ This is true enough, but it does not help her decide what to 
do. An enquiry into the logic of which concepts apply or do not apply in each 
possible situation is simply insufficient if we are not sure which of these situations 
actually pertains. 
 
Fortunately, we have another analytic tool that we can deploy operationally here: 
the concept of reliability. This time we are able to apply the concept successfully: 
indeed, we have done this already in Section 4.i. And knowing the distribution of 
error seems to give us all the information we need to make a decision. We suggest 
the following as a general principle of epistemic rationality: 
 
Reliability Principle 
 
When seeking an answer to a fixed question, always give preference to a source 
of beliefs known to be more reliable over a less reliable source, assuming both 
are freely available. 
 
 
Applying this to the case at hand, there were two sources for gaining a new belief: 
running Algorithm 3.12 on my laptop, and running Algorithm 3.13 on the same 
laptop. Interpreting reliability here in the natural way, as the probability that either 
program will give a correct output, we have the following table: 
 
 Ideal World Real World 
Algorithm 3.12   1 1− 𝑝!"# 
Algorithm 3.13 1− 𝑞!"# 1− 𝑞!"# − 𝑞!"# 
 
 
 
Table 4.1, showing reliabilities. 𝑝!"# and 𝑞!"# are the 
Implementation Errors, 𝑞!"# is the Internal Error of Algorithm 3.13, 
and we have argued that 𝑞!"# + 𝑞!"# < 𝑝!"#. 
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From the perspective of current mathematical practice, the crucial difference is in 
the left-hand column: Algorithm 3.12 works better in principle, even if this is not 
true in practice. But from a normative epistemic perspective, this is puzzling. We 
know that we live in the real world, where our physical systems yield only fallible 
means of processing information: therefore the right-hand column is the one to 
which we should attend. An important part of the argument of the previous section 
was that Susan had no special reason to doubt that her method was implemented in 
a reliable way. But as we are supposing that we care deeply about the outcome, 
there is no reason for us to now restrict ourselves to considering only those 
possibilities that we are obliged to take into account in order for us to satisfy the 
conditions governing the ascription of propositional knowledge. Rather, we can 
better ask: which possibilities are we now able to take into account that will lead 
us to making the most informed choice, and hence to success in our practical goal 
of supplying a prime number?  
 
It is clear then that if we can factor Implementation Errors into our analysis then 
surely it would be wise to do so, all other things considered. We should therefore 
give the answer 66,998,713 to the daemon, because this number was derived 
through a process that was more reliable (the reader is again asked to reassess at 
this stage which number they would intuitively prefer to give to the daemon, 
assuming that very high stakes are in play). 
 
We now generalize our conclusions from the particular case of our experiment to 
the rationality of Private Acceptance as such in this kind of situation. We saw that 
the first-person perspective arose quite naturally when we put the algorithms into 
practice to attain definite results, and this will also be the case for any individual 
mathematician in similar circumstances. Hence instead of looking only at the 
abstract, logical relations between our received epistemic concepts, we may follow 
Descartes and aim to model quite generally the position of first-person enquiry. 
Therefore, wherever mathematicians make use of the results of deductive 
algorithms in the context of Private Acceptance, these same mathematicians would 
be irrational not to believe the results of equivalent Monte Carlo randomised 
algorithms that are known to be more reliable overall. 
 
Lastly, we make some more general observations about the relative reliability of 
deductive and Monte Carlo algorithms in the context of finding prime numbers. 
Admittedly, the Trial Division Algorithm could have been implemented far more 
efficiently for Algorithm 3.12: the number of operations would be dramatically 
reduced not only by using a faster method for computing residues but also by 
considering only the prime numbers less than √𝑛 as possible divisors. Further 
reductions to the number of divisors are also possible: for example, by employing 
the concept of a ‘wheel’.168 These improvements may increase the impact of some 
kinds of Implementation Errors, however: whenever we increase efficiency by 
eliminating redundancy we tend to make our systems less robust.  
 
Moreover, even the best deductive algorithms are much slower than the Rabin-
Miller Algorithm, which can itself be improved to O(𝑘  ln!𝑛) using Fast Fourier 	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Transform-based (FFT) multiplication.169Consider, for example, the Agrawal-
Kayal-Saxena (AKS) primality test, one of the most efficient modern algorithms 
for determining whether a number is prime.170 The complexity of the original 
algorithm was O(ln!"𝑛), although Carl Pomerance and H. W. Lenstra171 later came 
up with a version whose complexity is only O(ln!𝑛). It is clear when looking at 
larger numbers the Rabin-Miller Algorithm is far superior in this respect: for 
instance, in verifying a candidate with 200 binary digits by running 20,000 tests, 
say, the modified Rabin-Miller Algorithm will need to perform some small 
multiple of 3×10! operations, whereas the order for the modified AKS test will be 
roughly of magnitude 7×10!". This is around twenty thousand times as many, 
though we have made an even more extravagant choice for the number of tests.  
 
In general, then, we may expect more Implementation Errors to occur when 
running deductive programs than with their Monte Carlo rivals. Moreover, these 
errors are sufficiently likely to render the possibility of an Internal Error negligible 
in comparison. So in using Monte Carlo algorithms we are likely to make fewer 
errors overall, compared with relying on the deductive algorithms mathematicians 
have traditionally preferred. 
 
 
4.iv. Human Errors 
 
‘In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we 
apply them, our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from 
them, and fall into error… Our reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause, 
of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by the irruption of other 
causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, may frequently be 
prevented.’ David Hume172 
 
In this section, we take another brief detour by continuing the discussion of 
Section 1.v about the Reliability of mathematical discourse, here insofar as it is 
produced by human mathematicians. Although impressive, we shall soon see that 
the abilities of mathematicians in this respect are less than perfect. The relevance 
of this observation – soon to be supported by philosophical and historical 
argumentation – is to block another argument against Monte Carlo algorithms. A 
critic might recognise their superiority to deductive algorithms, but simply 
maintain that deductive algorithms should also be abandoned too. In this section 
we will see that we should not worry too much about the fallibility of computers. 
The production of new mathematics has always been attended with some chance 
of error, and human error is by far the more likely cause of a mistake. 
  
We have said that ‘proof’ is to be used only in a successive sense: that is, a sound 
deductive argument for a particular claim. Hence by definition proofs establish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 The ‘soft-𝑂’ notation 𝑓 𝑥 = O 𝑔 𝑥  means that ∃  𝑘 ∈ ℝ  with 𝑓 𝑥 = O 𝑔 𝑥 log!(𝑔 𝑥 ) .  
170 Agrawal Manindra, Neeraj Kayal and Nitin Saxena, “PRIMES is in P”, Annals of Mathematics 
160 (2004): 781-793. 
171  “Primality Testing with Gaussian Periods”, accessed 13th August 2015, 
https://math.dartmouth.edu/~carlp/aks041411.pdf 
172 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 121. 
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their conclusions with no possibility of error, and it makes no sense to say ‘she 
found an error in her proof’, but we should rather say something like ‘what she 
initially took to be a proof, later turned out not to be’. However, as also made clear 
above, even if mathematicians unanimously adopt the policy of aiming to present 
proofs for all of their published writings, mistakes can and do creep into the 
literature. This is because mathematicians fall short of perfection in their ability to 
construct discourses that actually do give expression to proofs, as opposed to 
merely giving the appearance of doing so, and to check whether this is the case for 
a discourse written by another mathematician. 
 
Teaching experience discloses that mistakes occur frequently in the written work 
of most mathematics students, even by the time they are taking undergraduate 
degrees. Numbers and symbols are garbled during algebraic manipulations, 
expressions are copied incorrectly, theorems are applied when the conditions of 
application are not all met, elements of sets are counted multiple times, 
exceptional cases to which the main argument does not apply are ignored. A large 
number of errors occur from failure to treat minus signs with sufficient care: when 
multiplying out brackets, for example. Several years ago I invigilated an hour-long 
logic exam sat by eighty students, where the papers were marked anonymously 
and then correlated using seven-character ‘candidate numbers’, which the students 
were asked to copy onto the front of their exam papers. Three students, who all 
went on to score fairly highly in the logic exam, copied their candidate numbers 
incorrectly – even though the task was simple, there was ample time to check, and 
their passing the module was potentially at stake. And it is clear that the 
probability of there being at least one transcription error would increase with the 
number of students considered. 
 
There are steps that can be taken to avoid such errors. With numerical questions it 
is good practice to construct a Fermi-style approximation for how big the answer 
is likely to be, either mentally or on paper, to serve as a kind of check. Many 
errors are caught after examining an answer more carefully because it deviates 
from what is expected. However, it is surprising how little some students flinch 
when an obviously incorrect answer is found. Some years ago a young student of 
mine was calculating the original salary earned by someone who now received 
£33,000 a year after a 10% increase; after dividing by 110 to reach 1% of the 
initial salary they forgot to multiply by 100, and confidently wrote down a figure 
of just £300 a year! The frequency of error also varies with our level of 
concentration, which one can take steps to enhance, such as working in a quiet 
environment, and drinking plenty of water. But even with these aids it seems 
impossible to eliminate the possibility of error entirely.   
 
Moving from teaching to research contexts, the frequency of these mistakes does 
tend to diminish with years of mathematical training and experience. There may be 
many reasons for this. Perhaps it is partly due to an increase in cognitive power 
that enables professional mathematicians to hold larger chunks of the argument in 
their heads, and thus rely less on visual recaps. Perhaps it is due to acquiring habits 
that tend to reduce errors, or learning where certain natural pitfalls are in a variety 
of kinds of argument and how to avoid them. A greater depth of understanding 
also helps: we are far less likely to misremember the value of sin(𝜋/3) as ½ 
instead of √3/2 if we visualise it geometrically, as the 𝑦-coordinate of a point 
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with polar co-ordinates (1,𝜋/3). Lastly, there may be a number of overlapping 
checks in place that must all fail for error to occur unnoticed. A number theorist 
adding 125314 together with 141351 would immediately know they had made a 
mistake if the answer was an even number because of their intuitive grasp of 
parity, and likewise if the product of these two numbers turned out to be odd.  
 
Impressive as the abilities of a developed mathematician may be, however, they 
are nevertheless fallible in performing calculations. As Philip Davis points out in 
an entertaining and provocative paper entitled ‘Fidelity in Mathematical 
Discourse: Is One and One Really Two?’, all mathematics is expressed and 
communicated through the use of discrete symbols, which we interact with 
through a physical trace, such as a blob of ink, or a vibration in the air. These 
cannot be created, recognised, reproduced and concatenated with perfect fidelity, 
because human mathematicians – like computers – are fallible when considered as 
physical symbol-processing systems.  
 
This fact may have been easier to ignore where proofs were generally fairly short 
and information-theoretic considerations did not arise, so that our ability to 
manipulate symbolic expressions could be considered absolute without obvious 
contradiction. But as we saw in Chapter 1, some proofs are so long that this is now 
no longer the case. Describing day-to-day mathematical practice, Davis and Hersh 
write that making errors ‘happens to the best of us every day of the week. When 
the error is pointed out, one recognizes it as an error and acknowledges it. This 
kind of situation is dealt with routinely.’173 Likewise, philosopher Jody Azzouni 
writes: ‘It’s a robust part of mathematical practice that mistakes are found and 
corrected.’174 
 
These observations add weight to De Milo, Perlis and Lipton’s claim in an 
influential paper that the Reliability of the mathematical literature is secured not 
by individual mathematicians but because proofs are always positioned within a 
network of discoverers, checkers, reviewers, editors, users, communicators, 
simplifiers and generalisers.175 Once a proof is discovered it is generally articulated 
to colleagues, who then break it down and internalise it, producing their own 
versions and making simplifications. If it passes these initial informal tests, then 
the referees take a more careful look. If it is a significant result then once 
published it will be connected to a wide variety of other work, and then subjected 
to scrutiny for many years: every time the proof is articulated to new students, for 
example. The Reliability of the most central parts of mathematics is thus is 
achieved only via this social and institutional process, as was also well understood 
by Hume: 
 
‘There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to 
place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or 
regard it as any thing, but a mere probability. Every time he runs over his 
proofs, his confidence encreases; but still more by the approbation of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Davis, Hersh and Marchisotto, The Mathematical Experience, 61. 
174  Jodi Azzouni, “How and Why Mathematics is Unique as a Social Practice”, 207. 
175 Richard De Millo, Richard Lipton and Alan Perlis, “Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems 
and Programs”. 
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friends; and is rais’d to its utmost perfection by the universal assent and 
applauses of the learned world.’176 	  
So far we have discussed common but somewhat superficial algebraic or technical 
errors, most of which can easily be patched up, and merely typographical mistakes 
that constitute only the isolated and relatively unproblematic misprinting of a 
single symbol. Yet enquiry into the history of mathematics shows us that 
mathematicians also commit more serious conceptual mistakes that can threaten 
the validity of an entire proof strategy. These include some of the highest profile 
conjectures of modern mathematics: we have already noted serious mistakes in the 
initial versions of the Enormous Theorem papers and Kempe’s flawed argument 
for the Four Colour Theorem.  
Davis estimates that an error of ‘international significance’ – that is, the 
‘conjunction of a mathematician of great reputation and a problem of great 
notoriety’ – occurs every 20 years or so.177 Moreover, for these deeper conceptual 
errors the social, probabilistic nature aspect of the checking network can be less 
effective and the mistake can stay undiscovered for a long time: Kempe’s 
argument stood for 11 years before Heawood discovered his error. Once Heawood 
pointed it out then it was easy enough to see, but spotting it required the use of 
imagination where it was not obviously required. We close this section with more 
concrete examples of mistakes made by mathematicians. 
 
 
• Euler believed he had proved that for any function 𝑓  of two real 
variables the order of taking partial derivatives did not matter; that is 
that the equation !!!(!,!)!"!# = !!!(!,!)!"!#  always holds. His argument was 
flawed, and a counterexample was given by Schwarz in 1873.178 
 
• Given a right-angled triangle, the Malfatti circles are the unique trio of 
circles that are each tangent to the other two and to a pair of sides. In 
1803, Gian Francesco Malfatti claimed to have proved that of all the 
different ways of inscribing three non-overlapping circles into a right-
angled triangle, the Malfatti triangles maximize the total area enclosed 
by the circles. 179  Lob and Richmond disproved the conjecture in 
1930,180 and in 1967 Goldberg used their constructive procedure to 
show that Malfatti’s solution is never optimal.181 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Hume, Treatise, 121. 
177 Davis, “Fidelity in Mathematical discourse”, 262 
178 Steven Engleman, Families of Curves and the Origins of Partial Differentiation (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 2000), 9-11. The content of Euler’s conjecture is not entirely clear because the function 
concept had yet to receive a clear formulation: see Section 5.v. 
179  Gian Francesco Malfatti, “Memoria sopra un problema sterotomico”, Memorie di Maternatica e 
di Fisica della Societa Italiana delle Scienze 10 (1803): 235-244. 
180 H. Lob and H. W. Richmond, “On the Solutions of Malfatti’s Problem for a Triangle”, 
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 30 (1930): 287-304. 
181 Michael Goldberg, “On the Original Malfatti Problem”, Mathematics Magazine, 40 (1967): 241-
247. 
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• In 1806, André-Marie Ampère claimed to have proved that a 
continuous function must be differentiable at all but finitely many 
points. 182  This is untrue: in 1872 Weierstrauss famously gave an 
example of a nowhere-differential continuous function defined on an 
interval.183 
 
• In 1847, Gabriel Lamé mistakenly thought he had proved Fermat’s Last 
Theorem – most likely following Fermat himself. His mistake was to 
assume that complex numbers factor uniquely into Gaussian primes.184 
 
• A proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem was finally found by the heroic 
efforts of Andrew Wiles and published in the Annals of Mathematics in 
1995. However, an earlier version of Wiles’ argument was found to 
contain a major error that he spent over a year trying to fix.185 
 
• In 1943, Hans Rademacher thought he had disproved the Riemann 
Hypothesis. An error in his argument was found by Carl Siegel at the 
last minute, prior to its publication in the Transactions of the American 
Mathematical Society.186 He erroneously assumed that the logarithm of 
a complex number was single-valued. The result was nevertheless 
reported in Time magazine.187 
 
• In 1961, an incorrect result regarding Abelian categories that ‘many 
people since have known and used’ was published by Jan-Erik Roos. A 
counterexample was found by Amnon Neeman over forty years later in 
2002.188 
 
 
Davis himself recounts a long list of further errors made by mathematicians in 
print, including the following:189 
 
• His own textbook Interpolation and Approximation contained some 4 
typewritten pages of errata, ranging from ‘typos to more serious 
mathematical errors’. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Jesper Lützen, “Between Rigor and Applications: Developments in the Concept of Function in 
Mathematical Analysis”, in Cambridge History of Science, Volume 5, ed. Mary Jo Nye, 477. 
183  Karl Weierstrass, “On Continuous Functions of a Real Argument that do not Possess a Well-
Defined Derivative for any Value of their Argument”, in G. A. Edgar, Classics on Fractals 
(Boston: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company: 1993), 3-9. 
184 Gabriel Lamé, “Démonstration generale du théorème de Fermat” in Compte Rendu des Séances 
de L’Academie des Science (1847): 310-315. 
185 Simon Singh, Fermat’s Last Theorem (London: Harper Perennial, 2002), 277. 
186 Karl Sabbagh, The Riemann Hypothesis (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2003), 108-
109. 
187 Jonathan Borwein and David Bailey, Mathematics by Experiment: Plausible Reasoning in the 
21st Century (Massachusetts, A K Peters, 2004 ), 97. 
188  Amnon Neeman, “A Counterexample to a 1961 “Theorem” in Homological Algebra”, 
Inventiones Mathematicae 148 (2002): 397-420. The quotation is from the abstract of this paper. 
189 Davis, “Fidelity in Mathematical Discourse”, 261-262. 
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• The first edition of A Handbook of Mathematical Functions, a 
thousand-page compendium of formulas and tables issued by the 
National Bureau of Standards, contained hundreds of errors. 
 
• The mimeographed 1925 notes of E. H. Moore on Hermitian matrices 
was 180 pages long and was appended with 26 pages of errata. 
 
• In 1917, H. W. Turnbull calculated a system of what he thought to be 
125 invariants of two quaternary quadratic forms. In 1929, Williamson 
found that three were reducible; in 1946, Turnbull himself discovered 
that five more were reducible, and in 1947, J. A. Todd found a further 
reducible form. 
 
Lastly, Davis also notes that in 1935 a book was published by Maurice Lecat 
entitled Erreurs de Mathématiciens des origines á nos jours, which contained 
more than 130 pages of errors committed by mathematicians ‘of the first and 
second rank’190 from antiquity to the turn of the twentieth century: for example, 
Euler’s mistaken assertion that 1,000,009 is prime.191 
 
 
4.v. Public Acceptance and Autonomy 
 
We have seen in the previous sections that under some circumstances 
mathematicians would be irrational not to yield Private Acceptance to results 
given by Monte Carlo algorithms. In Section 1.vi, we noticed that some proof 
presentations are now so long that the checking process is thwarted, so that 
mistakes become increasingly likely. We also saw that parts of some arguments 
can only be constructed and checked by a computer. And in Section 4.i, we saw 
that the iterated structure of IMC testing means that some Monte Carlo algorithms 
tend to handle errors in a far more robust way than deductive techniques.  
 
Because Monte Carlo strategies are so widely applicable (see Chapter 3), these 
observations invite the question of whether mathematicians should under some 
circumstances relax the proof before publication rule and allow Monte Carlo 
algorithms to feature as justifications in the context of Public Acceptance. 
Mathematicians such as Phillip Davis have already made similar suggestions: 
 
‘It is possible that a new type of mathematics might develop in which the 
“derivations” or the “processes” are so enormously long that the probabilistic 
nature of the result will be an integral feature of the subject … It is also 
possible that mathematics might move into a period and into a corpus of 
material where the proof aspect ceases to have the classical significance and 
where one can live intimately with less than perfect fidelity.’192 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Davis, “Fidelity in Mathematical Discourse”, 262.  
191 Euler himself later showed it was composite by writing it as the sum of two squares in two 
different ways, and indeed it is equal to 293×3413. He was 70 years old and blind at the time. 
Leonhard Euler, “An Inquiry Into Whether or Not 1,000,009 is a Prime Number”, Nova Acta 
Academiae Scientarum Imperialis Petropolitinae 10 (1797): 63-7. 
192 Davis, “Fidelity in Mathematical Discourse”, 260. 
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Consider also the views of Doron Zeilberger, whose algorithmic identity theory 
we discussed in the previous chapter. After describing how easily results may be 
procured with his procedure compared to traditional methods, and regarding the 
computational cost of solving symbolic equations explicitly, he writes: 
 
 ‘As absolute truth becomes more and more expensive, we would sooner or 
later come to grips with the fact that few non-trivial results could be known 
with old-fashioned certainty. Most likely we will wind up abandoning the 
task of keeping track of price altogether, and complete the metamorphosis to 
non-rigorous mathematics’193 
For the remainder of the thesis, we will discuss the possibility of revising 
standards of Public Acceptance, replacing the rule of insistence upon proof 
discussed in Chapter 1 with the following condition: 
 
 𝜺-condition 
 
A result may be published in a peer-reviewed journal only if there is a proof 
available, or if the result has been produced through a procedure which endorses 
false results with a probability that is less than 𝜀 = 10!!",!!!. 
 
 
Here I have deliberately chosen a highly conservative value for the error bound, 
assuming that all advocates of probabilistic algorithms would find this choice 
acceptable. As this is also the same error bound that was used with algorithm 3.13, 
under this revised criterion for Public Acceptance there would be no explicit 
restriction on our publishing the claim that 66,998,713 is prime. Let us now 
consider what exactly a mathematician announcing the result would need to make 
public if this were to occur. We first introduce a new definition. 
 
 
Probabilistic Argument 
 
A discourse giving expression to a chain of reasoning embodied in the arrival at a 
new result through a Monte Carlo algorithm.  
 
 
A Probabilistic Argument for a claim is thus analogous to a proof presentation, 
and can be passed on to others to read with the purposes of convincing them that 
the conclusion is true. We continue to focus on the Rabin-Miller case. In giving a 
Probabilistic Argument here, a mathematician might publish the number thought 
to be prime together with a proof that it meets the 𝜀-condition given above. In 
addition, they might also include the list of potential witnesses tested. Let us now 
look at an example of such a discourse. For simplicity, we look for a prime 
number with only 11 binary digits – that is, an integer 𝑁 with 1024 ≤ 𝑁 ≤ 2047 
– and run only 150 iterations of the test before accepting a candidate. After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Zeilberger, “Theorems for a Price”, 7. 
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running a corresponding program, the number 1729 was produced. We have the 
following Probabilistic Argument. 
 
 
 
Although just a toy example that fails to meet the 𝜀-condition, if a mathematician 
had run this experiment then they would surely be convinced that the resulting 
number was prime. The chances of their being so unlucky as to pick 150 strong 
liars for a composite number are utterly negligible. And the reader can indeed 
check that none of these numbers are witnesses. However, some readers may feel a 
creeping sense of suspicion at this point; others may even recall a familiarity with 
our candidate, perhaps from an anecdote involving Ramanujan.194 Such suspicion 
would indeed be warranted: in fact, 1729 = 7×13×19  is not even a prime 
number at all!  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Upon being visited by Hardy in hospital, who asked him if there was any interesting about his 
taxi-cab number 1729, Ramanujan replied: ‘it is a very interesting number; it is the smallest 
number expressible as the sum of two cubes in two different ways.’ 1729 = 9! + 10! = 1! + 12! 
is sometimes known as the ‘Hardy-Ramanujan number’. Godfrey H. Hardy, Ramanujan (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 12.  
 
Theorem 4.2.    1729 is prime. 
 
Probabilistic Argument: Having run the Rabin-Miller Algorithm to look for 
primes with 11 binary digits, checking each candidate 150 times before 
accepting it, 1729 was finally outputted as an answer. The following 150 
numbers (arranged here into ascending order) were found as witnesses: 
 
9,  10, 12, 16, 69, 74, 75, 81, 90, 92, 103, 108, 120, 
129, 144, 160, 166, 172, 173, 181, 191, 192, 235, 256, 
257, 263, 289, 302, 347, 355, 363, 365, 374, 376, 386, 
402, 426, 433, 438, 439, 443, 484, 493, 536, 545, 555, 
562, 563, 568, 575, 584, 621, 625, 638, 649, 653, 654, 
666, 675, 690, 699, 706, 729, 740, 750, 757, 797, 802, 
807, 809, 810, 828, 829, 831, 841, 857, 872, 888, 898, 
901, 919, 920, 922, 927, 932, 972, 979, 989, 1030, 1039, 
1054, 1063, 1075, 1076, 1080, 1091, 1104, 1108, 1145, 
1154, 1161, 1166, 1167, 1174, 1184, 1193, 1200, 1236, 
1245, 1286, 1290, 1291, 1296, 1303, 1327, 1343, 1353, 
1355, 1364, 1366, 1374, 1382, 1394, 1427, 1447, 1466, 
1472, 1473, 1494, 1537, 1538, 1548, 1556, 1557, 1563, 
1569, 1585, 1609, 1621, 1626, 1629, 1637, 1639, 1648, 
1655, 1660, 1713, 1717, 1719, 1720 
 
It is known that π(2047) = 309 and π(1024)= 172, so by Theorem 3.10 the 
probability that a composite number was selected was less than: 
   (137/1024)4!"# ≅ 6.568×10!!"   
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Have we then witnessed a miracle? Not quite: in fact, nothing unlikely has 
happened at all. Rather than picking 150 numbers at random between 1 and 1728 
to test for witnesses, what I really did was simply to test every positive integer less 
than 1729 – which I knew was composite – in order to find all the strong liars.195 
The actual number of strong liars found was 162. I discarded 12 of them at random 
and deceitfully claimed to have been running 150 tests for each candidate. 
 
Here we see an issue with this particular kind of argument, then. As well as 
accepting the premises and agreeing with the rules of inference used, the reader 
will only be convinced by the argument presented if they believe that the author 
has in fact run the particular experiment they claim to have performed, and is not 
for example a tricksy young philosopher attempting to pull the wool over their 
eyes. Probabilistic Arguments could then undermine Autonomy if they became 
Publicly Accepted because mathematicians reading the argument need to invest 
trust in their colleagues as well as following their explicit arguments. We discuss 
this issue further in the next section. 
 
 
4.vi. Autonomy, Permanence, Reliability and Consensus Revisited 
 
In the previous section, we were concerned that Probabilistic Arguments seem to 
depend in a central way on the testimony of the author, and that this may damage 
Autonomy if claims are Publicly Accepted on the basis of these arguments alone.  
 
Discussing this problem, Kenny Easwaran defines an argument as ‘transferable’ if 
‘mere consideration of the proposition suffices for a relevant expert to become 
convinced of the conclusion, unlike arguments in which one needs to know that 
certain propositions were generated in a suitably random manner, or were 
generated by a reliable source’.196He then points out that proof presentations are 
transferable. Responding to his article, Don Fallis later agrees that transferability is 
important for maintaining Autonomy, in something like our sense: ‘The 
transferability of a proof allows a mathematician to check the proof for herself 
rather than having to rely on the testimony of another mathematician. Thus, the 
obvious suggestion is that transferability is valuable because it allows an 
individual to be epistemically autonomous.’197 
 
However, though we saw in Section 1.vi that having transferable arguments 
available in the literature is one way of maintaining autonomy, it may not be the 
only way. Let us now consider what mathematicians might do to remedy their 
situation, using the above example. Clearly, one cannot in general say anything 
about whether 1729 was selected randomly from {1024,… ,2047}, as each number 
is as likely to be selected as any other. We can however use statistical analysis to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 I also suspected that Carmichael numbers such as 1729, for which the consequent of the FLT is 
true, would tend to have a larger number of strong liars than other composite integers. Of course, 
there are still less than the global upper bound of (𝑛 − 1)/4   =   432. 
196 Kenny Easwaran, “Probabilistic Proofs and Transferability”, Philosophia Mathematica 17 
(2009): 354. 
197 Don Fallis, “What do Mathematicians Want? Probabilistic Proofs and the Epistemic Goals of 
Mathematicians” Logique et Analyse 45 (2002): 378. 
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test the hypothesis that the values for witnesses were indeed randomly selected 
from {1,…,1728}. Let us now do this. 
 
The mean of a discrete random variable distributed uniformly on {𝑎,𝑎 + 1,… , 𝑏} 
is 𝔼 𝑋 = 𝜇 = !!!!  and its variance is  𝕍𝑎𝑟 𝑋 = 𝜎! = (!!!!!)!!!!" . The Central 
Limit Theorem tells us that for a random sample (𝑦!,… ,𝑦!) of size 𝑛, with any 
sampling distribution having mean 𝜇  and variance 𝜎! , the sample mean 𝑦  is 
approximately normally distributed with mean 𝜇 and variance !!! .  
 
Let 𝐻! be the hypothesis that our data were selected by a process modeled by a 
discrete uniform distribution on {1,… ,1728}. Then the expected value of the 
sample mean is 1729/2 = 864.5  with variance 2,985,583/1800 = 1658.879 . 
The observed sample mean is 863.047. Performing a two-tailed test, under the 
null hypothesis the probability of getting a sample whose mean is this much, or 
even more, less than the true population mean is equal to ℙ 𝑍 ≤ −0.0357 = 1−Φ 0.0357 = 0.486.  
 
Clearly then there are no grounds to reject the null hypothesis here: the value for 
the sample mean given by our data seems entirely reasonable. We could also test 
the sample variance, or perform another test such as the 𝜒! test. However, no such 
test is ever completely conclusive, and it does look very much like our data were 
generated by a uniformly distributed random variable – although we know that this 
is in fact untrue.  
 
A more successful strategy for maintaining Autonomy is for readers to generate 
their own potential witnesses.198 Suppose that we read a Probabilistic Argument for 
the claim that some number 𝑁 is prime. We then randomly select 50 numbers from {1,2,… ,𝑁 − 1}, none of which are witnesses. How confident should we now be 
that 𝑁  is indeed prime? Again, to answer this question we need the prior 
probability of 𝑁’s being prime. But because we did not select 𝑁 ourselves and 
were merely presented with it, there is no acceptable way of assigning a 
determinate value here, for reasons made plain above. And so we cannot acquire 
direct mathematical reasons that enable us to Autonomously assign a determinate 
probability to the belief they support – that 𝑁 is prime – having been false.  
 
However, as we have tested a large number potential witnesses, if 𝑁 turns out to 
be composite we would clearly have observed a miracle. So it is reasonable to 
appeal to an inference to the best explanation here: on the basis of our testing, we 
can conclude that the work was not fabricated. But if we do come to accept that 
the publishing mathematician has performed the Monte Carlo procedure correctly, 
then we will also have excellent reasons for believing that 𝑁 is indeed prime.  
 
Though the reader’s ultimate reasons for believing 𝑁 is prime are not expressed 
within the published discourse itself, Autonomy can nevertheless be maintained. 
For the modal condition that any competent researcher can come to have their own 
direct reasons for believing any Publicly Accepted claim is still met, as there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 As pointed out by Fallis. Ibid., 381. 
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clear procedure for generating witnesses that will always work if the claim is true. 
If it does not work, and a witness is found, the claim must be retracted – much like 
finding an unbridgeable gap in a proof presentation. The second condition for 
Autonomy can be met, too. Mathematicians need never be permitted to publish a 
result on the basis of trust or authority, as journal referees can also generate their 
own potential witnesses to check the work has not been fabricated. 
 
We now move on to a discussion of Permanence and Reliability. Whilst the 
discussion of human error in the previous section was rather anecdotal in flavour, 
it is nevertheless clear that replacing the requirement of proof with the 𝜀-condition 
is not a serious reason for concerns about either of these two Practical Virtues. In 
Chapter 1 we noted that an estimated 200,000 proof presentations are published 
each year, and mistakes can and have been found. Yet if Probabilistic Arguments 
meeting the 𝜀-condition were accepted, the overwhelming probability is that not a 
single Implementation Error would ever occur in the entire future of the universe, 
even if these algorithms become used vastly more frequently than deductive 
algorithms are currently used in mathematics today. 
 
Lastly, we briefly discuss Consensus. It is plainly possible that some 
mathematicians would simply refuse to believe results whose only justification 
was given by a probabilistic algorithm. Yet it is not merely the sociological fact of 
Consensus that we are taking to be valuable here – the brute fact that there is de 
facto agreement – but rather that the mathematical community has the intellectual 
resources to provide its members with rationally compelling reasons to believe the 
truth of new results. And the arguments of this chapter show that if 
mathematicians are not to be convicted of irrationality then they must come to 
believe results justified by randomised algorithms meeting the 𝜀-condition. There 
can therefore be no new rational disagreement introduced into the context of 
Public Acceptance by this revision to established practice.  
 
 
4.vii. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that to maintain agnosticism about results delivered 
by Monte Carlo algorithms whilst yielding credence to deductive algorithms for 
the same task that are known to be less reliable overall would be a failure of 
epistemic rationality. Furthermore, due to their robust iterative structure, Monte 
Carlo algorithms tend to exhibit superior reliability in practice. 
 
We then considered the possibility of mathematicians replacing their rule of proof 
prior to publication with a weaker 𝜀-condition: that only results for which either a 
proof is available or which have been endorsed by a procedure that endorses false 
conjectures with probability less than 𝜀 = 10!!",!!!  are eligible for Public 
Acceptance.  
 
In the final section, I argued that this revision to established practice would not 
diminish the extent to which mathematics embodies our four Practical Virtues. If 
these Monte Carlo methods are available for the kinds of problems discussed in 
Section 1.vi, where proof can supply only a less effective means of justification, 
perhaps they can even help to promote them.  
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5. Normative Standards 
Within Mathematics  
 
 
In the opening section of this chapter, we examine an existing approach to the 
question of whether mathematicians should replace their restriction of proof prior 
to publication with something like the 𝜀 -condition. This is the means-ends 
reasoning framework of philosopher Don Fallis. In the second section, I argue for 
an alternative way of looking at the problem, wherein we regard mathematical 
discourses as governed by shared, normative standards that emerge historically. 
The remainder of the chapter will describe four such norms pertaining to 
contemporary mathematics, together with historical illustrations and reasons as to 
why they are now important for its continuing success. 
 
 
5.i. Means-Ends Reasoning and the Epistemic Objectives of Mathematicians 
 
In a 2002 paper, philosopher Don Fallis discusses mathematicians’ ongoing 
rejection of Probabilistic Arguments and examines potential reasons for this 
feature of mathematical practice.199 By ‘rejection’ he means that mathematicians 
never take these arguments to ‘establish’ a result, which we can take to mean 
something like regarding them as providing an argument sufficient to warrant 
Public Acceptance. As the focus of his paper is also the Rabin-Miller Algorithm, 
we will examine his argument in this section. 
 
Fallis attempts to explain mathematicians’ rejection of Monte Carlo methods by 
employing a means-ends reasoning framework. He first suggests various 
‘epistemic goals’ that individual mathematicians share, and then enquires as to 
whether their having these particular goals suffices to explain their rejection of 
Probabilistic Arguments. He identifies three reasons why mathematicians might 
choose to avoid using Probabilistic Arguments in light of their goals. Firstly, they 
might recognise that Probabilistic Arguments are not suitable means for achieving 
these goals. Secondly, it might be the case that although these arguments are in 
fact suitable means to their goals, this is not realised by mathematicians 
themselves. Thirdly, mathematicians might not be rational. He further restricts his 
enquiry to seeking explanations of the first type.200  
 
The focus of Fallis’ paper is also on specifically epistemic201 goals, though he is 
well aware that there are other goals mathematicians could have. He takes the 
central epistemic goals of mathematicians to be acquiring more true beliefs and 
avoiding false ones, but considers other, more specific epistemic goals as well. 
Before we move on to his argument, we first consider some other goals that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Don Fallis, “What do Mathematicians Want? Probabilistic Proofs and the Epistemic Goals of 
Mathematicians.”  
200 Ibid., 6. 
201 Though Fallis does not give a clear indication of the sense in which ‘epistemic’ is intended, it is 
meant in a fairly broad sense to include for example understanding as an epistemic goal. 
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mathematicians have that proofs can be an effective means to achieving, some of 
which are not epistemic in nature. 
 
Firstly, the search for a proof of a theorem can enable us to see connections 
between different areas of mathematics, and even suggest a new theorem, such as 
a generalisation. This idea of connectedness is central to Hardy’s concept of what 
it is to do good mathematics: 
‘The ‘seriousness’ of a mathematical theorem lies, not in its practical 
consequences, which are usually negligible, but in the significance of the 
mathematical ideas which it connects. We may say, roughly that a 
mathematical idea is ‘significant’ if it can be connected, in a natural and 
illuminating way, with a large complex of other mathematical ideas.’202  
 
To take a concrete example, following the work of Gerhard Frey and Jean-Pierre 
Serre, Ken Ribet showed that Fermat’s Last Theorem would follow from the 
Taniyama-Shimura Conjecture. This paved the way for Andrew Wiles’ proof of 
the theorem and connected number theory with the study of modular forms within 
topology.203 De Villiers summarises the point more generally: 
 
‘Clearly, the value here is largely in gaining multiple perspectives; 
developing a deeper, richer understanding; or opening up a whole range of 
possible analogies, connections, specializations, and generalizations that can 
be further explored.’204 	  
The challenge of finding a proof is also a spur to developing new mathematical 
tools: to prove the theorem Wiles had to collect and refine an impressive array of 
techniques in number theory. The hunt for a proof can also help us solidify our 
mathematical concepts, as what is really essential to them must be clarified to give 
a rigorous deductive argument. For instance, in Lakatos’ Proofs and Refutations, 
he describes successive and increasingly adequate attempts at defining polyhedra 
when proving Euler’s Theorem.205 
Next, within an educational context, seeing the logical connections between 
concepts is also a useful means to acquiring and fully understanding them. Hence, 
the focus in pure mathematics lecture courses is typically on definitions, theorems 
and proofs, together with a few examples. At a more elementary level, perhaps no 
mathematician has done more in recent years to highlight the benefits of 
introducing proof into the classroom than De Villiers. 
 
Lastly, proofs can also provide aesthetic pleasure. This may have more impact on 
mathematicians’ research than we might initially think. Assuring us this attitude is 
widespread and the norm, Hardy poignantly writes:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Godfrey H. Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 89. 
203  Ken Ribet, “On Modular Representations of 𝐺𝑎𝑙(𝑄/𝑄)  Arising From Modular Forms” 
Inventiones Mathematicae 100 (1990): 431-476. 
204 De Villiers, “The Role and Function of Quasi-Empirical Methods in Mathematics”, 413. 
205 Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
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‘Beauty is the first test; there is no permanent place in the world for ugly 
mathematics.’206  
 
Valuable as these benefits of proof are, they will not help us to explain 
mathematicians’ ongoing rejection of Probabilistic Arguments. For clearly, they 
are features belonging only to some but not all acceptable deductive arguments. If 
a proof of an important theorem is found, then journals will go ahead with 
publication regardless of whether the proof affords deeper insight into connections 
between results, can be generalised, or is aesthetically pleasing. Hence, an 
argument’s being a means to securing one of these ends is desirable but not 
essential within the context of Public Acceptance. Consider in particular the 
experiments of chapter 3: as Fallis later says, we must provide an explanation that 
‘is consistent with the acceptability of the trial division test’, and Algorithm 3.12 
clearly has no such benefits.207 
 
We now move on to the rest of Fallis’ argument. The epistemic objectives he 
imputes to mathematicians fall into two categories: those that do not explain the 
rejection of Probabilistic Arguments, and those that offer only a partial but 
unsatisfying explanation. We consider each possible objective in turn. 
 
 
Epistemic objectives that do not explain 
 
1. Epistemic Conservativeness 
 
As mentioned above, Fallis begins from the premiss that mathematicians seek to 
acquire true mathematical beliefs whilst avoiding believing falsehoods. But 
compared to other scientists, who are willing to use inductive methods, 
mathematicians are especially ‘epistemically conservative’. That is, they put a 
greater premium on avoiding error, even at the cost of greatly slowing down the 
rate at which new true mathematical beliefs are accumulated. However, Fallis 
points out that imputing this goal to mathematicians does nothing to explain the 
rejection of Probabilistic Arguments, since they are willing to make use of 
deductive methods that are in practice less reliable overall. 
2. Long Term Errors 
The second epistemic objective he considers is that mathematicians want to avoid 
errors ‘in the long run’, which seems to mean that any false beliefs they do acquire 
are found as swiftly as possible. Though the first draft of a proof presentation may 
contain errors, most of the time these will be uncovered by the reviewing process. 
However, mathematicians can also catch errors made through the use of Monte 
Carlo methods, by running more iterations of the testing phase themselves. 
Probabilistic Arguments can therefore also be an equally adequate means of 
avoiding errors in the long term. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology, 85 
207 Fallis, “What do Mathematicians Want?”, 13. See also Don Fallis, “The Epistemic Status of 
Probabilistic Proof”, The Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 165-186. 
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3. Developing Consequences of Results 
We have seen that mathematics is built up like a house of cards, with arguments 
for new results usually relying on other results taken to have been established 
previously. So rather than considering results one by one, mathematicians might 
then have the epistemic goal of avoiding errors creeping into this structure, to 
prevent the entire thing from coming tumbling down. But again, where 
probabilistic methods are more reliable than deductive ones, they are also more 
suitable as a means to keep the whole mathematical edifice free from errors too. 
4. Understanding 
Lastly, Fallis lists understanding as another epistemic objective: it has long been 
acknowledged by mathematicians and philosophers that proofs can enable us to 
see why a result is true as well as that a result is true. The point is well summarised 
by Yu Manin: ‘A good proof is a proof that makes us wiser.’208 However, it is 
unclear what sense may be attached to the question of why 66,998,713 is prime. 
And again, Fallis points out the Trial Division Algorithm will also not provide any 
understanding of why the result is true. Both algorithms from the last chapter gave 
us no information other than the single integers they outputted.  
 
 
Epistemic Objectives that do explain but that are not satisfying 
 
1. Proofs as Intrinsically Valuable 
 
Next, Fallis considers that deductive arguments might be of value for their own 
sake, rather than as means to an end; that the construction of proofs could be a 
legitimate goal in its own right. He is rather dismissive of this idea, writing: ‘We 
might have hoped that mathematicians restrict themselves to using deductive 
proofs because doing so is the most effective means to achieving some further 
epistemic objective (such as avoiding errors and finding errors that have already 
been made).’209   
2. Liability for Mistakes 
Another potential epistemic objective is that mathematicians might want to avoid 
coming to believe falsehoods simply by being unlucky and through no fault of 
their own. If a mathematician comes to believe a false claim for which they think 
they have a deductive proof then they must have made a mistake somewhere in 
their argument, but a Monte Carlo algorithm might yield an incorrect result even if 
it has been implemented perfectly. However, it is mysterious exactly why this 
would be of value to mathematicians, and in any case mathematicians accept 
results yielded by deductive methods that are subject to various unpredictable 
sources of error, as discussed earlier. They could therefore be unlucky here too. 
Using Monte Carlo algorithms instead also reduces the chances of such errors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Yuri I. Manin, “Good Proofs are Proofs that Make us Wiser”, interview by Martin Aigner and 
Vasco A. Schmidt, The Berlin Intelligencer (1998): 16-19. 
209 Fallis, What do Mathematicians Want?”, 16. 
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3. Correctness in Principle 
A third, related objective mathematicians might have is aiming to use only 
techniques that always work correctly in principle, if they are applied properly and 
put into practice without incident. Again, we saw in the last chapter that this 
consideration also does not provide convincing epistemic reasons for the rejection 
of probabilistic methods. We know that we live in a world where such 
implementations errors do occur, and furthermore ‘we would have hoped that 
mathematicians use deductive proofs exclusively because of some actual 
epistemic benefit that they derive.’210 
4. Applicability  
The last epistemic goal Fallis considers is that mathematicians might prefer 
techniques that are widely applicable. Deductive techniques can be used in a wide 
variety of situations, whereas Probabilistic Arguments may currently be somewhat 
more limited. However, this does not explain the rejection of Probabilistic 
Arguments where they are available and known to be reliable. This is especially 
puzzling in cases where randomised algorithms are the only available way of 
solving a problem that is too complex to be amenable to deductive techniques. 
Moreover, we saw in Chapter 3 that randomised algorithms can already be 
employed in quite a broad range of situations, even though the field is perhaps still 
in its infancy. In any case, they are not intended to replace deductive methods 
entirely, but merely to constitute one more tool in a mathematician’s arsenal. 
 	  
Having considered all the epistemic goals available in the literature, and found 
none that might explain mathematicians’ rejection of Probabilistic Arguments, 
Fallis concludes that the burden is now upon mathematicians to come up with 
goals that make sense of their rejection. If they are unable to do so then 
presumably we are to conclude either that mathematicians have yet to realise that 
Probabilistic Arguments are means to their goals, or that they are behaving 
irrationally in continuing with this aspect of mathematical practice. 
  
5.ii. The Rationality of Public Acceptance 
 
Let us take it that Fallis’ arguments are correct on his own terms. In fact, it seems 
reasonable to draw even stronger conclusions from the above considerations than 
he does. Within his individualist means-ends framework there are no epistemic 
reasons for mathematicians to prefer deductive algorithms over Monte Carlo 
procedures which are known to be more reliable overall. Nevertheless, I shall 
argue for the conservative view: that mathematicians are rational in continuing to 
reject these Probabilistic Arguments in the context of Public Acceptance. For like 
the infallibilist in Section 4.ii, we shall see that Fallis has been misled by taking 
too narrow and restricted a view of how the problem is to be approached.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Ibid., 16. 
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My response to Fallis’ argument has four parts. Firstly, I reconsider the 
relationship between mathematicians’ individual goals and the overall progress of 
the discipline. Secondly, I argue that as well as being determined only with 
reference to individual goals, the rationality of the Public Acceptance of new 
results can also be understood in terms of adherence both to shared rules and to 
shared standards of excellence. Thirdly, we see that these rules and standards of 
excellence are general and extend across all of mathematics, rather than being 
highly particularised and judged according to individual cases. Fourthly, the 
standards of excellence pertain to finished mathematical discourses.  
 
Towards the end of his paper, Fallis defends the individualist framework he has 
adopted, wherein he takes as his starting point the de facto personal goals of 
individual mathematicians and regards the content of rationality as pertaining to 
the selection of appropriate means to further the pursuit of these goals.211  He 
concludes that to adopt a strategy that does not have the best individual epistemic 
consequences overall seems rather perverse. This is a view that fits well with the 
line of argument given in the previous chapter, and his framework does accurately 
capture the situation of a mathematician deciding whether to Privately Accept a 
conjecture. However, it is somewhat misleading when we consider the shared 
standpoint of Public Acceptance (Fallis himself does not discuss the Public-Private 
partnership explicitly). 
 
It is true enough, of course, that mathematicians may have any number of 
individual goals, motivations and desires that drive the direction of their research. 
In Hardy’s famous memoir, he writes: 
 
‘There are many highly respectable motives which may lead men to 
prosecute research, but three which are much more important than the rest. 
The first (without which the rest must come to nothing) is intellectual 
curiosity, desire to know the truth. Then, professional pride, anxiety to be 
satisfied with one’s performance, the shame that overcomes any self-
respecting craftsman when his work is unworthy of his talent. Finally, 
ambition, desire for reputation, and the position, even the power or the 
money, which it brings.’ 
 
Yet equally clearly, when a mathematical discourse is to be submitted for 
publication, its author(s) must contend with the publication rules and shared 
standards of excellence held in place by both journals and by the mathematical 
community itself. Mathematics is an example of a practice, in the sense given to 
this term by Alasdair Macintyre.212 The standards of excellence characterise what 
it is to do mathematics well, and must be learnt by its newest practitioners if they 
are to contribute to research within the field. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211  In a later paper, Fallis also considers ‘shared goals’ of mathematicians – but from the 
perspective of the objections given here his position is not relevantly different. Don Fallis, 
“Probabilistic Proofs and the Collective Epistemic Goals of Mathematicians”, in Collective 
Epistemology, eds. Hans Bernard Schmid, Marcel Weber, and Daniel Sirtes (Germany: Ontos 
Verlag, 2011), 157-175. 
212 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 218. 
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It is not just that personal motivations are subordinate to these shared rules and 
standards, and that mature mathematicians’ individual goals can only be pursued 
through submitting to them. As we seek to progress in our mathematical 
education, at first we are not primarily attempting to satisfy our own 
predetermined epistemic goals at all. Rather, we are learning to think like a 
mathematician: 
 
‘To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the 
inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my 
own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which 
currently and partially define the practice.’213 
 
From the perspective of the practice then, what is or is not a good reason for using 
a certain technique or adopting a certain approach to a problem – or even for 
whether a certain problem is a good one – is encountered as something that is 
independent of and prior to my initial current goals and choices. Coming to 
understand the distinctive form of giving and asking for reasons amongst 
mathematicians in the context of Public Acceptance may require a long and 
arduous training, and is not available simply through a general enquiry into the 
logic of epistemic vocabulary. It is only by becoming initiated into the practice, 
and learning through the example of others how to reason like a mathematician 
and to produce good mathematics, that our mature research goals as developed 
mathematicians can later be formulated.214 
 
Understanding and evaluating the form of giving and asking for reasons for the 
Public Acceptance of new results that is embedded within mathematical practice 
requires a pluralistic approach. Firstly, we have seen that mathematical research is 
structured by shared rules. For instance, mathematicians require proofs for the 
Public Acceptance of new results. Of course, we are not able to invoke this 
particular rule here, as precisely what is in question is its rational justification: 
whether continuing to uphold it is really in mathematicians’ best interests, or is 
contributing to the flourishing of mathematics itself. But notice that it extends 
across the discipline as a whole, rather than having its applicability decided upon 
in a piecemeal way, by consideration of individual cases.  
 
Secondly, mathematics is also characterised by the four Practical Virtues that are 
important for mathematics to continue to flourish and for mathematical enquiry to 
achieve the high level of success it has enjoyed hitherto. These concern the body 
of accepted mathematics itself (Reliability), the relation of the community of 
researchers to this mathematical edifice over time (Permanence), the relationship 
of researchers to each other (Consensus), and the relationship of individual 
researchers to the community as a whole (Autonomy).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, 221. 
214 There are of course exceptional individuals such as Ramanujan who learn to do valuable 
mathematics outside of the mainstream tradition.  Such individuals will often create their own way 
of doing things: for instance, Ramanujan notoriously did not share our concept of proof or view of 
its importance. But these are the exception rather than the rule, and their uniqueness only highlights 
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The Practical Virtues may not have as much weight in determining 
mathematicians’ choices in comparison with their individual goals. But it is clear 
that we can and should evaluate mathematicians’ collective choices in terms of the 
maintenance of the Practical Virtues, and that this project is clearly a very 
different project from the one Fallis pursues. Yet I have also argued that the Public 
Acceptance of Probabilistic Arguments would not undermine the Practical Virtues. 
It seems that we can envision an equally robust research community where 
practitioners accept Probabilistic Arguments as binding in the context of Public 
Acceptance, and mathematical enquiry continues to flourish. 
 
However, I have also indicated that a third perspective is available here: the 
production of new mathematics is also regulated by shared standards of 
excellence. Our quartet of Practical Virtues will thus be complemented by a suite 
of what I will call ‘Intellectual Virtues’. These are four normative standards that 
apply directly to published mathematical discourses themselves: ideals that for a 
time supply us with constraints upon what a good piece of mathematics can be.215 
 
These Intellectual Virtues can and do influence the individual choices of 
mathematicians because they bear directly on what kinds of reasoning are 
acceptable to express in published discourses in order to establish a result as 
Publically Accepted. Mathematics is therefore less exclusively results-orientated 
than Fallis takes it to be. Mathematicians do not simply pick up any means that are 
suitable for the justification of their results according only to a generalised concept 
of individual epistemic rationality. Rather, each concrete mathematical 
achievement considered as a whole must adhere to these shared standards of 
excellence.216 Our four Intellectual Virtues are given as follows:  
 
 
Abstractness 
 
Mathematics concerns abstracta and never makes claims essentially referring to 
spatiotemporal particulars.  
 
Explicitness 
 
Published arguments are always capable of being made explicit and never require 
complex intuitive leaps that are not reducible to simple steps.  
 
Univocality 
 
Concepts essentially used in published mathematical arguments (other than 
perhaps a few basic concepts) are always attended with precise necessary and 
sufficient defining conditions, and any specific entity essentially referred to is 
always given a clear definite description.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 There is some overlap here with Section 1.iv, where we discussed adequacy conditions for proof 
presentations, though the focus is now different. 
216 For further criticism of the view of mathematics as primarily results-oriented, see David 
Corfield, Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 181. 
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Formalizability 
 
Acceptable mathematical arguments are always in principle capable of being set 
out within a standard formal system, for which the axioms and rules of inference 
may be given fully explicitly.  
 
 
Examination of these standards will also reveal that although they have a broad 
application across the discipline as a whole they are neither eternal nor immutable. 
Each has a history and has emerged only through the continuing tradition of 
mathematical enquiry up to this point – often in response to highly specific 
problems. In explaining them further, then, I will make use of historical illustration 
from periods that I take to be especially crucial in their development.  
 
For Abstractness, the chief illustration will be the conception of mathematics as 
concerning propositions about abstract ideal spatial objects found in some strands 
of Ancient Greek geometry, such as the research carried out at Plato’s Academy. 
To understand Explicitness, we discuss the replacement of visual and intuitive 
techniques with more systematic algebraic and symbolic methods attendant to the 
development of analytic geometry in the 17th Century, and the parallel break with 
intuition initiated within synthetic geometry. Our chief historical example for 
Univocality is the clear formulations of limits, functions and derivatives arrived at 
by Cauchy and Weierstrass in the search for foundations for the calculus in the 19th 
Century. And naturally we discuss Formalizability in the context of the deeper 
foundational research carried out in the 20th Century, motivated by the goal of 
achieving for mathematical proofs the ideal transparency of formal logic. We can 
also see that these developments are linked and that there is progress towards a 
distinctive kind of excellence that is characteristic of mathematics as such.  
 
We will however need to go further than merely writing history here. These 
standards of excellence must themselves be susceptible to clear rational 
justification if the practice of mathematics is not to become arbitrary and 
dogmatic. It will be insufficient only to identify the historical development of the 
Intellectual Virtues, or even the ways in which their adoption was necessary to 
overcome specific problems that mathematicians faced at the time. For it may be 
that they have since become obsolete, and their observance is no longer necessary.  
 
How is this rational justification to be achieved? Clearly, Fallis’ program could 
resurface at this point, as it may be possible to justify the pursuit of the Intellectual 
Virtues with reference to mathematicians’ goals. But a more primary question is 
whether observance of the standards that these virtues embody is contributing or 
detracting from the flourishing of mathematical enquiry: whether or not they are 
essential for the practice of mathematics as it now exists to continue in good 
working order. As we shall see in this chapter, these four Intellectual Virtues do 
facilitate the development of mathematical research, for two kinds of reasons: both 
directly and because they maintain and enhance the Practical Virtues.217 
 
In arguing for the importance of these four Intellectual Virtues in the remainder of 
this chapter, we will also prepare the way for the final argument against Monte 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 It is arguable that Reliability should be grouped with the Intellectual Virtues. 
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Carlo methods, to be given in the next chapter. Here we will show that 
Probabilistic Arguments inevitably fail to comply with these standards of 
excellence. This provides mathematicians with strong reasons for rejecting them in 
the context of Public Acceptance. 
 
 
5.iii. Mathematics as Concerning Abstracta 
 
‘A mathematician, like a painter or a poet, is a maker of patterns. If his 
patterns are more permanent than theirs, it is because they are made with 
ideas.’ – G. H. Hardy218 
 
In this section, I shall describe how the propositions given in a piece of 
mathematics never make essential reference to particulars situated in space and 
time, and always concern or can always be interpreted so as only to concern 
abstract entities. We begin with some historical illustration. 
 
Sometime around the start of the 5th Century BCE, the science of pure geometry 
was established by the Ionian Ancient Greeks. Though we now possess only 
fragments and scattered references from later authors, it is clear that during this 
period discourses concerning abstract planar and spatial entities were produced. 
By the time of Euclid’s Elements – conventionally dated to the year 300 BCE – 
this research programme had crystalised into a unified and elaborate deductive 
axiomatic system in which theorems are derived from a small number of widely 
accepted premisses.219 Here for the first time we find a general and persistent 
search for stable universal truths underlying the chaos and flux of physical, 
empirical reality; a tendency that permeates Ancient Greek natural philosophy 
more generally. In contrast, according to Pascal Boyer, pre-Hellenic peoples: 
 
‘lacked the tendency, essential to both mathematical and scientific method, 
toward the isolation of certain samenesses from their confusingly carried 
concomitants in nature and in thought. Lacking these elements of invariance 
to serve as premises of inference, they were accordingly without 
appreciation of the characteristics which distinguish mathematics from 
science, namely, its logical nature and the necessity of proof.’ 	  
As made clear by his dialogue Republic, Plato regarded pure mathematical 
geometry – as distinct from practical geometry and mensuration – as having great 
intellectual value, and he encouraged its study at the Academy.220 Though Plato 
agreed that the physical world was to a large extent imperfect, unstable and 
unknowable, the geometricians at the Academy were not concerned with empirical 
phenomena at all, but rather with a perfect, abstract and unchanging world beyond 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology, 84. 
219 See Wilbur Richard Knorr, The Ancient Tradition of Geometric Problems (New York: Dover, 
1993); Euclid, The Thirteen Books of the Elements, 3 Volumes, trans. with introduction and 
commentary by Thomas Heath,  (New York: Dover, 2012); and Proclus, A Commentary on the 
First Book of Euclid’s Elements, trans. with an introduction by Glenn Morrow (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992). 
220 David Fowler, The Mathematics of Plato's Academy: A New Reconstruction (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1991). 
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physical reality. This kind of mathematics was a good example of human beings 
attaining unqualified knowledge of absolute, objective truths. In Republic, Plato 
emphasises that although mathematicians use visible diagrams in their thinking, 
these are not the true objects of their enquiry. Socrates explains to Glaucon: 
 
‘And you will also be aware that they summon up the assistance of visible 
forms, and refer their discussion to them, although they’re not thinking 
about these, but about the things these are images of. So their reasoning has 
in view the square itself, and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they have 
drawn. And the same with other examples.’221  
 
Though it is perhaps arguable that in the Renaissance mathematics was seen as 
about the corporeal world, the Abstractness of this strand of Ancient geometry is 
now characteristic of contemporary mathematics more generally.  
 
We now pause here to consider a potential rejoinder to this claim. For even in 
looking back through the small number of mathematical problems that have been 
discussed in this thesis so far, such as the combinatorial questions from Chapter 1, 
or the problem with Alice and Josh jumping down the stairs in Chapter 2, we find 
both questions and solutions apparently referring to an array of physical situations 
involving committees, tennis tournaments, staircases, and necklaces.  
 
These references are only for psychological convenience, however, as the final 
proof of Fermat’s Little Theorem illustrates. The other arguments can also be 
recast in a similar form, and so do not constitute counterexamples to the 
Abstractness of contemporary mathematics.  Moreover, the kind of knowledge we 
gained here was clearly different in character from knowledge about the physical 
properties of the phenomena referred to, and surer and more certain than such 
knowledge could ever be. What is the average weight of a necklace? What 
proportion of tennis tournaments is won by a winner from the previous year? 
Consider again another concrete example. 
 
Problem 5.1. 
 
Suppose we have a bench one metre long, and an unlimited supply of ants, 
which walk at one metre per minute. We place the ants anywhere on a thin 
line running along the bench, facing either direction, after which they will 
begin walking forwards. If two ants bump into each other, they will collide 
perfectly elastically: that is, each will instantaneously turn through 180 
degrees on their axis and continue in the other direction (the ants may be 
considered to be of negligible size). How should we place the ants on the 
bench so that at least one ant stays on the bench as long as possible? 
 
 
The solution may be reached as follows. Considering the local interactions 
between ants, we notice that for a given arrangement of ants, they will stay on the 
bench exactly as long if we change the rules so that instead of bumping into each 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Plato, The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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other and turning instantaneously they simply walk through each other without 
influencing each other at all. We can now easily see that the maximum time is one 
minute, which will always be attained so long as at least one ant is placed at either 
end of the bench faced toward the other end.  
 
Now, superficially, both problem and solution make reference to ants and to 
corporeal concepts such as ‘bumping’ and perfectly elastic collisions. But one can 
see this is easily avoidable; we can see and feel the precision in the underlying 
mathematical argument, though it might require a bit of thought to recast it in a 
more acceptable guise. The reference to the physical world is thus not essential, 
and again there are no grounds for objection to the core claim of this section. And 
the same is true in similar cases. 
 
We now say a few words about why Abstractness is of ongoing importance for 
mathematics today. Firstly, as we have already claimed, the certainty of 
mathematics is much higher in comparison with even the most fundamental items 
of physical knowledge, and this increased certainly in comparison with natural 
science is surely in part due to the ideal character of mathematics. For instance, 
mathematicians never make claims of the form ‘𝑋 is a group’, where 𝑋 is a 
collection of physical entities or patterns of interactions within a physical system. 
They only discuss what would follow if the components of a system did form a 
group by drawing out the logical consequences of the axioms. Mathematicians 
therefore avoid committing themselves to empirical assumptions that are 
unnecessary for their peculiar work. Yet within physics it is precisely these 
empirical modeling assumptions that cannot be conclusively established: 
 
‘The certainty of mathematics depends upon its complete abstract 
generality. But we can have no a priori certainty that we are right in 
believing that the observed entities in the concrete universe form a particular 
instance of what falls under our general reasoning.’222  
 
In addition, the high level of abstraction we find in mathematics leads to an 
impressive economy of thought. Mathematical techniques can be applied to give 
accurate results across a wide variety of practical problems, resulting in what 
Wigner has called the ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of mathematics in natural 
science.223 For instance, distinct abstract geometrical concepts such as ‘straight 
line’, ‘circle’, ‘right-angle’ can be applied to problems in many diverse fields in 
order to aid the thinking of a wide variety of practitioners.224  
 
Furthermore, because its content is abstract, mathematics is not restricted to 
concepts that have sensory counterparts. It now seems clear that we are ‘at liberty 
arbitrarily to create imaginaries’,225 even if these correspond to nothing in nature. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Alfred North Whitehead, “Mathematics as an Element in the History of Thought”, in The World 
of Mathematics, Vol 1, ed. James Newman (New York: Dover, 1956) 404. 
223 Eugene Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,” 
Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 13 (1960): 1-14. 
224 On this point see Philip Jourdain, “The Nature of Mathematics”, in The World of Mathematics, 
Vol 1, ed. James Newman (New York: Dover, 1956), 14-15. 
225 John Graves’ famous reservation about Hamilton’s definition of quaternions.  Quoted in 
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No mathematician today is worried about whether quaternions or complex 
numbers ‘really exist’, in the purely metaphysical sense – they are simply 
identified with certain sets of real numbers subject to formal algebraic rules. This 
freedom to go beyond nature enables the development of systems that are far more 
harmonious and complete, which ultimately leads to advances in applications. 
Computation of real integrals is often much easier using complex analysis, for 
instance, and the use of complex numbers is common in engineering.226 
 
 
5.iv. The Decline of Visual Intuition  
 
In this section I claim that in contemporary mathematics, Publicly Accepted 
Results are always attended by arguments that it is possible to reduce to clear and 
simple steps, and never rest only upon leaps of intuition that cannot be broken 
down into such steps. Our story picks up in the 17th Century, during which time 
direct reasoning about spatial entities in geometry (as in the arguments of Euclid’s 
Elements, Books I and II) comes to be supplemented with Descartes and Fermat’s 
algebraic-symbolic methods, made possible by the use of equations to define 
curves. These new techniques, which later come to predominate, permit more 
explicit inferences and proofs that do not rely on visual intuition. Moreover, 
synthetic geometry – which continues to reason directly about geometrical entities 
– also develops to become increasingly abstract, culminating in Hilbert’s 
axiomatic approach, which is again entirely divorced from spatial intuitions.  
 
In his 1637 work La Geometrié, Descartes showed how arithmetic operations such 
as extracting a root can be performed geometrically. He also advocated the view 
that if 𝑎 represents a line segment, then 𝑎! should not represent an area, but rather 
a second line segment that stands in the same proportional relationship to  𝑎 as 𝑎 
does to a line segment of unit length:227 that is, 1:𝑎 = 𝑎:𝑎! . Once all such 
symbolic expressions are so interpreted, then ‘Any problem in geometry can be 
reduced to such terms that a knowledge of the lengths of certain straight line 
segments is sufficient for its construction.’228 Descartes also came to identify 
curves in the plane given by loci with algebraic equations in two variables. In the 
words of Fermat:  
 
‘Whenever in a final equation two unknown quantities are found, we have a 
locus, the extremity of one of these describing a line, straight or curved.’229 
 
Descartes and Fermat had in fact already worked out the basic principles of 
analytic geometry by the 1620’s, having realised that ‘all the properties of a curve 
such as the magnitude of its area or the direction of its tangent are fully determined 
when an equation in two unknowns is given’.230 Descartes also announced a 
general method of finding the normal to a curve at an arbitrary point, by 
considering the radius of a circle touching the curve. In hindsight this seems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Though some engineers have been known to have trouble spelling them. 
227 René Descartes, La Geometrié, in God Created The Integers, ed. Stephen Hawking (London: 
Penguin, 2004), 293. 
228 Descartes, La Geometrié, 292. 
229 Quoted in Pascal Boyer, History of Analytic Geometry (New York: Dover, 2004), 75. 
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highly promising, though his technique is hard to apply in practice, and like many 
of his other ideas was not worked out fully in his published writings. 
 
In 1659 and 1661, van Schooten published a large two-volume second edition of 
his Geometria a Renato Des Cartes, with elaborate commentary and explanation 
to make up for the rather obscure style of Descartes’ 1637 work. This edition 
included treatises by DeWitte giving the explicit equations for conic sections, 
techniques by Sleuse for finding the tangent to any polynomial curve and a variety 
of others, methods by Huygens and Hudde for finding points of inflexion and 
maxima and minima, and much else besides.231 The work was highly influential 
and was read by Newton and Leibniz, facilitating their later work on the general 
algebraic study of curves.  
 
We pause here to consider a simple example of the power of analytic geometry, 
using modern notation and what are now called ‘Cartesian co-ordinates’.232 
 
Problem 5.2.  
 
Let 𝐴𝐵𝐶  be an equilateral triangle. Let 𝐷  be on 𝐴𝐵  produced such that 𝐴𝐵   =   𝐵𝐷. Let 𝐸 be on 𝐵𝐶 produced such that 𝐵𝐶 = 𝐶𝐸. Let 𝐹 be on 𝐵𝐶 
between 𝐵 and 𝐶 such that 2𝐵𝐹 = 𝐹𝐶. Let 𝑋 be the intersection of the lines 
through 𝐴𝐹 and 𝐷𝐸. Find the angle ∠𝐵𝑋𝐷.233 
  
 
This problem may require some thought if approached in a traditional geometric 
manner, reasoning directly about the geometric objects defined. However, using 
techniques from co-ordinate geometry in its modern form the solution will be 
entirely mechanical.  
 
We first interpret the triangle as a certain subset of points on the Cartesian plane. 
Without loss of generality, let the vertices 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶  be at (0,0) , (1,0)  and (1/2,√3/2)  respectively. Then 𝐷  is at (2,0) , 𝐸  is at (0,√3) , and so 𝐹  is at (5/6,√3/6) . Hence the line through 𝐴(0,0)  and 𝐹(5/6,√3/6)  is given by 𝑦   =   √3/5  𝑥 and the line through 𝐷(2,0) and 𝐸(0,√3) is given by 𝑦   =   √3  −  √3/2  𝑥. Solving these two equations together, we find that 𝑋 is at (10/7, 2√3/7). It follows that the gradient of 𝐵𝑋 produced is 2/√3, whereas the gradient of 𝐷𝑋 produced is −√3/2, meaning that ∠𝐵𝑋𝐷 is a right angle. 
 
Once the power of these techniques was appreciated, there was a recognisable 
move towards an emphasis on algebraic rather than geometric derivation in the 
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context of justification, with the latter now seeming more definitive.234 Consider 
now a second example of analytic geometry in action, this time from complex 
analysis. We will see how algebraic methods enable us to be more explicit than 
when using visual intuition. We first define a convex subset of ℂ as follows. 
 
 
Definition 5.3. A subset 𝑆 ⊂ ℂ  is convex iff ∀𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑆  the line segment 
connecting 𝑎 and 𝑏 is contained entirely within 𝑆. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, consider the right-hand complex half-plane: the set 𝑅 = {𝑧 ∈ ℂ  |ℜ 𝑧 > 0}. 
The belief that this set is convex is easily supplied by intuition and visual 
imagination. Yet our intuitions are somewhat vague and indeterminate because 
there are so many kinds of cases. Are we sure we have included all of them in our 
reasoning? When this result is proved in elementary complex analysis courses, a 
more explicit algebraic-symbolic approach is preferred. We first identify the line 
segment from 𝑎 to 𝑏 as the following set of complex numbers: 
 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏 1− 𝑡   |  𝑡 ∈ [0,1]  
 
Now, let 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑅 and let 𝑧   lie on the line segment between 𝑎 and 𝑏. We aim to 
show 𝑧 ∈ 𝑅.  
 
If 𝑧 = 𝑎 or 𝑧 = 𝑏 we are done. Suppose not. Then 𝑧 =   𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏 1− 𝑡  for some 𝑡 ∈ (0,1). We now have that 
 ℜ 𝑧 = ℜ 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏 1− 𝑡 = 𝑡ℜ 𝑎 + 1− 𝑡 ℜ 𝑏 > 0 
 
so that  𝑧 ∈ 𝑅 as required.  
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This proof does not rely on intuitions about the geometry of a flat planar surface. 
Moreover, the formulation of a line as a set of points satisfying an algebraic 
condition that is expressed algebraically also makes the corresponding definition 
of convexity more exact as well. Another intuitive result for which explicit proof 
is required is the Jordan Curve Theorem: that the removal of a non-intersecting 
continuous closed curve from the plane splits it into two connected components, 
one of which is bounded. Though the result again seems visually obvious, this 
time an explicit proof is rather more difficult to find, and some special cases such 
as fractal curves like Koch’s Snowflake require considerable effort to deal with. 
The non-obviousness of the result was pointed out by Bolzano, who also gave the 
first precise formulation of the problem.235 
 
As well as these developments in analytic geometry, there is a parallel history of 
the decline of intuition in synthetic geometry too. We mention just two key 
developments. Following millennia of failed attempts to prove Euclid’s parallel 
postulate from his other axioms, mathematicians such as Bolyai and Lobachevski 
came to explore the consequences of dropping the postulate, ultimately resulting in 
the study of a variety of non-Euclidean geometries. The differences between these 
were later described in algebraic (specifically, group-theoretic) terms. Intuitions 
based on everyday physical thinking about space, which largely seem to conceive 
of it as Euclidean, are of less help when working with these alternative geometries, 
and a more explicit, axiomatic approach is preferable. 
 
A further departure from methods based on spatial intuition was made with 
Hilbert’s 1899 Der Grundlagen der Geometrie. In this influential work, Hilbert 
built up synthetic geometry axiomatically from first principles. Though his text 
does contain diagrams, the proofs are fully explicit and do not rely essentially on 
visual intuition: ‘we will use figures often. However, we will never rely on 
them.’236 This approach was influenced by an 1882 work by Moritz Pasch, who 
wrote that ‘the theorem is truly demonstrated only if the proof is completely 
independent of the figure.’237 
 
Hilbert’s axiomatic approach is so Abstract and Explicit that it is unnecessary even 
to give interpretations of the entities his system concerns. He begins with three 
kinds of objects – points, lines, and places – but as he later remarked, these could 
equally well be replaced by ‘tables, chairs and beer mugs’.238 Indeed, the concepts 
of ‘line’ and ‘point’ can often be simply interchanged, giving corresponding ‘dual’ 
theorems. We have thus moved a long way from Euclid’s familiar and intuitive 
semantic definitions, such as of a point as ‘that which has no parts’.  
 
Speaking more generally, over the past few centuries mathematics has moved 
away from complex intuitive leaps in the context of justification, and towards 
explicit derivations where every step is clearly shown. In the next section, we will 	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focus on the conceptual clarity of modern analysis and how its central objects are 
attended by clear necessary and sufficient defining conditions. Here we will also 
see how both the concepts and the modes of justification their use permit also 
became logically divorced from the spatiotemporal intuitions by which they may 
have originally been arrived at. Our intuitive concepts such as ‘curve’ and 
‘tangent’ will turn out to be too vague for progress to continue, so that now 
‘intuition cannot be considered final in analysis’.239  
 
Visual techniques have however made a comeback in recent years and are now 
highly important for discovering results in differential geometry, topology and 
complex analysis. This is in part due to the development of the computer: 
practitioners are able to plot graphs of entities like the Mandelbrot set with a level 
of detail that would have previously been unthinkable (see also Section 2.iii). 
However, these approaches must always be supplemented with rigorous logical 
proof and are never final in the context of justification.240 This Intellectual Virtue 
of contemporary mathematics we have called Explicitness.  
 
We should again pause here to make a brief caveat regarding our general thesis 
about contemporary mathematics. It is not that such explicit proofs are undergone 
each time a result such as the triangle inequality for complex numbers – also easily 
supplied by visual intuition – is given; but rather, that a result which lacked any 
publicly available, explicit proof would now be regarded as problematic. As in the 
previous section, we are talking about a modal constraint here.  
 
Lastly, we close the section by briefly noting some further advantages of 
Explicitness within contemporary mathematics. We saw a brief glimpse of one 
such advantage for geometry in the discussion of Problem 5.2. Here our algebraic 
approach to the problem had a certain mechanicalness whereby very little creative 
imagination was required to find the answer. The application of algebraic methods 
can bring problems that may once have required the genius of an Archimedes 
within the reach of an average student; a deep intuitive grasp of the problem is 
now often unnecessary because a basic facility with symbolic manipulation 
suffices to reach the solution. 
 
Two other advantages of Explicitness have already been explored in Chapter 2, 
where we saw proof was in many cases superior to non-deductive methods, both 
epistemically and in securing agreement amongst practitioners. If we are to rely on 
impenetrable leaps of intuition in the context of justification, we have no a priori 
guarantee that different practitioners will agree in their judgements – this may then 
damage Consensus. Moreover, judgement based on visual intuition has repeatedly 
proved itself to be insufficiently reliable in many areas of mathematics, and 
especially in analysis (see for example the discussion of Weierstrass’s nowhere-
differentiable function in the next section). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239  James Pierpont, “On the Arithmetization of Mathematics”, Bulletin of the American 
Mathematical Society 5 (1899), 394. 
240 Mancosu, “Visualization in Logic and Mathematics”, 18-20. 
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Lastly, in proving that the right-hand complex half-plane 𝑅 = {𝑧 ∈ ℂ  |ℜ 𝑧 > 0} 
was convex we also saw that the demand for explicit derivations can drive 
progress towards clear definitions. This brings us directly to the next section. 
 
 
5.v. Conceptual Clarity in Contemporary Mathematics 
 
In this section, I claim that the concepts of contemporary mathematics always have 
clear, shared, publicly available, necessary and sufficient defining conditions. 
Likewise, specific objects discussed (such as the exponential function) are always 
given clear definite descriptions. The chief historical illustration of this thesis will 
be the rigorous formulation of real analysis that took place in the 19th Century, 
wherein the collection of powerful results and calculation techniques developed by 
Newton, Leibniz, Lagrange, Euler and others were given rigorous and systematic 
treatment by Cauchy, Bolzano, Weierstrass, Dirichlet and Abel.241 
 
Newton discovered many powerful results in the general study of curves. By the 
mid-1660’s, he was able to differentiate and integrate any polynomial expression, 
and to apply the same procedures to more or less all the algebraic and mechanical 
equations then known. He realised that differentiation and integration were inverse 
operations, what we now call the Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, and went 
on to develop a wide range of integration techniques.242 He also inquired into the 
foundations of his achievements, though this time with only limited success. He 
was able to avoid the paradoxical infinitesimals – ‘neither finite quantities, nor 
quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing’243 – only by introducing other obscure 
concepts, such as prime and ultimate ratios, and nascent (just coming into being) 
and evanescent (about to cease to exist) quantities. 
 
In the meantime, Leibniz was responsible for similar developments on the 
continent. His notation facilitated a more general conception of differentiation 
with respect to variables other than time, and the algorithmic nature of his 
techniques enabled them to be more readily applicable. Yet the foundational 
problems still remained. Lagrange later focused attention upon them by proposing 
the rigorous foundations of the calculus as a prize problem to the Berlin Academy 
in 1784. His lectures at the École Polytechnique were published in two books in 
1797 and 1799-1801, and these efforts influenced both Bolzano and Cauchy.244  
 
Lagrange hoped to base the calculus on the concept of a derivative. Yet rather than 
following Newton’s geometrical approach he simply defined the derivative as the 
coefficient of ℎ in the Taylor series expansion of the function 𝑓(𝑥 + ℎ). He thus 
demonstrated the same faith in symbolic formalism shown by Leibniz and Euler 
(who was his doctoral supervisor), and sought to ground analysis in what he 
thought was the secure basis of algebra.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Boyer, The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development; Judith Grabiner, “Is 
Mathematical Truth Time-Dependent?” 
242 Isaac Newton, “The October 1666 Tract on Fluxions”, in The Mathematical Papers of Isaac 
Newton, ed. D. T. Whiteside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). 
243 George Berkeley, The Analyst, in From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of 
Mathematics, ed. William Ewald, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 81. 
244 Israel Kleiner, “Rigor and Proof in Mathematics: A Historical Perspective”, 296. 
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However, like Newton before him, Cauchy ultimately believed that the algebraic 
approach was problematic. Instead he saw that the route to a successful 
systematisation of real analysis was to base it on the fundamental concept of a 
limit.245 He would employ this highly successfully, and though giving only a 
verbal definition it was clear from his proofs – in which the definitions had 
featured prominently, as those of earlier mathematicians including Euler had not – 
that he had essentially our modern conception. In the 1870’s, Weierstrass – who 
worked out the approach more systematically – replaced Cauchy’s verbal 
definition with a symbolic definition using quantifiers. This is essentially the 
definition we use today: 
 
 
Definition 5.5.  
 
A sequence 𝑥!  tends to a real limit 𝑙 as 𝑛 tends to infinity iff: 
 ∀𝜀 > 0, ∃  𝑁 ∈ ℕ   ∶     𝑛 ≥ 𝑁  ⟶    𝑥! − 𝑙 < 𝜀. 
 
 
Definition 5.6.  
 
A real function 𝑓 tends to a limit 𝑙 as its argument tends to ∞ iff: 
 ∀𝜀 > 0    ∃  𝑥 ∶   ∀𝑦, 𝑦 > 𝑥   → 𝑓 𝑦 − 𝑙 < 𝜀   
 
in which case, we write lim!→! 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑙. 
 
 
The discovery of these definitions constituted a substantial mathematical 
achievement: they encompass everything bound up with our intuitive conceptions 
of limits using only functions, real numbers and logical quantifiers, with no vague 
references to space, time, motion, or infinite processes. Similar definitions are of 
course available in other cases, where the argument and value of the function tend 
either to specific real numbers or to ±∞. The definitions of the other central 
analytic properties of functions can now be given: 
 
Definition 5.7.  
 
A real function 𝑓 is continuous at a point 𝑎 of its domain iff: 
 lim!→! 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑎) 
 
 
Definition 5.8. The derivative of a real function at 𝑥 is equal to the following 
limit, if it exists: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Judith Grabiner, “Who gave you the epsilon? Cauchy and the origins of rigorous calculus”, The 
American Mathematical Monthly, 90 (1983): 185– 194. 
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lim!→! 𝑓 𝑥 + ℎ − 𝑓(𝑥)ℎ  
 
 
In this case, we say that 𝑓 is differentiable at 𝑥. 
 
 
Clearly, this latter definition takes its inspiration from Newton’s geometric 
approach. For the kinds of well-behaved continuous functions mathematicians had 
largely dealt with before the 19th Century, the value of the expression considered is 
equal to the gradient of the secant, which on a graph of such functions visually 
appears to approach that of the tangent. Yet the definition itself is logically 
independent of geometrical considerations and is applicable to any function 
whatever, even those for which the idea of graphical representation is problematic. 
For instance, we define a function 𝑓 as follows: 
 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑥!𝑠in !!         , 𝑥 ≠ 0            0                        ,                  𝑥 = 0 
 
 
Then according to Definition 5.8 the function 𝑓  is differentiable everywhere, 
despite its chaotic behaviour near the origin. We can also rigorously connect the 
property of differentiability with other attributes: if a function is differentiable at a 
point then it is always continuous there too, for example. 
 
It is also clear from Definitions 5.5 – 5.8 that by the 19th Century focus had shifted 
from the general study of algebrao-geometric properties of curves to a study of the 
formal analytical properties of functions. We therefore also give a brief discussion 
of the function concept.246 When functions first emerged as an explicit subject of 
study in the 17th Century, it was in connection with the development of analytic 
geometry and the calculus, and the physical applications being made of this new 
mathematics. For Bernoulli, a function was a mathematical expression composed 
of a variable and some constants that could be evaluated for any real input. Euler 
gave a similar definition in 1748: 
 
‘A function of a variable quantity is an analytic expression composed in any 
way whatsoever of the variable quantity and numbers or constant 
quantities.’247 
 
Yet later Euler generalised this definition to one that ‘encompasses all the ways in 
which one quantity can be determined in terms of others’, and his definition was 
repeated by Lagrange, Lacroix and Cauchy.248 As increasingly exotic functions 
gained acceptance with some writers, it eventually became unclear which class of 
entities were being discussed. Since around the start of the 20th Century the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 For a detailed discussion, see A. P. Youschkevich, “The Concept of Function up to the Middle 
of the 19th Century”, Archive for History of Exact Sciences 16 (1976): 37-85. 
247 Quoted in Victor J. Katz, “Euler’s Analysis Textbooks”, in Leonard Euler: Life, Work and 
Legacy, ed. Robert Bradley and C. Edward Sandifer (Oxford: Elsevier, 2007), 214 
248 Lützen, “Between Rigor and Applications”, 472.  
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favoured solution has been to first define functions in a very broad way – the 
‘ordered pairs’ formulation – and then later restrict attention to functions having 
certain properties, such as being continuous, uniformly continuous, differentiable, 
Lipchitz, and so on. We can thereby attain a high degree of rigour whilst still 
admitting as true those theorems that only apply to specific kinds of functions. 
 
This ‘ordered pairs’ definition of a function 𝑓 from 𝑋 to 𝑌 is given using set 
theory. We begin with any two sets 𝑋 and 𝑌, called the domain and codomain of 
the function respectively. Intuitively speaking, the domain 𝑋 is regarded as the set 
of entities (they need not now be real numbers) that can be the inputs or values of 
the argument of the function, and the codomain 𝑌 is regarded as the set of possible 
outputs to which these inputs are assigned; this is indicated with the notation 𝑓:𝑋 → 𝑌 . Yet in mathematical terms we need not refer to this intuitive 
interpretation in terms of a rule of assignment at all, however complex and 
heterogeneous; instead the definition of a function can be given as a subset of this 
Cartesian product 𝑋×𝑌 as follows.249 
 
Definition 5.9. 
 
A function 𝑓:𝑋 → 𝑌 is a subset of 𝑋×𝑌 such that ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋  ,∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 ∶    (𝑥,𝑦) ∈ 𝑓 
and moreover such that if (𝑥,𝑦!) ∈ 𝑓 and (𝑥,𝑦!) ∈ 𝑓 then 𝑦! = 𝑦!. 
 
 
Again, the definition is completely explicit and does not rest on a merely intuitive 
acquaintance with the concept at any point. We can also now define a sequence 
with members in 𝑋 as a function 𝑓:ℕ → 𝑋. 
 
A further area where clarification was required was with the notion of a real 
number itself, which was at the time still being understood in a vague geometric 
idiom using the number line. However, with only this geometric notion 
mathematicians were unable to rigorously prove three important theorems from 
Cauchy’s Course d’analyse: that a continuous function on a closed bounded 
interval is Riemann integrable, the Intermediate Value Theorem, and that an 
increasing sequence of real numbers that is bounded above converges to a real 
limit. This latter property is equivalent to the least upper bound or ‘completeness’ 
property of the real numbers: every non-empty subset of ℝ that is bounded above 
has a least upper bound. It is also equivalent to the statement that every Cauchy 
sequence converges to a real limit. Completeness is of central importance in real 
analysis, and indeed its appearance is often taken to be a condition that 
differentiates the subject from what is otherwise mere algebra.250 
 
Cauchy’s arguments for the three theorems just mentioned rested on intuitive 
geometric reasoning. To further divorce the new mathematical analysis from 
spatial intuitions – which had by then proved unreliable – many mathematicians 
recognised that an explicit account of the real numbers in non-geometric terms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 We define the Cartesian product 𝑋×𝑌 to be the set of all ordered pairs from 𝑋 and 𝑌, i.e. 𝑥, 𝑦 |𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 . 
250 Though it need not appear in a more general enquiry into analysis that is not specifically 
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was needed. This may be achieved by a combination of synthetic and constructive 
methods: we first give a system of axioms that specify the desired properties of 
real numbers as a totally ordered field together with the completeness property, 
and then construct an explicit model that can be shown to satisfy these axioms.  
 
Various such models are now available; for instance, the decimal expansion of a 
real number enables us to associate it with an infinite sequence of decimal digits.251 
A second and historically prior construction is due to Cantor, based on ideas from 
Weierstrass. Cantor associated real numbers with sets of ‘fundamental sequences’ 
– what we would now call rational Cauchy sequences – which converge to the 
same real limit.252 A third approach due to Dedekind253 makes use of the concept of 
Dedekind cuts, which are partitions of the rational numbers into two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 
such that the following conditions are met: 
 
i.) ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∶   𝑎 < 𝑏 
ii.) ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴,∃𝑎! ∈ 𝐴   ∶ 𝑎! > 𝑎 
 
All three of these constructions permit us to carry out arithmetic operations, and 
we can easily check that they satisfy the usual axioms of the real numbers – 
crucially, including the LUB property. Weierstrass’ project of trenchantly purging 
all of analysis of the use of infinitesimals and intuitive geometrical reasoning can 
then be satisfactorily completed.  
 
Another advantage of Weierstrass’ approach is that the formal definition with 
logical quantifiers enables a greater appreciation of the importance of their order. 
This led to the rectification of some earlier omissions that Cauchy’s merely verbal 
definition led him to commit. In particular, Cauchy did not distinguish between 
pointwise and uniform continuity, nor pointwise and uniform convergence of a 
sequence of functions: 
 
 
Definition 5.10. 
 
A real function 𝑓 is continuous iff  
 ∀𝑥  ∀𝜀 ∈ ℝ!    ∃𝛿 ∈ ℝ!:    ∀𝑦,       𝑥 − 𝑦 < 𝛿     → 𝑓 𝑥 − 𝑓 𝑦 < 𝜀     
 
 
And uniformly continuous iff 
 ∀𝜀 ∈ ℝ!    ∃𝛿 ∈ ℝ! ∶     ∀𝑥  ∀𝑦,       𝑥 − 𝑦 < 𝛿     → 𝑓 𝑥 − 𝑓 𝑦 < 𝜀 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Care must be taken to avoid dual representation – for example, 1   =   0.99999…. See Timothy 
Gowers, “What is so Wrong With Thinking of Real Numbers as Infinite Decimals?”, Department 
of Pure Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics, accessed 19th August 2015. 
https://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~wtg10/decimals.html 
252 Marcus Giaquinto, The Search for Certainty: A Philosophical Account of Foundations of 
Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 17. 
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Definition 5.11.  
 
A sequence of real functions 𝑓!  converges pointwise to a function 𝑓 iff: 
 ∀𝑥∀𝜀 ∈ ℝ!  ∃𝑁 ∈ ℕ ∶     ∀𝑛 ∈ ℕ,𝑛 ≥ 𝑁 →    𝑓! 𝑥 − 𝑓 𝑥 < 𝜀 
 
 
And converges uniformly to a real function 𝑓 iff: 
 ∀𝜀 ∈ ℝ!  ∃𝑁 ∈ ℕ ∶   ∀𝑥  ∀𝑛 ∈ ℕ,𝑛 ≥ 𝑁 →    𝑓! 𝑥 − 𝑓 𝑥 < 𝜀 
 
 
Conflating both pairs of concepts led Cauchy to arrive at the false result that a 
convergent series of continuous functions is a continuous function – a claim he 
took himself to have proved, using infinitesimal methods.254 Abel pointed out a 
counterexample in 1826. The following series of continuous functions: 
 
 𝑓! 𝑥 = sin 𝑥1 − sin 2𝑥2 + sin 3𝑥3 −   …+ (−1)!!! sin 𝑛𝑥𝑛  
 
 
converges to a function that is discontinuous at 𝑥 = (2𝑛 + 1)𝜋 for all integers 𝑛.255 The correct result – the Uniform Limit Theorem – requires the convergence 
to be uniform, whereas for this series it is only pointwise. For some other 
purposes, stronger conditions such as ‘equicontinuity’ are also needed. 
 
We now discuss some further advantages of this new approach based on clear 
definitions rather than a merely intuitive acquaintance with the underlying 
concepts.  One consequence is that definitions come to feature more prominently 
in the proofs, as opposed to merely vaguely indicating a subject matter for 
discussion. Proofs then become far easier to construct and again are almost 
mechanical: hence it is often remarked that analysis proofs seem to ‘write 
themselves’. More generally, a solid grasp of the underlying definitions makes 
writing proofs of elementary results easy: often we need only write out what is to 
be proved as explicitly as possible and see the connections emerge. 
 
Another consequence of Univocality is that the logical structure of proofs becomes 
more transparent, as we can see exactly which properties of functions or sequences 
are being used. We have already noticed the converse of this claim in the previous 
section; indeed it seems plausible to think that the quality of arguments and the 
adequacy of definitions will tend to be correlated.256  
 
Next, once it is clear what is essentially involved in the concept of a real limit, it 
then becomes easier to generalise to other cases. From the symbolic definition we 
see that all that is really needed is a set equipped with a notion of distance. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Kleiner, Rigor and Proof in Mathematics, 299. 
255 Umberto Bottazini, The Higher Calculus (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986), 113. 
256 Again see Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations. 
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soon led to the extension of the limit definitions to the complex numbers, with the 
complex modulus function replacing the absolute real value. The other definitions 
given above extend similarly, and the notion of an integral can also be analogously 
applied; this has led to the fascinating theory of complex analysis. Moreover, not 
only the theorems but also the proofs are often identical (though other results are 
highly surprising and counterintuitive).  
 
Eventually, mathematicians further generalised complex analysis to consider 
functions defined on arbitrary metric spaces 𝑋 and 𝑌. Not only do the above 
definitions generalise accordingly, but also many of the theorems from real 
analysis also have analogues within this more general approach, and the proofs are 
again often very similar. Consider the following result from real analysis: 
 
Theorem 5.12. 
 
Let 𝑓 be a continuous function on a closed bounded interval [𝑎, 𝑏]. Then 𝑓 is 
bounded and attains its supremum and infimum. 
 
 
We can also prove the following generalisation: 
 
Theorem 5.13. 
 
Let 𝑓 be a continuous function on a compact metric space 𝑋. Then 𝑓 is bounded 
and attains its supremum and infimum. 
 
 
Since the 19th Century, this requirement of clear defining conditions has become 
characteristic of mathematical research more broadly. There is a parallel history of 
the development of abstract algebra over roughly the same period, initially 
motivated by developments in the theory of equations, and the strikingly original 
work of Évariste Galois. George Peacock introduced axiomatic thinking into 
arithmetic and algebra, and De Morgan, Gibbs and Cayley also produced 
influential work that switched attention to the study of highly general abstract 
algebraic systems such as groups, fields, and vector spaces.257 
 
This approach based on abstract concepts attended with clear definitions gives a 
wonderfully economic method of treating many systems at once. For instance, if a 
theorem is proved about a general class of structures, such as vector spaces (𝑉,𝔽,∗,+), it automatically applies to a wide variety of specific systems, such as 𝑛-dimensional vectors with elements from a field 𝔽, the set of matrices 𝑀 of any 
dimensions with elements from 𝔽 under matrix addition and scalar multiplication, 
the space 𝑉 = 𝐻𝑜𝑚(𝑈,𝑊) of linear maps between vector spaces 𝑈 and 𝑊 under 
composition and scalar multiplication, the space of continuous functions on a 
closed bounded real interval [𝑎, 𝑏]  with pointwise addition and scalar 
multiplication, and many more besides. Moreover, beyond pragmatic questions of 
economy, the interest often lies in the connections that are made clear between 
such structures when what is essential to them has been isolated.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 For an overview see Merzbach and Boyer, A History of Mathematics, chapter 21. 
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Within this new structuralist approach to mathematics, wherein only the most 
general features of different kinds of objects and systems are given, merely 
intuitive understanding becomes less effective. A general familiarity with the 
system, such as physical intuition provides for some continuous real functions of 
one variable, is not available because we will usually not even know specifically 
which system we are talking about. And many of the underlying concepts are far 
removed from everyday experience, so that our intuitions about them cannot be 
relied upon in the absence of clear definitions. During a lecture delivered by von 
Neumann in Göttingen in the 1920’s, about linear operators on Hilbert Spaces, 
Hilbert – who was in the audience – was alleged to have stood up and asked ‘Yes, 
Herr von Neumann, but what actually is a Hilbert space?’258  
 
The Univocal formulation of a concept can also aid Consensus. For instance, there 
is now no trace of the long controversy about what is to count as a function. 
Moreover, once we are clear about definitions, theorems of impressive strength 
and sophistication can be proved – but prior to this, such achievements are often 
not available to us. Consider trying to arrive at (or even state) Theorem 5.13 
without having clear definitions of the concepts ‘continuous’, ‘function’, 
‘compact’, ‘metric space’, ‘bounded’, ‘supremum’ and infimum’. Each concept 
plays an important part and is essential to the truth of the theorem: if any of the 
antecedent conditions are not met, then the consequent may not be true. 
 
Once such clear definitions of the important concepts are available, mathematics 
becomes the study of patterns of idealised deductive relationships within 
structures.259 The precision of theorems in modern abstract mathematics means 
they can be confidently applied without exception to all eligible systems. If this 
were not the case, the structuralist approach would be far less effective. We would 
always need a separate enquiry in each case to see whether a system we were 
interested in which apparently fell under the scope of a theorem really did meet the 
conditions of its application, and whether the conclusion really did follow. Within 
modern abstract mathematics such moves are unnecessary: we only need check 
that we do indeed have an instance of a group, ring, field, vector space, metric 
space, or whatever class of entities the theorem we wish to make use of concerns.  
 
Again, before moving on we must qualify the claim that all mathematical concepts 
actually in use meet the standard of Univocality. For example, consider the follow 
definition from Stein and Sakarachi’s Complex Analysis: ‘We call a toy contour 
any closed curve where the notion of interior is obvious’.260 This concept also 
appears in the statement of a restricted version of Cauchy’s Theorem.261 Yet just as 
a person possessing the virtue of honesty may sometimes lie on occasion, the 
normative ideal of necessary and sufficient defining conditions is present even in 
those cases where it is not attained. Mathematicians will typically see such 
counterexamples as areas where more progress is required.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Kleiner, Rigor and Proof in Mathematics, 303. 
259 Again, see Corfield, Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics, 181. 
260 Elias Stein and Rami Shakarachi, Complex Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003), 40. 
261 Ibid., 41. 
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Lastly, there are some concepts such as the membership symbol ∈ in set theory 
that are taken as fundamental and so do not require explicit definition. Though the 
meaning of these concepts is nevertheless clear, it is only indicated through the use 
of examples. 
 
 
5.vi. Formalizing Mathematics 
 
In this section, we see how during the early 20th Century mathematicians began 
formalizing their mathematical arguments. This required them to make explicit 
their mathematical and logical axioms, and the rules of inference used to derive 
results. These techniques also allow us to show with the minimum of assumptions 
that the rules of inference mathematicians make use of are truth-preserving (c.f. 
Section 1.1). Moreover, any argument that is not translatable into such a system 
would now be considered problematic. 
 
The story of this development continues from the previous section. Once a 
construction of the real numbers – such as Cantor’s or Dedekind’s – has been 
given, we are still faced with two problems. The first is to supply a corresponding 
account of the rational numbers, on which such definitions rest. The second is that 
the constructions of the real numbers given above make use of infinite sets whose 
members cannot be given explicitly. Cantor’s account refers to the set of all 
fundamental sequences and hence the set of all infinite rational sequences of 
which it is a subset, and Dedekind’s account assumes a set of all cuts.  
  
Rational numbers can be interpreted as equivalence classes of ordered pairs of 
integers,262 and so the first problem further reduces to giving an account of the 
integers and then the natural numbers. One such account was given by Frege, who 
identified the natural number 𝑛 with the class of all classes containing 𝑛 elements. 
He also interpreted classes as the extensions of predicates.263 Russell later showed 
that this approach to set theory is problematic by considering a predicate 𝐹𝑥 
defined to mean that 𝑥 is not a member of itself. But there can be no class that 
forms the extension of this predicate: otherwise it would have to both contain itself 
and not contain itself. This is Russell’s paradox, which shows that Frege’s system 
was inconsistent, as was revealed to Frege the night before publication of the 
second volume of his efforts in 1902.264 Two further set-theoretic paradoxes had 
also been discovered previously: the Burali-Forti paradox and Cantor’s paradox.265  
 
Whilst Russell and Whitehead were attempting to fix the issues with their 
understanding of set theory in terms of classes conceived as extensions of 
predicates, Zermelo developed an alternative axiomatic approach. His 1908 paper, 
he gave a set of axioms for set theory that enabled the development of arithmetic 
and analysis whilst avoiding the known paradoxes.266 But although this was an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 The classes form a partition of the set { 𝑎, 𝑏 |𝑎 ∈ ℤ, 𝑏 ∈ ℕ} under the equivalence relation 𝑅, 
where 𝑅( 𝑎, 𝑏 , 𝑐,𝑑 ) iff 𝑎𝑑 = 𝑏𝑐. 
263 Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic. See also Giaquinto, The Search for Certainty, 33. 
264 Giaquinto, The Search For Certainty, 53. 
265 Ibid., Part II. 
266  Ernst Zermelo, “Untersuchungen über die Grudnlagen de Mengenlehre”, Mathematische 
Annalen I (1908): 261-281. 
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important achievement, doubts about his system were not eliminated entirely. The 
presence of further sources of inconsistency had not been definitively ruled out, 
and still seemed an open possibility. The same was true of Russell and 
Whitehead’s modified system. 
 
With these issues in mind, Hilbert aimed to prove using only finitary methods267 
that classical mathematics was reliable in the sense that it could not be used to 
derive false finitary consequences. As these finitary methods were highly 
transparent, and so possessed a particularly high degree of epistemic security, the 
completion of this project would have served to remove any remaining doubts 
about classical mathematics. His approach to achieving this goal involved 
formalising set theory in a way that was precise enough for the formalized system, 
together with some logical axioms, to itself become the subject of mathematical 
investigation.  
 
Formal systems in this sense consist of a completely specified formal language 
together with an effectively decidable set of axioms in that language and a finite 
set of inference rules. Sentences of the language are composed of finite strings of 
symbols from a fixed alphabet. The specification for allowable sentences gives 
explicit rules of composition such that we have an effective way of deciding, for 
any string of symbols, whether it is a sentence in the language. Sentences are 
arranged into sequences called derivations, such that each line in the derivation is 
either an axiom (either logical or mathematical) or follows from one or more 
earlier lines by inference rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that are also given explicitly. 
For any given sequence of sentences, we can thus always in principle effectively 
determine whether it is a derivation.  
 
We now state the soundness theorem for first-order predicate logic with identity. 
Within a formal language 𝐿 we can define both semantic (i.e. truth-theoretic) and 
syntactic (i.e. proof-theoretic) notions of entailment. For a set of sentences Γ in 𝐿 
and a single sentence 𝜃 in 𝐿, the first notion, written Γ ⊨ 𝜃, says that 𝜃 is true for 
every interpretation ℑ of 𝐿 in which each member of Γ is true. The second notion, 
written Γ ⊢ 𝜃, says there is a derivation of 𝜃 using only the elements of  Γ as 
axioms (in addition to the logical axioms). The soundness theorem for first-order 
predicate logic then says that Γ ⊢ 𝜃   ⇒ Γ ⊨ 𝜃. Moreover, the proof relies on very 
little mathematics, all of which is highly uncontroversial.268 
 
The soundness theorem for first-order logic entitles us to be confident that any 
mathematical argument that can be formalised as a purely deductive proof from 
explicit premises is valid. The possibility of recasting mathematical arguments in 
accord with such a model thus became a widely accepted standard, and any 
argument that cannot be formalised in this way is now counted as flawed or at 
least unclear. This is the Intellectual Virtue we have called ‘Formalizability’. 
 
We now discuss some of the advantages of Formalizability for contemporary 
research. One such benefit has already been made clear: this practice provides an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 For the definition of ‘finitary’ subject matter, see Giaquinto, The Search for Certainty, 145-146. 
268 The converse result, Gödel’s Completeness Theorem, was proved in 1929. Kurt Gödel, “Über 
die Vollständigkeit des Logikkalküls”, Doctoral Dissertation (University of Vienna, 1929).  
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effective check on the validity of our arguments and of accepted mathematical 
rules of inference (again, see Section 1.1). Secondly, it also gives a check on 
Univocality: in attempting to formalise our arguments we may realise that some of 
our definitions are not sufficiently clear.  
Formalizability also enables automated proof checking and the creation of large 
online libraries of proofs. One such attempt was the QED project, an attempt to 
build a ‘single, distributed, computerized repository that rigorously represents all 
important, established mathematical knowledge.’269 Its founders hoped to improve 
the Reliability of Publicly Accepted mathematics, and to facilitate smoother 
collaboration between research mathematicians, who would be able to quickly and 
efficiently scan the database for results relevant to their research.270  
Sadly, the QED project did not really get off the ground and was abandoned in 
1996. The same idea has since been implemented successfully, however: in the 
Mizar system for instance. This also consists of a formal language (based on 
Tarski-Grothendieck set theory), a program for mechanically checking proofs 
written in this language, and a library of formalized mathematics encompassing 
some 49,000 theorems.271 Other such projects also exist, including the Metamath 
program,272 and verification programs are now numerous.273 The proofs of many 
important results have been successfully formalized, including the Prime Number 
Theorem,274 the Hahn-Banach Theorem,275 Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and 
the Jordan Curve Theorem,276 the Robbins Conjecture,277 Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorems,278 and (as mentioned in Section 1.vi) the Four Colour Theorem.279  
Formalizability can thus provide an effective alternative solution to the problems 
discussed in Section 1.vi: that proof presentations are sometimes so long that they 
tend to thwart the checking process, and that some proofs essentially make use of 
computers. Although computers are still used to automatically check that each step 
in the formalised proof is valid, these checks are simple and highly transparent – 
unlike the original 1976 proof of the Four Colour Theorem, where the computer 
was programmed to carry out complex chains of reasoning. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 “Summary”, QED. Accessed 19th August 2015. http://mizar.org/qed/ 
270 “The QED Manifesto”, in “Automated Deduction – CADE 12”, Springer-Verlag, Lecture Notes 
in Artificial Intelligence 814 (1994): 238-251. 
271 “Mizar Project”, accessed 18th August 2011. http://mizar.org/project/ 
272 http://metamath.org 
273 For instance, ACL2, Coq, HOL Light, HOL4, ProofPower, IMPS, Isabelle, Mizar, NUPRL and 
PVS. 
274 Jeremy Avigad, Kevin Donnelly, David Gray, Paul Raff, “A Formally Verified Proof of the 
Prime Number Theorem”, ACM Transactions on Computational Logic 9 (2007): 1-23. 
275 Gertrud Bauer and Markus Wenzel, “Computer-Assisted Mathematics at Work (The Hahn-
Banach Theorem in Isabelle/Isar)”, in Selected Papers from the International Workshop on Types 
for Proofs and Programs, ed. Thierry Coquand, Peter Dubjer, Bengy Nordström and Jan M. Smith 
(London: Springer-Verlag, 2000), 61-76. 
276 Artur Korniłowicz, “A Proof of the Jordan Curve Theorem via the Brouwer Fixed Point 
Theorem”, Mechanized Mathematics and its Application 6 (2007): 33-40. 
277 William McCune, “Solution of the Robbins Problem”, Journal for Automated Reasoning 19 
(1997): 263-276. 
278 Larry Paulson, “A Machine-Assisted Proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems for the Theory 
of Hereditary Finite Sets”, Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2014), 484-498. 
279 Georges Gonthier, “Formal Proof – The Four-Color Theorem”, Notices of the AMS 55 (2008): 
1382-1393.  
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Moreover, it is also possible to translate formalised proofs into a special self-
correcting ‘probabilistically checkable’ format. Probabilistic checking of formal 
proofs enables us to ‘become confident of their validity by checking only 10 or 20 
bits chosen randomly in a correlated way.’280 The Probabilistically Checkable 
Proofs Theorem, a result of immense scope and value, tells us that ‘any 
mathematical theorem, in any standard formal system such as Zermelo-Fraenkel 
set theory, can be converted in polynomial time into a probabilistically-checkable 
format.’281  
The use of these techniques would not require us to revise the traditional rule of 
proof prior to publication, as they remain a purely external check on the validity of 
a deductive argument and do not form an essential part of it – just as Euler 
supplemented his theoretical work on infinite series with numerical checks. Like 
the hand-held calculator, these techniques could improve the Reliability of 
mathematics without interfering with the underlying logic of mathematics itself.  
Again, a brief caveat before moving on. At the moment, it is not true that every 
Publicly Accepted mathematical truth has been successfully formalized. However, 
any argument that essentially relies on a rule of inference that can be given no 
interpretation in such a system – and hence cannot be checked to be truth-
preserving – would surely now be treated with suspicion. Like Abstractness, 
Explicitness and Univocality, Formalizability is thus also a modal condition.  
 
 
5.vii. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have articulated four standards of excellence that apply to 
published mathematical discourses, and given brief justifications for retaining 
them in the future. These were Abstractness, Explicitness, Univocality and 
Formalizability. In the next chapter, I will argue that Probabilistic Arguments 
cannot adhere to these four standards, thus providing reasons for mathematicians 
to reject them in the context of Public Acceptance.  
 
We have also mentioned a highly effective and widely applicable technique for 
improving the Reliability of Publicly Accepted mathematics, based on translating 
formal proofs into a special error-correcting format. This may constitute an 
alternative remedy to the problems with proof outlined in Section 1.vi, and one 
that will not require mathematicians to Publicly Accept mathematical arguments 
that do not comply with the four Intellectual Virtues.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280  Scott Aaronson, “Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity”, in 
Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond, ed. B. Jack Copeland, Carl J. Posey, Oron 
Shagrir (United States: MIT Press, 2013), 302 
281 Ibid., 302. 
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6. Mathematics and Probability 
 
 
In the opening section of this chapter I give a clear example of how the Intellectual 
Virtues (Abstractness, Explicitness, Univocality and Formalizability) can supply 
us with reasons for rejecting arguments for mathematical claims in the context of 
Public Acceptance. I then ask whether the arguments of Chapter 4, which 
established the epistemic superiority of the Rabin-Miller Algorithm to the Trial 
Division Algorithm in the context of Private Acceptance, carry as much weight 
when we consider Public Acceptance. In the rest of the chapter, I argue that to 
allow Probabilistic Arguments in the context of Public Acceptance would lead to 
the Intellectual Virtues being undermined. 
 
  
6.i. Public Acceptance and Non-Mathematical Arguments 
 
We open with an example of how the normative principles articulated in the 
previous chapter can give us reasons to exclude certain modes of enquiry from 
being part of Publicly Accepted mathematics, even if the conclusions arrived at 
through them are of a distinctly mathematical kind. A means of justifying a 
mathematical statement may still constitute an unacceptable attempt at 
mathematics even if it employs a method that can be shown to be highly reliable. 
 
The reader may recall that in Section 2.i we briefly mentioned the DNA computer 
methods of Leonard Adleman, which can be used to solve problems in pure 
mathematics.282 One such problem is that of finding a Hamiltonian path in a given 
directed graph on 𝑛  vertices. 283  Finding a Hamiltonian path directly through 
combinatorial analysis can become computationally intensive for large values of 𝑛, but the DNA algorithm is usually able to find one much more efficiently. 
Moreover, if the algorithm does not find one then there is a very strong chance that 
no such path exists.  
 
DNA molecules have a double-helix structure with two coils of proteins, each 
either guanine, adenine, thymine and cytosine, denoted herein by the letters G, A, 
T and C. G will only bond with C and conversely, whereas A will only bond with 
T and conversely. So given a string of proteins – such as A-T-C-G-A – there is a 
unique string of that length which will bond with it at every place – i.e. T-A-G-C-
T. The algorithm exploits this property as follows. Firstly, we represent each town 
by a unique 20-molecule long strand of DNA. We then also represent all the one-
way roads (𝑥,𝑦) as 20-molecule long strands DNA by taking the last 10 molecules 
from the formula for the town 𝑥, and the first 10 from the formula for the town 𝑦. 
When the strands of DNA are allowed to bond together, each road strand of DNA 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Leonard Adleman, “Molecular Computation of Solutions to Combinatorial Problems”, Science 
266 (1994): 1021-1024. See also Don Fallis, “The Epistemic Status of Probabilistic Proof”, The 
Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 165-186. 
283 A directed graph is such that the edges are ordered rather than unordered pairs of vertices: 
imagine 𝑛 towns joined by one-way roads. A Hamiltonian path on a graph of size 𝑛 is a collection 
of adjacent edges 𝑥!, 𝑥! , 𝑥!, 𝑥! ,… , 𝑥!!!, 𝑥!  such that each 𝑥! is distinct: that is, a route that 
visits each town exactly once and returns to the starting point. 
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act as a kind of ‘molecular splint’ that joins a pair of towns that are adjacent on the 
original graph. The diagram illustrates the idea with molecules of length 6 instead 
of 20: 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
After paths of various lengths have been allowed to form, the next stage is to sort 
the strands by length using a gel separation process. Only strands of length 20𝑛 
are retained, with the rest being discarded. Then we heat the mixture until the 
double helixes break apart into single strands of DNA. Next, magnetised copies of 
the inverse of the strand representing the first town in the graph are added to the 
tube. A magnet is held against the container, isolating all the strands that 
correspond to paths visiting the first town. The rest of the strands are discarded, 
and the mixture is heated to split the remaining strands from their magnetised 
inverses. This process is repeated for each town so that only strands corresponding 
to paths of length 𝑛 that visit every town remain. 
 
If any strands of DNA remain at the end of the process, we can easily check 
against the original graph that they do in fact correspond to Hamiltonian paths. If, 
on the other hand, no strands remain, then the chances of there being a 
Hamiltonian path in the graph is very slim. Adleman says in the instructions for 
implementation that ‘the quantity used should be just sufficient to ensure that 
during the ligation step (step 1), a molecule encoding a Hamiltonian path will be 
formed with a high probability if such a path exists in the graph.’  
 
As before, if this probability is high enough then Private Acceptance that there are 
no Hamiltonian paths may under some circumstances be rationally required. Yet it 
is intuitively clear that such a procedure is unsuitable for establishing this claim as 
a piece of Publicly Accepted mathematics, and that mathematicians would be 
warranted in rejecting it in this context. Though the conclusion is a mathematical 
proposition, the argument contains further propositions that essentially refer to 
physical properties of DNA, contravening Abstractness. These are only known 
empirically, and no clear derivation can be given, flouting Explicitness. The 
argument also involves physical concepts not amenable to precise definition in a 
way that would satisfy a mathematician, and so fails to meet Univocality. Lastly, 
the argument is certainly not Formalizable.  
Diagram 6.1. A depiction of the binding of 
two vertices using DNA.  
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In the remainder of this section, I will use an analogy to show that the arguments 
from earlier chapters about the practical superiority of Probabilistic Arguments in 
the context of Private Acceptance have less purchase in the context of Public 
Acceptance. Here, not only the standards of a general individual epistemology but 
also the Intellectual Virtues are in play. We proceed by again comparing two 
algorithms for the same task: one of which will be more effective in practice, but 
nevertheless clearly inferior qua piece of mathematics.  
 
In Chapter 2, we said that Gauss has proved that the class of compass and 
straightedge constructible polygons is exactly the class of 𝑛-gons for which 𝑛 is 
the product of a power of 2 and any number of distinct Fermat primes.284 For 
example, if 𝑛   =   17 then the 𝑛-gon (called a heptadecagon) is constructible. The 
first such construction was given by Johannes Erchinger in 1825.285 We give a 
different method, using Carlyle Circles.  
 
 
Algorithm 6.2 (Constructs an heptadecagon of unit side length) 
 
 
1. Given a line segment 𝑂𝐴 of unit length, construct a circle 𝛾! centred at 𝑂 
passing through 𝐴 . This circle will be the circumcircle of the 
heptadecagon. Produce 𝑂𝐴 to give a line meeting the circle 𝛾! again at 𝐵. 
Construct the perpendicular to 𝑂𝐴  through 𝑂  meeting 𝛾!  again at two 
points – call either one of these 𝐶. 
 
2. Now bisect 𝑂𝐵 at the point 𝐷 and construct a circle 𝛾! centred at 𝐷 passing 
through the point 𝐴. Construct also a line through 𝐷 parallel to 𝑂𝐶 and let 𝐸 be the point of intersection of this point with 𝛾! that lies on the other side 
of 𝑂𝐴 as 𝐶. 
 
3. Now draw a circle 𝛾! centred at 𝐸 passing through the point 𝐶. This will 
intersect with the line 𝑂𝐴 produced at two places. Let 𝐹 be the intersection 
on the same side of 𝑂𝐶 produced as 𝐵, and let the other intersection of the 
circle 𝛾! with 𝑂𝐴 produced be at the point 𝐺, so that 𝐺 is on the same side 
of 𝑂𝐶 produced as 𝐴. 
 
4. Now bisect 𝑂𝐺 to find the point 𝐻. Draw a circle 𝛾! centred at 𝐻 passing 
through 𝐶. This will meet 𝑂𝐴 produced at two points. Let 𝐼 be the point on 
the same side of 𝑂𝐶 produced as 𝐴. 
 
5. Now bisect 𝑂𝐹  to give the point 𝐽 . Construct a circle 𝛾!  centred at 𝐽 
passing through 𝐶. This circle 𝛾! will also meet the line 𝑂𝐴 produced at 
two points. Let 𝐾 be the point of intersection of 𝛾! that lies on the same 
side of 𝑂𝐶 as 𝐴, i.e. between 𝑂 and 𝐴. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 To Recap, a Fermat prime is a prime of the form 2!! + 1 
285 Karin Reich, “Die Entdeckung und frühe Rezeption der Konstruierbarkeit des regelmäβigen 17-
Ecks und dessen geometrische Konstruktion durch Johannes Erchinger (1825)”, in Mathesis. 
Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstag von Matthias Schramm, ed. R. Thiele (Berlin: Diepholz, 
2000), 101-118. 
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6. Now bisect 𝐴𝐾 to find the point 𝐿 and draw a circle 𝛾! centred at 𝐿 and 
passing through 𝑂. Let the second intersection of this circle with the line 
segment 𝑂𝐴 produced be at 𝑀. Now draw a circle 𝛾!  centred at 𝑂 and 
passing through 𝑀, meeting the line segment 𝑂𝐶 extended at 𝑁, where 𝑁 
is on the same side of 𝑂𝐴 extended as 𝐶 (i.e. so that 𝑁 is slightly further 
along 𝑂𝐶 from  𝑂 than 𝐶 is). 
 
7. Now join 𝑁 with the point 𝐼 and bisect 𝐼𝑁 to find the point 𝑃. Construct a 
circle 𝛾! centred at 𝑃 passing through 𝐶. This will meet 𝑂𝐴 produced at 
two points: let 𝑄 be the point furthest from 𝑂 (i.e. the one that is further 
along 𝑂𝐴  produced from 𝑂  than 𝐴  is). Now draw the perpendicular 
bisector of 𝑂𝑄, which will meet the original circle 𝛾! at two points. Let one 
of these points be 𝑅 – on the same side of 𝑂𝐴 as 𝐶, say. Then angle 𝐴𝑂𝑅 is 
equal to !!!" and 𝐴𝑅 is the side length of a heptadecagon centred at 𝑂 with 
vertices at 𝐴 and 𝑅. Mark 15 more points equally spaced around the circle 
and join these up to obtain the heptadecagon. 
 
 
 
This algorithm is rather complex, and although other algorithms for the 
construction are available unfortunately none is significantly simpler than this one. 
We can however give a much simpler algorithm for producing a polygon with 17 
sides that is very close to being regular. Consider a heptadecagon of unit side 
length. Using trigonometry, we have that the length of the radius of a circumcircle 
is equal to !!  cosec   !!!" = 2.721095575876…. Now, we proceed as follows. 
Writing the fractional part in binary, we see it is equal to 0.1011100010 to ten 
binary decimal places. If we can construct a line segment of approximately this 
length, it will be correct to over one part in a thousand – well below the threshold 
of visual perception. Consider then the following algorithm. 
 
Algorithm 6.3 (Constructs an approximate heptadecagon of unit side length) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have used Apollonius to construct heptadecagons using both methods – though 
only going to the 5th binary decimal place rather than the 10th as suggested above, 
as the program was unable to accommodate this resolution (indeed, there seems 
something rather perverse about going that far, like rounding to too many decimal 
places after an approximation). The results are included below. I have actually 
forgotten which polygon is which, though the reader is challenged to guess (as we 
Draw a line segment 𝑆  of unit length, and then bisect the original length repeatedly 
to form the smaller lengths 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… , 𝑥!. Then join twice the original length 𝑆 
together with the sum 𝑥! + 𝑥! + 𝑥! + 𝑥! + 𝑥!. Call this total length 𝐿. Construct 
an isosceles triangle with two sides equal to 𝐿 upon the original line segment 𝑆, 
with its third vertex at the point 𝑂. Now construct a circle with a centre at 𝑂 
through the two endpoints of 𝑆. Use the unit length to mark 15 more points around 
the circle. Join up vertices that are adjacent on the circle to obtain a shape with 17 
sides that are approximately equal.  
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effectively rounded the value down, one side will be shorter than the others on the 
polygon that is only approximate). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 6.4.  
A heptadecagon produced 
either using Algorithm 6.2 
or Algorithm 6.3. 	  
Diagram 6.5.  
A heptadecagon produced 
using the other algorithm. 	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The second procedure also contains an idea that is far more general: it can be 
adapted to construct an approximately regular polygon of any number of sides. For 
instance, below is a polygon that approximates a regular heptagon, a shape for 
which Gauss’ result implies no exact construction procedure can be given. The 
result is accurate to around four parts in a thousand (one side is slightly shorter 
than the other six). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Though Algorithm 6.3 can be adapted to yield a polygon that is arbitrarily close to 
being regular, this will never achieve a completely regular construction. Yet we 
can now add to this an observation similar to that which motivated the central 
question attended to in this thesis. Even if we are very careful and use only the 
finest instruments, when we actually put Algorithm 6.2 into practice the resulting 
physical drawing will inevitably fall short of absolutely perfect regularity.  
 
We define Implementation Errors for both algorithms as the expected practical 
deviation from an ideally constructed drawing, and the Internal Error of Algorithm 
6.3 as the deviation of an ideal implementation from a truly regular polygon. We 
may assume for the sake of argument that there is a comprehensive physical 
argument establishing that when the algorithms are put into practice the sum of 
Internal and expected Implementation Errors for Algorithm 6.3 is smaller than the 
expected Implementation Error for Algorithm 6.2. This is in any case highly 
plausible as Algorithm 6.3 is much simpler. We have the following table: 
 
 
 
 Diagram 6.6. A polygon that closely 
approximates a regular heptagon. 	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 Ideal World Real World 
Algorithm 6.2   1 1− 𝑝!"# 
Algorithm 6.3 1− 𝑞!"# 1− 𝑞!"# − 𝑞!"# 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can now engage in an analogue of the thought experiment conducted in the 
previous chapter. Suppose now that we need a drawing of a regular heptadecagon 
that is as precise as possible for some important purpose. Which method should 
we now choose? Would we not be irrational to prefer the method that is less 
accurate when actually implemented, even though it may work perfectly in theory?  
 
The second algorithm may be superior in a sense, but Plato would rightly be more 
pleased with a geometer who had discovered the first. For this subject matter – 
within the context of Public Acceptance, where the Intellectual Virtues apply – the 
relevant comparison is the first column. In evaluating the two Algorithms qua 
pieces of mathematics we are concerned with their abstract content and not the 
empirical conditions under which they can be put into practice effectively. It is 
therefore clear that only Algorithm 6.2, but not Algorithm 6.3, gives an acceptable 
solution to the construction problem studied by Gauss.  
 
Over the next four sections, I shall argue that Probabilistic Arguments are likewise 
unacceptable in the context of Public Acceptance. The cases are disanalogous in 
two ways, however. Firstly, in comparing the Trial Division and Rabin-Miller 
algorithms we do actually want to put them into practice, and for the results to 
gain Public Acceptance. We are not simply studying their formal properties in the 
abstract. Secondly, Algorithm 3.13 can get us a real prime number: in all 
likelihood, 66,997,813 is as genuine a prime as 48,140,819. If this is true, it will 
have provided us with an acceptable solution in the sense that the final answer 
given at the end is not deficient in any way. However, the Intellectual Virtues 
apply to entire discourses and not just to their conclusions.  
 
 
6.ii. Probabilistic Arguments Reconsidered 
 
‘In testing primality of very large numbers chosen at random, the chance of 
stumbling upon a value that fools the Fermat test is less than the chance that 
cosmic radiation will cause the computer to make an error in carrying out a 
‘correct’ algorithm. Considering an algorithm to be inadequate for the first 
reason but not for the second illustrates the difference between mathematics 
and engineering.’ – Hal Abelson and Gerald J. Sussman 286 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Hal Abelson and Gerald J. Sussman, Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), section 1.2. 
Table 6.7, showing accuracies. 𝑝!"# and 𝑞!"# are the 
Implementation Errors, 𝑞!"# is the Internal Error of 
Algorithm 6.3, and we may assume that 𝑞!"# + 𝑞!"# < 𝑝!"#. 
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We now begin the assault on Probabilistic Arguments in earnest. Let us first 
reconstruct the underlying logic of our main probabilistic argument. 
 
Major Premiss: ℙ 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚  3.13  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠  𝑎  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒   < 𝜀 = 10!!",!!! 
 
Minor Premiss: 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚  3.13  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑    66,998,713  
 
Conclusion: 66,998,713  𝑖𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 
 
 
In Chapter 4, we raised a worry about whether a third party reading the argument 
can ever really have independent knowledge that the event expressed by the minor 
premiss actually occurred, though we ultimately did not consider this objection 
decisive.  In Section 6.v below we raise further issues about the rule of inference 
appealed to here. Before that, however – in this section, and in the following three 
– we show that the two premisses rest upon assumptions that cannot be established 
in an acceptable way. The justification of these premisses involves the following 
theorem, restated here for convenience: 
 
Theorem 6.8. 
 
Let 𝑛!,𝑛!,𝑛!,… be a sequence of candidates chosen randomly and independently 
from the set 2!", 2!" + 1,… , 2!" − 1 . 
 
Suppose that for each candidate 𝑛! in turn we randomly choose 16,613 elements 
from 1,… ,𝑛! − 1  and test whether any of these are witnesses to the 
compositeness of 𝑛!. 
 
We output the first candidate for which no witnesses are found. 
 
Then this procedure produces a prime number with a probability of at least 1− 𝜀, 
where 𝜀 = 10!!",!!!. 
 
 
The statement of Theorem 6.8 here involves the concept of ‘random choosing’. As 
was made clear our discussion of Univocality in Section 5.v, we ought to get clear 
on this phrase and ask what it really amounts to. Mathematical sense is made of 
the concept using the theory of discrete random variables initiated by Andreas 
Kolmogorov in the 1930’s.287 We will now briefly review the basics of his system, 
to gain a deeper insight into what is going on here. 
 
Intuitively, the theory of random variables is best explained in the context of 
performing an experiment whose outcome is uncertain. Examples of experiments 
are tossing a coin and recording the number of accidents on a stretch of motorway 
in one hour. We now make some definitions, introducing only as much generality 
as is necessary for our purposes.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Andrey Kolmogorov, Foundations of the Theory of Probability (New York: Chelsea, 1956). 
This is by far the most widely accepted approach, and though other approaches are available, this 
does not affect the argument.  
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By the term ‘sample space’, we denote the set of possible outcomes of the 
experiment. For instance, for the two experiments described in the previous 
paragraph, the sample spaces are {ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠, 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠} and ℕ = {0,1,2,3… } respectively. 
Hence, although the members of Ω  might be given numerically, this is not 
necessarily the case. For our purposes, we also need only consider cases where the 
sample space is countable.  
 
Definition 6.10.  
 
A sample space is a countable non-empty set Ω. 
 
 
We also define ‘events’ as follows. 
 
Definition 6.11. 
 
An event 𝐸 ⊆ Ω is a subset of the sample space. 
 
 
For the second experiment, one event might be that an even number of accidents 
occurs during the one-hour interval observed. In rolling a normal die, two distinct 
events might be rolling an odd number and rolling a prime number. We say an 
event 𝐸 has ‘occurred’ if the outcome of the experiment is contained in 𝐸. 
 
Next we introduce a structure onto these events. 
 
Definition 6.12. 
 
Suppose ℱ is a collection of events. Then ℱ is called an event space iff the 
following three conditions are met: 
 
1. Ω ∈ ℱ 
2. If 𝐸 ∈ 𝐹 then 𝐸! ∈ ℱ.  
3. If 𝐸!,𝐸!,… ,𝐸! ∈ ℱ then 𝐸!!!!! ∈ ℱ. 
 
 
Such a collection of subsets of Ω is called a ‘𝜎-algebra’. In rolling a die, where the 
sample space is Ω = {1,2,3,4,5,6}, for most applications we can usefully take ℱ to 
be the set of all 2! = 64 subsets of Ω: 
 ℱ = {∅, 1 , 2 ,… , {2,3,4,5,6},Ω}. 
 
 
In essence, a random variable is a way of assigning a numerical value to each 
outcome of the experiment. It is thus neither ‘random’, nor a variable: it is in fact a 
function. It must also be measurable: that is, for any real number 𝑥, the pre-image 
of 𝑥 in Ω must always be a member of ℱ. 
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Definition 6.13. 
 
A random variable is a function   𝑋:Ω → ℝ  such that 𝑋!! 𝑥 ∈ ℱ      ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ, 
where 𝑋!! 𝑥 = {𝜔 ∈ Ω|𝑋 𝜔 = 𝑥}. 
 
 
For the first experiment described above, we might decide to stipulate 𝑋 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠 = 1 and 𝑋 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 = 0. With the second we may simply take 𝑋 as the 
identity function, as the outcomes of the experiment are already given as real 
numbers. Next we state conditions for ascribing probabilities to the events in an 
event space ℱ in a way that is intuitively consistent. 
 
Definition 6.14. 
 
A probability function (or probability measure) is a function 𝒫:ℱ → ℝ such 
that the following three conditions are met: 
 
1. For all events 𝐸 ∈ ℱ, 𝒫 𝐸 ≥ 0. 
2. 𝒫 Ω = 1. 
3. For all 𝐸,𝐹 ∈ ℱ,   if 𝐸⋂𝐹 = ∅ then 𝒫 𝐸 ∪ 𝐹 = 𝒫 𝐸 + 𝒫(𝐹). 
 
 
Definition 6.15. 
 
A probability space is a triple (Ω,ℱ,𝒫) subject to the above conditions. 
 
 
Lastly, we are now able to define the probability mass function of the random 
variable 𝑋, using the preimage in Ω of elements of 𝐼𝑚(𝑋) ⊂ ℝ and the probability 
function 𝒫. 
 
Definition 6.16. 
 
Let (Ω,ℱ,𝒫)  be a probability space. The probability mass function for a 
random variable 𝑋:Ω → ℝ is a function 𝑝!: 𝐼𝑚(𝑋) → ℝ given by  
 𝑝! 𝑥 = 𝒫(𝑋!! 𝑥 ) = 𝒫({𝜔 ∈ Ω|𝑋 𝜔 = 𝑥}) 
 
We often write ℙ(𝑋 = 𝑥) instead of 𝑝! 𝑥 . 
 
 
As a familiar example, consider again the experiment of rolling a fair die together 
with the natural probability function 𝒫 1 = 𝒫 2 = ⋯ = 𝒫 6 = !!, which 
extends uniquely to the function 𝒫 E = |!|!  for any 𝐸 ⊆ Ω = {1,2,3,4,5,6}. We 
can then obtain familiar results such as  ℙ 𝑋  𝑖𝑠  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 = !! = !!. This is an example 
of a discrete uniform random variable – that is, one with a finite image set 𝐼𝑚 𝑋 = {𝑥!, 𝑥!,… , 𝑥!} and with ℙ 𝑋 = 𝑥! = !! for each 𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
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Using this concept of a discrete uniform random variable, we can now give a 
rigorous restatement of Theorem 6.8. 
 
 
Theorem 6.17. 
 
Let (𝑁!,𝑁!,𝑁!,… )  be an infinite sequence of independent discrete uniform 
random variables, each taking values in the set 2!", 2!" + 1,… , 2!" − 1 . 
 
Let (𝐴!,!,𝐴!,!,… ,𝐴!,!""!#)    , (𝐴!,!,𝐴!,!,𝐴!,!,…𝐴!,!""!#)    , …   be an infinite set 
of sequences of random variables, each of length 16,613, and where the 𝐴!,! are 
independent discrete uniform random variables on {1,… ,𝑁! − 1}. 
 
For each positive natural number 𝑖  and each natural number 𝑗  with 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤16,613 we define a random variable 𝑌!,! as follows: 
 
 𝑌!,! =         1                𝑖𝑓𝐴!,!   𝑖𝑠  𝑎  𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠  𝑡𝑜  𝑁!  0                  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                   
   
 
Now define another infinite sequence of random variables 𝑍!,𝑍!,… as follows: 
 𝑍! = 𝑌!,!!!",!"#!!!  
 
 
So that 𝑍! is zero if and only if no witnesses have been found for 𝑁!. 
 
Lastly, we put 𝑟 = min  {𝑖      𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡  𝑍! = 0} and then 𝑁 = 𝑁!. 
 
Then ℙ 𝑁  𝑖𝑠  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 < 𝜀 = 10!!",!!!.  
 
 
This second statement of the theorem has no reliance on the mysterious and 
hitherto corporeal-sounding concept of ‘random choosing’. Random variables are 
simply functions, and the theory of probability is the study of the formal properties 
of these functions. The theory of probability is thus a subfield as rigorous as any 
other branch of pure mathematics. However, for our argument to get running, we 
will need to venture beyond this formalism. Consider again the argument. 
 
 
Major Premiss: ℙ 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚  3.13  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠  𝑎  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒   < 𝜀 = 10!!",!!! 
 
Minor Premiss: 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚  3.13    𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑    66,998,713  
 
Conclusion: 66,998,713  𝑖𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 
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As we have said, there is a further assumption that needs to be discharged here. 
Theorem 6.17 applies only when we have some sequences of independent discrete 
uniform random variables. In being able to successfully run algorithm 3.13, the 
compiler needs access to a random number generator: a device that supplies us 
with a stream of numbers. For the premisses to be true, we need it to be the case 
that the discrete uniform distribution gives the correct probability mass function 
for modeling the output of this random number generator. However, the meaning 
of this claim has not been fixed by anything we have said so far. We discuss this 
further in the next section, where it will become clear that it is not a mathematical 
question at all, but a question for the philosophy of probability.  
 
 
6.iii. Interpreting Probability Statements 
 
‘It is unanimously agreed that statistics depends somehow on probability. 
But, as to what probability is and how it is connected with statistics, there 
has seldom been such complete disagreement and breakdown of 
communication since the Tower of Babel.’ – Leonard Savage 288  
 
In the previous section, we saw that for the premisses of our Probabilistic 
Argument to be true we need it to be the case that the discrete uniform distribution 
gives the correct probability mass function for the output of our random number 
generator. The general question of when a given probability function is 
appropriate for modeling a concrete experiment is the philosophical problem of the 
interpretation of probability. But there is no settled account of how best to resolve 
this problem: only controversy and disagreement.  
 
This disagreement concerns not only the details but is even about broadly what 
kind of account is needed. Is probability a logical concept, connecting bodies of 
evidence with hypotheses? Does it ascribe physical properties to experimental 
setups? Or is probability an epistemic notion – either determined by objective 
evidential conditions, or simply by subjective doxastic states? As we shall see 
shortly, all of these responses have been given.289 There is thus a concern about 
whether Probabilistic Arguments are acceptable from the perspective of 
Univocality. This is a stark contrast to the mathematical theory of probability 
proper, which carefully avoids the issue here:  
 
‘The axioms of probability theory are set up so that abstract probabilities 
can be computed readily, but nothing is said about what probability really 
signifies, or how this concept can be applied meaningfully to the actual 
world.’290  
 
Just as Hilbert’s terms ‘points, ‘lines’, and ‘places’ did not require interpretation 
within his axiomatic geometry, the mathematical theory of probability need never 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Leonard Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (New York: Dover, 1972), 2. 
289 This chapter’s discussion of the various interpretations of probability is indebted to Alan Hájek, 
“Interpretations of Probability”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 22nd August 2015, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/ 
290 Donald Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming: Volume 2 (Addison-Wesley: Massachusetts, 
1981), 142. 
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give guidelines for an appropriate choice of the underlying probability function 𝒫. 
It simply leaves it as an arbitrary function, subject only to the conditions of 
Definition 6.14. This definition clearly satisfies both Abstractness and 
Univocality. Likewise, mathematically speaking Ω  is simply defined as an 
arbitrary set, with no mention of experiments. The legitimacy of these definitions 
does not depend on any perceived correspondence with physical reality, though 
failure here might have meant that the theory was not useful.  
 
The norm of Univocality tells us that in order for the premisses of a Probabilistic 
Argument to be acceptable from a mathematical point of view we must give a 
clear interpretation of the claim that the correct probability mass function for our 
random number generator is given by the discrete uniform distribution. However, 
it may be that this problem is not insuperable. Let us not overstate what is 
required: we need not resolve the general philosophical problem of the 
interpretation of probability in its entirety, but may simply stipulate a definition 
that will be adequate for this particular kind of experiment. However, I shall argue 
that none of the available interpretations will resolve the matter in a way that is 
acceptable from the perspective of both Abstractness and Explicitness. 
 
Before proceeding with the argument, we first need to take note of another 
ambiguity in the problem. For our probability mass function may apply in two 
ways here. It can apply either directly to the hardware: the random number 
generating device itself, considered as a physical system. Alternatively, it can 
apply to the software this system runs: as a mathematical property of the 
algorithms used to generate the random numbers. Consequently, there will be two 
interpretations of the minor premiss as well. It could indicate that a particular 
corporeal event has occurred – that the physical random number generator did not 
find any numbers meeting the conditions for witnesshood for the candidate given. 
Or, it could also express a mathematical property of the number generating 
software: that it does not generate any such numbers. 
 
The argument that no available interpretation is satisfactory will now proceed in 
three parts. In the rest of this section, we briefly discuss logical probability. In the 
next section, we consider the two remaining kinds of interpretations – physicalist 
and epistemic – as they apply directly to the hardware itself, showing that neither 
will be suitable. In Section 6.v, I give a parallel argument when the interpretations 
are taken to apply to the software running the algorithm. 291 
 
The theory of logical probability is so called because it regards probability as 
primarily applying to propositional inferences. According to this interpretation, 
whose noted proponents include Peirce, Keynes, Boole and Carnap, the probability 
associated with an inference from a given body of evidence 𝐸 to an hypothesis 𝐻 
encapsulates the degree to which 𝐸  provides evidential support for 𝐻 . In 
evaluating probabilities we must thus consider a class of relevantly similar 
circumstances where inferences of this kind apply. This degree of support may be 
quantified as the proportion of instances when the inference yields us a true belief 
rather than a false one. Pierce elaborates: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 These sections will include discussion of the frequency interpretation, which is given both 
hardware and software-based formulations. 
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‘The inference from the premise, 𝐴, to the conclusion, 𝐵, depends, as we 
have seen, on the guiding principle, that if a fact of the class 𝐴 is true, a fact 
of the class 𝐵  is true. The probability consists of the fraction whose 
numerator is the number of times in which both 𝐴 and 𝐵 are true, and whose 
denominator is the total number of times in which 𝐴 is true, whether 𝐵 is so 
or not.’292 
 
It is not clear how such a definition can apply here. We are not looking to quantify 
relationships between hypotheses and bodies of evidence at all, but rather, to 
understand the conditions under which a random number generator should be 
modeled by a discrete uniform probability distribution on {1,… ,𝑛}. The only 
conceivable way this definition could apply is to let 𝐸 be the claim that 𝑋 is a 
random variable representing the output of our random number generator and let 𝐻!   be the hypothesis that 𝑋 = 𝑘 for each 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛. If we then take Peirce’s 
proportional interpretation of the strength of evidential support, we arrive at 
simply another way of saying that the random number generator will output each 
element of {1,… ,𝑛} with the same proportional frequency. This idea will be 
discussed later, under the guise of the frequency interpretation. 
 
 
6.iv. Hardware-Based Approaches  
 
In this section, we consider both epistemic and physicalist (including frequency) 
interpretations of probability as they apply to a random number generator qua 
physical piece of hardware. Crandall and Pomerance suggest one such method for 
generating random numbers using a physical process: 
 
‘Aim a microwave receiving dish at the remote heavens, listening to the 
black-body “fossil” radiation from the early cosmos, and digitize that signal 
to create a random bitstream.’293 
 
In applying directly to a corporeal entity, any such interpretation must fail to meet 
Abstractness. When the premisses are set out in full then our argument will be 
seen to contain propositions that essentially refer to a physical system. However, 
because one might take the view that it is worthwhile to sacrifice Abstractness in 
this instance in return for the other benefits probabilistic algorithms can bring, we 
will also discuss each of the available interpretations in more detail. We will see 
that each is attended with its own peculiar problems when employed in this 
context. I further argue that none of these interpretations can be applied in a way 
that is acceptable from the perspective of Explicitness. 
 
Let us begin by discussing the classical theory of probability. This interpretation 
was perhaps first anticipated by Cardano in his Liber de Ludo Aleae, and discussed 
by Leibniz, Bernoulli, de Moivre. Another noted source is the Fermat-Pascal 
correspondence – especially their discussion of games of chance. This was 
occasioned by a question posed by the Chevalier de Meré, who was interested in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Red and the Black”, in The World of Mathematics, ed. James 
Newman (New York: Dover, 1956), 1336. 
293 Crandall and Pomerance, Prime Numbers, 361. 
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the problem of how to split winnings fairly when such games were interrupted 
before their completion.294 But arguably the most influential statement of the 
theory is due to Laplace: 
 
‘The theory of Chance consists in reducing all the events of the same kind 
to a certain number of cases equally possible, that is to say, to such as we 
may be equally undecided about in regard to their existence, and in 
determining the number of cases favourable to the event whose probability 
is sought. The ratio of this number to that of all the cases possible is the 
measure of this probability, which is thus simply a fraction whose 
numerator is the number of favourable cases and whose denominator is the 
number of all the cases possible.’295 
 
The idea, then, is to apportion probabilities equally amongst cases between which 
the evidence is equally balanced, or between which our total information is 
indifferent. Consider again the experiment of throwing a die that is made from 
uniform material. There is no reason to think the outcome will be any particular 
number rather than another, and so we assign each outcome equal probability. 
Similar examples are common in probability and statistics textbooks. The 
following example is fictitious but may be taken as typical: 
 
Suppose I have a bag with 8 balls, each identical except that 5 are red and 3 
are yellow. I put my hand in and pull a ball out without looking. What are 
the chances I pull out a red ball? 
 
Laplace gives his definition immediately after his even more famous statement of 
the principle of causal determinism. So accordingly, if we know to a sufficient 
degree the initial conditions of a particular experiment, we may know the outcome 
with certainty: ‘probability is relative, in part to this ignorance, in part to our 
knowledge.’296 It is clear then that the classical interpretation of probability is 
indeed epistemic in character. Probabilistic statements do not give objective 
descriptions of external states of affairs, but rather, indicate something about the 
evidential state of those who utter them.  
 
As we saw with epistemic probabilities more generally in Chapter 3, this 
interpretation is clearly problematic from the perspective of the Practical Virtues. 
Most of the time enquirers will have different epistemic states, damaging 
Consensus, and the probabilities may be updated over time, damaging 
Permanence. So this interpretation is unsuitable for bringing Probabilistic 
Arguments into compliance with the demands of Univocality within the context of 
Public Acceptance for these same reasons. However, we will also point out a 
further problem with epistemic interpretations in this context.  	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Suppose we take a newspaper and extract all the numbers found written anywhere 
within it, forming them into a list. We then pick a number at random from our list 
and record its first non-zero digit. The sample space for this experiment is 1,2,… ,9 . Supposing we know nothing else about this situation. Then we have no 
reason to believe that the outcome will be any particular integer rather than 
another, and so the classical theory of probability suggests we apply a uniform 
distribution. However, doing so would be ill advised here, because – somewhat 
surprisingly – the true probability has been empirically determined to be as 
follows: 
 𝑝 𝑑 = log!"(1+ !!) 
 
This is known as ‘Benford’s Law’, and has a number of partial and overlapping 
explanations.297 In establishing this result, we take empirical observation to trump 
the application of the classical theory in this instance. This is a serious problem for 
the classical interpretation: it could be that our evidence is indifferent between 
every possible outcome only because we lack important knowledge about the 
experimental setup. It is not enough to plead ignorance: if the true probabilities are 
not in fact uniform, this may affect the running of our algorithm. We need to have 
positive knowledge of the correct assignment.  
 
Next we discuss the subjective interpretation of probability, which is largely due to 
Frank P. Ramsey.298 Ramsey was sceptical about the existence of objective logical 
relations between pieces of evidence and hypotheses, and hence the 
determinateness of the assignments suggested by the logical interpretation 
discussed in the previous section. He argued instead that probability is the ‘logic 
of partial belief’; the degree of credence experienced by agents – specified to be in 
some sense rational, to avoid consequences of the kinds of statistical biases 
discussion in Section 3.vi – in the face of uncertainty and in response to particular 
situations or bodies of evidence. This conception of probability thus lives up to its 
name: ‘Probabilistic reasoning – always to be understood as subjective – merely 
stems from our being uncertain about something.’299 
 
Clearly, the same problem just raised appears again. The naïve approach of fitting 
a uniform distribution to the newspaper data is not indicative of a failure of 
rationality per se, but merely a lack of empirical knowledge. But as well as this, 
there are also further problems with both Abstractness and Univocality that will 
prove to be insurmountable.  To assert that our random number generator is such 
that rational agents would give equal assent to the propositions that it will output 
each number in the range automatically brings into our Probabilistic Arguments 
the concepts ‘rational’, ‘agent’, and ‘belief’. These are notions that find their 
application not to abstracta but to complex intentional systems such as ourselves, 
and which cannot be formulated sufficiently clearly or precisely for the purposes 
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of mathematical theorising. For instance, ‘belief’ has typically been understood 
here in terms of ideal betting or exchange behaviour: 
 
‘Let us suppose that an individual is obliged to evaluate the rate 𝑝 at which 
he would be ready to exchange the possession of an arbitrary sum 𝑆  (positive 
or negative) dependent on the occurrence of a given event 𝐸 , for the 
possession of the sum 𝑝𝑆; we will say by definition that this number 𝑝 is the 
measure of the degree of probability attributed by the individual considered 
to the event 𝐸, or, more simply, that 𝑝 is the probability of 𝐸 (according to 
the individual considered; this specification can be implicit if there is no 
ambiguity).’300 
 
Moreover, in being so explicitly subjective the concept thus elucidated is again 
clearly unsuitable for our purposes here because there is explicit provision for the 
possibility that different agents disagree in assignments. Again, licensing 
propositions expressing subjective probability statements in the context of Public 
Acceptance would therefore damage both Consensus and Permanence.  
 
Let us now see if physicalist accounts of probability can avoid these problems with 
modeling our random number-generating hardware. Consider first the best systems 
approach of David Lewis, which builds on his account of the laws of nature.301 
Lewis regards the laws of nature as the theoretical framework that gives a 
description of the universe that is the best possible in terms of theoretical virtues 
such as simplicity and strength (i.e. predictive power). If we include probabilistic 
theories such as quantum mechanics, then we can introduce another theoretical 
virtue called ‘fit’. A framework has more fit than another if the actual history of 
the universe is asserted to be more probable within that framework. We then 
ascribe probabilities to particular experiments just in case the ultimate laws of 
nature describe them in a probabilistic manner. 
 
Again, whilst interesting, Lewis’ efforts will not be of much help to us here. For 
although there is strong evidence for quantum mechanics, it is still not an 
attractive idea to hold mathematics hostage to empirical enquiry. We are currently 
hardly in a position to give a sufficiently confident answer to the ultimate theory 
of everything, and yet it appears that it would be necessary for us to do so before 
we could sure that we were ascribing the appropriate probability function to our 
random number generator.  
 
A second physicalist account is the propensity interpretation. This framework has 
received perhaps its fullest development in the hands of Karl Popper,302 though it 
was anticipated by Peirce in 1910.303 Like Lewis’ best systems theory, it is 	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intended to constitute an objective description of the physical world. This time we 
ascribe to the random number generator (or perhaps to the entire physical set-up) a 
certain kind of propensity, or disposition, to yield each possible outcome – either 
in a single case or in the long run.  
 
The approach seems promising though we might again worry that the notion of 
propensity cannot be formulated with sufficient precision to comply with 
Univocality. Consider in particular Pierce’s interpretation of assigning the usual 
discrete uniform probability distribution to a die: 
 
‘The statement means that the die has a certain ‘would-be’; and to say that 
the die has a ‘would-be’ is to say that it has a property, quite analogous to 
any habit that a man might have.’304  
 
Later in the section we will enquire how quantitative knowledge of these 
propensities might be achieved. But first let us discuss one final physicalist 
interpretation of probability.  
 
The final theory we shall consider is the frequency interpretation, developed in an 
1876 work by Venn.305 Other names associated with the frequency approach are 
Reichenbach, von Mises, and Fisher. In the next section, we will see that it can be 
given a software interpretation: here we again understand it empirically, as 
applying to the hardware used to generate the numbers. In its more tenable 
versions, it states that the probability function 𝒫:ℱ → ℝ!!  is to assign the 
numerical value 𝑞 to the probability of the event 𝐸 ∈ ℱ if and only if 𝑞 is the long-
term limiting proportion into which outcomes of the experiment would fall into the 
set  𝐸 ∈ Ω if the experiment were repeated infinitely many times. 
 
The frequency approach is highly popular with both statisticians and natural 
scientists, so let us examine this definition in more detail. Suppose that we have an 
actual experimental situation with a set of possible outcomes Ω, and whose 
outcome is modeled by a single random variable 𝑋:⟶ ℝ. Imagine now that we 
were to repeat the experiment infinitely many times ‘under similar conditions’ and 
obtain successive outcomes 𝜔!, 𝜔!,… . We could then define sequences 𝑥!  and 𝑦!  by setting 𝑥! = 𝑋(𝜔!) for all 𝑖 and then 𝑦! = 𝑗     1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑖    𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑥! = 𝑘} , so 
that 𝑦! is the number of times that 𝑋 takes the value 𝑘 in the first 𝑖  repetitions of 
the experiment. This interpretation of probability says that we should define ℙ 𝑋 = 𝑘  to be the number 𝑝 if and only if lim!⟶! !!! = 𝑝.  
 
As the scare-quotes suggest, there are problems in making sense of the phrase 
‘under similar conditions’ here. In many cases, if the initial conditions are 
sufficiently similar then we will always get the same outcome each time: for 
instance, mechanical coin flipping machines exist which can reliably give a 
predetermined outcome.306 In general we will not be able to give clear necessary 
and sufficient conditions but only indicate roughly what is meant here, perhaps 	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through the use of examples. As we shall see presently, there are problems with 
how we would ever know this interpretation to apply. Indeed, we may also worry 
that in practice it will never apply, as the Cauchy/Weierstrass limit formulation is 
so exacting that even a tiny asymmetry in our die will prevent it from being 
literally true.307 To contrast the character of an application of this definition with a 
piece of genuine mathematics, we give a short discussion of a related theorem. 
 
The law of large numbers applies when we have a countably infinite sequence 𝑋!  
of random variables defined on a sample space Ω (that is, a sequence of functions 𝑋!:Ω⟶ ℝ) which are pairwise independent and such that each has the same 
probability mass function with mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎!. This time, for each 𝜔 in Ω 
we define an associated sequence 𝑥!!  with 𝑥!! = 𝑋!(𝜔) for all 𝑖, and a second 
sequence 𝑥!!  as the arithmetic mean of the first 𝑗 terms of the first sequence, i.e. 𝑥!! = !! 𝑥!! +⋯+ 𝑥!! . 
 
If the variance is finite, the strong law of random numbers says that however the 
underlying probability function 𝒫 is defined we always have that: 
 𝒫 𝜔  |    lim!⟶! 𝑥!! = 𝜇 = 1 
 
 
Likewise, the weak law of large numbers, which does not require the variance to 
be finite, says that  
 ∀𝜀 > 0, lim!⟶!𝒫 𝜔  |      𝜇 − 𝜀 < 𝑥!! < 𝜇 + 𝜀   = 1 
 
 
There are also various generalisations that relax other conditions. Unlike a 
concrete application of the frequency definition, these results can be explicitly 
proved like any other piece of genuine mathematics, such as the Pythagorean 
Theorem. Being authentic theorems, their veracity is unquestioned. 
 
Note also that for these two mathematical results there is a single experiment with 
outcome 𝜔 that determines the value of all the 𝑋!, and so when we state each 
theorem we can make use of the usual multiplicative definition of pairwise 
statistical independence: 
 ℙ 𝑋!! = 𝑥!, . . ,𝑋!! = 𝑥! = ℙ 𝑋!! = 𝑥! …ℙ 𝑋!! = 𝑥!  
 
where the 𝑛! are distinct. 
 
But for the frequentist interpretation, though we likewise need some condition 
saying that successive repetitions of the experiment do not affect each other, this 
mathematical formulation will not be available because there is no larger 
probability function applying to joint outcomes of successive repetitions of the 	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experiment. We must therefore rely on the intuitive concept of causal 
independence, which though having an important place in empirical science is less 
precise than its mathematical counterpart.  
 
These physicalist interpretations of probability each give empirical conditions for 
a discrete uniform distribution to apply to a given experiment. Let us now think 
about how we might secure knowledge that they are met, returning to the simple 
case of throwing a die. I have now in front of me a die on the table. Suppose now I 
am to roll it. Regardless of which interpretation of probability we advocate, it is 
attractive to believe that I know that the chances of rolling any of the six possible 
numbers are identically one in six. But how exactly do I know that this is the 
appropriate probability distribution for the experiment? How do we determine 
what the die’s propensity to roll each number is, or the frequency with which each 
outcome will arise if we were to roll it over and over again, infinitely many times? 
 
One important line of thought here is the symmetry of the die: its uniform physical 
construction suggests the discrete uniform distribution. There are of course people 
who take this kind of question far more seriously: how do Last Vegas hotels 
ensure that a batch of dice intended for use in one of their casinos are fair? One 
would imagine there are a number of methods here: attention to the manufacturing 
process, perhaps supplemented with empirical tests involving statistical frequency 
analysis, whereby samples of dice are tested to see if they deviate from expected 
behaviour when thrown a certain number of times.  
 
No physical die is ever perfectly symmetrical on a sufficiently small scale, 
however: these enquiries are only approximate. If we had sophisticated enough 
measuring equipment, we would perhaps realise that we should be giving 
probabilities differing slightly from 1/6. The actual die I have here is made from 
wood: how will the direction of the grain affect how it bounces? The numbers are 
marked with painted depressions: how does this affect its weight distribution? We 
are not sure exactly how it will be thrown either – so it is not clear what impact 
these inequities might have. But perhaps we should be less sure that a uniform 
distribution really is the true answer. Certainly it will not be possible to fully 
establish this claim through a chain of reasoning that is acceptable from the 
standpoint of Explicitness. Indeed, research suggests that a hand-flipped coin is 
biased towards returning to its initial orientation:308 the probability it comes up the 
same way is around 0.51.  
 
This example makes clear that our justification for assigning the uniform 
distribution to a random number generator qua physical piece of hardware cannot 
comply with Explicitness. Thus concludes our discussion of the hardware 
approach. For all the interpretations of probability available here, the conditions 
given will clearly fail Abstractness. Moreover, in practice a justification for 
applying a uniform distribution cannot be given without the violation of 
Explicitness. Each approach was also shown to have additional problems in this 
context. In the next section, we consider the application of probability directly to 
the software being run on our machines when implementing our algorithms. 	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6.v. Software-Based Approaches 
 
The arguments of the last chapter show that we cannot regard probability 
statements as referring directly to a random number generator qua physical piece 
of hardware if our four Intellectual Virtues are to be adhered to. In this section we 
apply our distributions directly to the underlying software, thus avoiding a conflict 
with Abstractness. Nevertheless, we shall see that no argument capable of being 
broken down into clear and simple steps can be given for the conclusion that the 
discrete uniform probability distribution correctly models our random number 
generator. Probabilistic Arguments therefore inevitably fail to meet with the 
Intellectual Virtue of Explicitness. 
 
When so-called random numbers are supplied by a computer, typically what 
happens in practice is that the compiler uses a pseudorandom number generator 
that is in fact entirely deterministic, though it is thought hard to predict its 
behaviour in practice (again this often cannot be proved). Such pseudorandom 
number generators take as input a ‘seed’ value – usually taken from the 
computer’s internal clock – and repeatedly apply a complicated and (apparently) 
difficult-to-invert number-theoretic function to it, producing a string of numbers 
recursively. 
 
One way of modeling these generators is to regard the seed value 𝜔 as the 
outcome of the physical experiment of running the program. Once the seed value 
is determined then so is our sequence, and ultimately the output too. So we can 
regard the generator as a representing a function 𝐹:Ω → ℕ. But this would be a 
return to the hardware approach because we would be modeling a physical 
experiment. So instead we focus on the sequences generated and enquire under 
what conditions we can consider them to be random. Commenting on this 
situation, von Neumann wrote in 1951 that ‘Anyone who considers arithmetical 
methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin.’309 The use of 
such pseudorandom sequences is common in practice, however, and this is the 
approach taken. So let us first get more acquainted with pseudorandom sequences. 
 
We begin with a highly simple example: a linear congruential generator. To 
construct a sequence of random numbers between 0 and 𝑚 − 1, we begin with a 
seed. In this case, I’ll take the current time in minutes – it is 14.51, so 891. We 
then compute successive terms using a recurrence relation as follows: 
 𝑥!!! ≡ 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏  mod  𝑚  
 
 
Arbitrarily picking 𝑎 = 1000 and 𝑏 = 314, we use this to generate a sequence of 
possible witnesses to the primality of 1729: 
 891, 879, 982, 242, 254, 151, 891, 879,… 
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The sequence is periodic with a period of only 6! We would have been fortunate 
here because 891 is a witness: 
 891!"#$ = 1  𝑚𝑜𝑑  1729  891!"#   = 1  𝑚𝑜𝑑  1729  891!"#   = 1  𝑚𝑜𝑑  1729  891!"#   = 1  𝑚𝑜𝑑  1729  891!"#   = 1  𝑚𝑜𝑑  1729  891!"       = 1065  𝑚𝑜𝑑  1729.  
 
 
However, it is clear that this particular method is inadequate for our general 
purposes. Any such sequence must also be periodic if it is generated recursively: 
eventually we must arrive at a term previously encountered, as there are only 
finitely many terms to choose from. Past a certain point it would then not matter 
how many IMC tests we perform in total: only the number of distinct elements in 
the sequence will be important. If this number is more than (𝑛 − 1)/4, then the 
test is guaranteed to be deductively conclusive. But it might be much less than 
this, as the example just given shows.  
 
Knuth writes ‘Many random number generators in use today are not very good … 
It is not easy to invent a foolproof source of random numbers.’310 He then goes on 
to describe an algorithm he once invented that unexpectedly turns out to yield a 
sequence that eventually becomes constant for some seed values. He comments: 
‘The moral of this story is that random numbers should not be generated with a 
method chosen at random. Some theory should be used.’311 Again, what is required 
here is competence – not the rational management of ignorance: we need to have 
positive knowledge that the sequences we are using will work well in practice. So 
as before, the subjectivist approaches are no good here. Let us see if the frequency 
approach fares any better. 
 
We reduce the problem to constructing binary sequences as follows. Suppose we 
want to pick an integer from the set 𝑎,𝑎 + 1,… , 𝑏  where 2! ≤ 𝑎 < 𝑏 < 2!. We 
generate 𝑛 − 1 binary bits and see if the resulting number lies in {𝑎,… , 𝑏}. If not, 
we simply discard it and look for another number.  
 
Suppose now that our generator gives us the alternating sequence 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,… 
 
Intuitively, this sequence does not seem ‘random’ at all. Yet it is clear that it meets 
the conditions stipulated by the frequency definition: the proportion of terms equal 
to 0 or 1 tends to 1/2. If we used this for Algorithm 3.13 it would always select 
the same even number 10101010… 101 = 2!" + 2!" +⋯+ 2 in binary, and for 
Rabin-Miller applications more generally would only ever check a single witness. 
 
So, when is a pseudorandom sequence sufficiently ‘random’ to produce the kind of 
results we need in a Rabin-Miller test? What general conditions can we give? As 
Knuth explains, ‘A quantitative definition is needed. It is undesirable to talk about 	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concepts that we do not really understand, especially since many apparently 
paradoxical statements can be made about random numbers.’312 He goes on to 
consider two definitions by earlier authors: 
 
‘D. H. Lehmer (1951): “A random sequence is a vague notion embodying 
the idea of a sequence in which each term is unpredictable to the uninitiated 
and whose digits pass a certain number of tests, traditional with statisticians 
and depending somewhat on the uses to which the sequence is to be put.” 
J. N. Franklin (1962): “The sequence (1) is random if it has every property 
that is shared by all infinite sequences of independent samples of random 
variables from the uniform distribution.”’313 
Concluding that neither definition is adequate, Knuth then writes:  
‘What we really want is a relatively short list of mathematical properties, 
each of which is satisfied by our intuitive notion of a random sequence; 
furthermore, the list is to be complete enough so that we are willing to agree 
that any sequence satisfying these properties is “random.”’314 
As Lehmer suggests, in practical applications theoreticians tend to make use of a 
number of distinct tests to check if a given random number generator is 
appropriate in a given context. Knuth explains: 
 
‘Two kinds of tests are distinguished: empirical tests, for which the 
computer manipulates groups of numbers of the sequence and evaluates 
certain statistics; and theoretical tests, for which we establish characteristics 
of the sequence by using number-theoretic methods based on the recurrence 
rule used to form the sequence.’ 315 
 
Further to the frequency test, Knuth discusses several other such tests: the 
serial correlation test, the run test, the gap test, the maximum-of-𝑡 test, and the 
collision test amongst others. He goes on: 
 
‘The reader probably wonders, “Why are there so many tests?” … The need 
for making several tests has been amply documented. It has been recorded, 
for example, that some numbers generated by a variant of the middle-square 
method have passed the frequency test, gap test, and poker test, yet flunked 
the serial test. Linear congruential sequences with small multipliers have 
been known to pass many tests, yet fail on the run test because there are too 
few runs of length one. The maximum-of-𝑡 test has also been used to ferret 
out some bad generators that otherwise seemed to perform respectably.’316  
 
When a new kind of algorithm is invented, more testing will need to be done to see 
whether a given generator gives good results when paired with it, and new kinds of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 Ibid., 142. 
313 Ibid., 142. 
314 Ibid., 142. 
315 Ibid., 39. 
316 Ibid., 73. 
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applications may even necessitate entirely new tests. Moreover, problems with 
generators have been quite frequent in the past: 
 
‘It seems that just as often as a new random-number generator is developed, 
so, too, is some older scheme shown to be nonrandom enough to be, say, 
“insecure,” or yield misleading results in Monte Carlo simulations.’317  
 
Consider also Knuth’s lamentations on this topic:  
 
‘For more than a decade, the most common random number generators in 
daily use were seriously deficient’.318 
 
Clearly, heuristic tests such as these can never be entirely conclusive: we are 
adopting something like an engineering perspective here, relying on a mixture of 
experience, empirical observation and intuition as well as calculation. The field of 
pseudorandom number generation focuses on developing methods that work well 
in practical applications in cryptography and other applied computer sciences, 
rather than rigorous derivation. In particular, the suitability of a particular 
pseudorandom number generator for a given application can never be established 
in such a way as to comply with the demands of Explicitness.  
 
Let us again compare the situation to a similar one within mathematics proper. It is 
often of interest know whether a given series such as  
 1𝑛!!!!                         or                       1𝑛!!!!!  
 
 
converges or not. In this case, the former (the harmonic series) diverges, whereas 
the latter converges319 to !!!, as shown by Euler. In approaching problems of this 
nature we also we have a number of tests that we can apply, where the spheres of 
application of each test overlap, and no test is universally applicable. These 
include the ratio test, the root test, the comparison test, the alternating sequence 
test, the integral test, and Abel and Dirichlet’s tests. Yet though such tests can be 
inconclusive, when they do yield a definite verdict this always constitutes a 
rigorous proof that the sequence is convergent. Any further testing is then otiose.  
 
In this section, we have seen that software approaches fare no better than hardware 
approaches in giving an account of Probabilistic Arguments that is acceptable 
from the perspective of Univocality. We have seen that there is no determinate, 
objective, operational criterion to tell us when a given pseudorandom sequence 
may be modeled with a discrete uniform distribution for the purposes of a given 
Monte Carlo method. Practitioners instead rely on a series of heuristic tests whose 
application does not meet the demands of Explicitness. In the next section, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Crandall and Pomerance, Prime Numbers, 361. 
318 Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming: Vol 2, 4. 
319 A series 𝑎!!!!!  is said to converge if and only if the sequence 𝑠!  of partial sums 𝑠! =𝑎!!!!!  converges. 
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discuss the nature of inference within Probabilistic Arguments, showing that it 
precludes them from being Formalizable.  
 
 
6.vi. Probabilistic Inference  
 
In this section, I consider Probabilistic Arguments from the perspective of 
Formalizability, the Intellectual Virtue articulated in Section 5.vi. We will see that 
as things stand Probabilistic Arguments cannot be formalised within a standard 
formal system. Moreover, attempts to augment these formal systems to 
accommodate Probabilistic Arguments will also be shown to be problematic. 
Hence, we will show that mathematicians have further reasons to reject these 
arguments in the context of Public Acceptance. 
 
Consider again the form of our Probabilistic Argument from Chapter 3, which I 
will again repeat here for convenience. 
 
 
Major Premiss: ℙ 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚  3.13  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠  𝑎  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒   < 𝜀 = 10!!",!!! 
 
Minor Premiss: 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚  3.13    𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑    66,998,713  
 
Conclusion: 66,998,713  𝑖𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 
 
 
It is clear that the inference from the premisses to the conclusion cannot be 
constructed within the kinds of standard formal system we have discussed. For the 
inferences of such formal systems are always truth preserving. But for arguments 
of this kind – based on Monte Carlo procedures – it is possible for the premisses to 
be true and the conclusion false. So in order to formalise the argument, we need to 
add a new rule of inference to the standard formal systems within which Publicly 
Acceptable mathematics is to be formalised; one that explicitly licenses these 
kinds of inferences. 
 
In an old joke attributed to American philosopher Morris Cohen, logic texts are 
divided into two parts. In the first part, concerning deductive logic, deductive 
fallacies – wherein conclusions are drawn that do not follow logically from the 
premises – are guarded against. In the second part, concerning inductive logic, 
they are endorsed.320 Needless to say, many mathematicians will take the first 
perspective here and curtly dismiss such an inference rule as endorsing a fallacy. 
We will press the matter a little further, however, as inferences of this sort are 
clearly common in natural science as well as everyday life. Nevertheless, I shall 
give two reasons against introducing a new rule of inference of this sort into the 
logic in which Publicly Accepted mathematics is to be formalised. Consider first 
the following argument schema. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 Vincenzo Crupi, “Confirmation”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, introduction, accessed 
17th August 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/ 
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Major Premiss: ℙ 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚  3.13  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠  𝑎  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒   < 𝜀 = 10!!",!!! 
 
Minor Premiss 1: 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚  3.13  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑    𝑁 
 
Minor Premiss 2: 𝑁  𝑖𝑠  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒  
 
 
Conclusion: 𝑁  𝑖𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 
 
 
This argument represents a situation where we have been incredibly unlucky in 
having Algorithm 3.13 fail us by outputting a composite number 𝑁, which we also 
happened to already know was composite (perhaps it ends in an even digit, say). 
Clearly, in this situation and knowing these premisses we would not be justified in 
coming to believe the conclusion. But if the second minor premiss were omitted, 
the argument would be acceptable within our modified formal systems equipped 
with a rule permitting probabilistic inferences. 
 
This shows that the logic of any formal system that could express Probabilistic 
Arguments would not be monotonic. A logic is monotonic if whenever a 
proposition 𝜑 can be deduced from a set of propositions Γ, it can also be deduced 
from any set of propositions Γ′ such that Γ ⊆ Γ′. But choosing a non-monotonic 
logic as the basis for formalizing Publicly Accepted mathematics is unacceptable, 
on pains of sacrificing Permanence. If we were to do so, later practitioners might 
come to know new propositions that invalidate entire classes of earlier inferences. 
Mathematics could therefore no longer be a cumulative hierarchy of theorems that 
grows over time.  
 
Another issue is that unlike rules of inference known to be truth-preserving, 
probabilistic rules of inference cannot be used arbitrarily many times within the 
same argument. To illustrate why not, consider the following iterated iterated 
iterated Monte Carlo Algorithm.  
 
 
Algorithm 6.20 
 
Run Algorithm 3.13 repeatedly until it has generated 10!,!!!,!!! integers. 
 
Assert the proposition expressing the claim that all of these integers (which will 
not all be distinct) are prime. 
 
 
Now, in this case we have a conclusion that is acceptable within our new modified 
formal system, as we may assume there are no unstated premisses that block the 
inference. But this application of the rule of inference is again clearly illegitimate: 
we have relied on it so many times that now it is actually overwhelming unlikely 
that the conclusion will be true. 
 
Again, things would be even worse if we gave a probabilistic proof by induction, 
where the inductive steps were justified only by separate appeals to the 𝜀-rule in 
each instance, so that it was in fact relied upon infinitely many times: 
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Premiss 1: 𝑆(1) 
 
Premiss 2: ∀𝑘,      𝑆(𝑘) ! 𝑆(𝑘 + 1)  
 
 
Conclusion: 𝑆 𝑛     ∀𝑛 ∈ ℕ 
 
 
Why is it that these are illegitimate invocations of the probabilistic inference rule 
when its use in determining that 66,998,713 is prime was not? And how many 
times can we use it, exactly? It is clear that we need an explicit condition here. For 
if it is left to individual judgement in particular cases, then this will introduce the 
possibility of disagreement, damaging Consensus. Moreover, if such a side-
condition has not been given then our new formal systems will be problematic 
from the perspective of proof theory, where we are often interested in proving 
results about the entire class of acceptable derivations within a formal system. But 
if we have not specified how many times the probabilistic rule of inference can be 
appealed to, then the class of acceptable derivations becomes vague. Univocality is 
thus sacrificed, and the rigorous techniques of proof theory cannot be applied. 
 
One idea for overcoming this problem is to introduce a global error constraint that 
applies to derivations as a whole. Suppose a derivation contains a finite number of 
probabilistic inferences with associated errors 𝐸!,𝐸!,… ,𝐸! . As well as the 
requirement that each 𝐸! is less than 𝜀, we can also give a side condition that the 
total error 𝐸 is less than 𝜀. That is: 
 𝐸 = 1− (1− 𝐸!) <!!!! 𝜀 
 
 
Three further problems arise here. The first is of a practical nature. Because in 
practice proof presentations rely on subsidiary results, the total error associated 
with the derivations establishing these must always be taken into account and kept 
track of. Secondly, meeting this side-condition is a holistic property that requires 
us to look at a derivation in its entirety, whereas the techniques of proof theory 
tend to operate by looking at smaller chunks of an argument and using recursion. 
Lastly, there is also again concern about whether the specification of an acceptable 
derivation is sufficiently precise to meet Univocality. In the previous two sections 
we have seen that there may be disagreements about what the correct probability 
of error is. There is no definite procedure available for determining the total 
probability of error exactly: indeed, throughout the thesis we have been working 
only with upper bounds here. 
 
 
6.vii. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have presented semantic, metaphysical, epistemic and logical 
considerations in favour of the conservative view that Probabilistic Arguments 
should not be given as justification in the context of Public Acceptance.  
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Univocality requires us to give a clear meaning to the claim that our random 
number generator should be modeled using a discrete uniform random variable. 
Doing this requires us to choose between the various interpretations of probability 
postulated by theorists hitherto, applied in either a hardware or a software sense. 
Every such application met with insuperable problems with Explicitness, and 
hardware approaches inevitability encounter problems with Abstractness too. 
Lastly, we saw in the final section that Probabilistic Arguments cannot be 
satisfactorily formalised.  
 
We therefore conclude that discourses expressing Probabilistic Arguments cannot 
be brought into compliance with the four Intellectual Virtues of mathematical 
enquiry. 
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7. Should Mathematicians Play Dice? 
 
 
‘Wherever there is any hope of salvage, we will carefully investigate fruitful 
definitions and deductive methods. We will nurse them, strengthen them, 
and make them useful. No one shall drive us out of the paradise which 
Cantor has created for us.’ – David Hilbert321 
 
 
7.i. Concluding Summary 
 
Let us review the argument given so far.  
 
In Chapter 1 we articulated the four Practical Virtues of mathematical enquiry: 
Permanence, Reliability, Consensus and Autonomy. We argued that these were 
highly valuable to mathematicians, and also that insistence on proof prior to 
publication plays a central role in maintaining them. 
 
In Section 1.vi, we then pointed out that these standards are now in danger of 
going into decline, due to the length and complexity of many proofs in 
contemporary mathematics, and the increasing reliance on computers.  
 
In light of these problems, in Chapter 2 we investigated the use of deductive 
techniques in the context of justification. We concluded that only clearly defined 
methods that can be associated with a determinate, quantitative evidential value 
would be suitable for supporting the Public Acceptance of new results, on pain of 
a much more severe deterioration of the Practical Virtues. This given, we 
restricted our attention to probabilistic algorithms. 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we argued that mathematicians are under some circumstances 
rationally obliged to Privately Accept the conclusions of probabilistic algorithms. 
We gave a definition of a ‘Probabilistic Argument’ as a discourse suitable for 
expressing the conclusions yielded by such a method. We then considered relaxing 
the rule of requiring proof for Public Acceptance, to include results endorsed by 
any procedure that yields a falsehood with probability less than 𝜀 = 10!!",!!!. We 
concluded that because of the scope and effectiveness of Monte Carlo techniques, 
this innovation could be a viable solution to maintaining the Practical Virtues. 
 
However, in Chapter 5 we argued that mathematical research also embodies four 
corresponding Intellectual Virtues: Abstractness, Explicitness, Univocality and 
Formalizability. These are shared standards of excellence that partially constrain 
what a good mathematical discourse can now be. And in Chapter 6, we saw that 
Probabilistic Arguments cannot be brought into compliance with them. 
 
We have therefore shown that mathematicians can give reasons for rejecting 
Probabilistic Arguments within the context of Public Acceptance. But are these 
sufficient reasons? How might we respond to the view that we should sacrifice the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 David Hilbert, “Über das Unendliche”, Mathematische Annalen 95 (1926): 161-190. 
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Intellectual Virtues in pursuit of the benefits Probabilistic Arguments can bring, 
both in enhancing the Practical Virtues and for the progress of research in general? 
For we saw in Section 4.vi that probabilistic methods may provide a viable 
solution to the challenges to the Practical Virtues raised in Section 1.vi. And there 
may be kinds of problems that whilst at this time cannot be solved with deductive 
techniques are amenable to probabilistic methods. 
 
Though mathematicians today are likely to value the Intellectual Virtues for their 
own sake, there are also two other routes to their rational justification. Firstly, they 
have direct benefits: we saw in Chapter 5 why adherence to the Intellectual Virtues 
is important for mathematical enquiry to continue to flourish to the extent it does 
today. Modern functional analysis would not be possible without a strict adherence 
to Univocality, for example. Secondly, the Intellectual Virtues were also shown to 
be important for maintaining the Practical Virtues. For instance, Consensus is 
difficult to achieve if Univocality and Explicitness are not met, due to the 
instability of individual intuitive judgement. 
 
The rejoinder may also be countered by consideration of a rival way of protecting 
the Practical Virtues from threats produced by the nature of contemporary 
mathematics. In Section 5.vi, we saw that the Probabilistically Checkable Proofs 
Theorem gives us an immensely powerful way of checking the validity of proofs. 
Moreover, we noted that the scope of this technique extends across all of Publicly 
Accepted mathematics: ‘any mathematical theorem, in any standard formal system 
such as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, can be converted in polynomial time into a 
probabilistically-checkable format.’322 These checks need not be included as part 
of Publicly Accepted mathematics proper, and are merely a highly effective way 
of ascertaining the validity of our deductive arguments. 
 
Making use of this technique requires that our mathematics is Formalizable, which 
is only possible if the other three Intellectual Virtues are also present. One cannot 
Formalize an argument containing empirical premisses; if concepts are not 
unambiguously specified they cannot be identified with suitable formal entities; 
inferences that essentially rely on complex and irreducible intuitive judgements 
cannot be rendered as explicit rules in a formal system. 
 
All things considered, then, mathematicians should continue to ensure that their 
work embodies the Intellectual Virtues. They are therefore not behaving 
irrationally in continuing to reject Probabilistic Arguments as a basis for Public 
Acceptance. This is true even though they are under some circumstances required 
to Privately Accept the results of Monte Carlo algorithms. Such results may even 
be announced, for example in the Journal of Experimental Mathematics – and thus 
drive the direction of future research. However, these claims must be clearly 
separated off from those parts of their work they wish to gain Public Acceptance.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Aaronson, “Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity”, 302. 
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7.ii. Epilogue 
 
Part of our conclusion has been that Public and Private Acceptance may under 
some circumstances come apart. But this is nothing new and indeed is confirmed 
by day-to-day mathematical experience. We often rely on a disparate variety of 
kinds of evidence in coming to believe in our hearts that the answer we have found 
is correct, and may only then even begin looking for the kind of explicit reasons 
suitable for Public Acceptance.  
 
Though I still have not checked it deductively, I have argued that I am rationally 
required to believe the claim that 66,998,713 is prime. The reader is again invited 
either to accept the claim on the argument given thus far or to generate their own 
numbers for potential witnesses. In using a probabilistic algorithm known to be 
highly reliable we have thus arrived, though not by mathematics, at the truth.   
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